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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-Freedom of Information Act-Letters of Warning
and Detention Are Identifiable Records Not Within Investigatory Files
Exemption, And Their Disclosure Is Not a Violation of Due Process.-
Appellee requested disclosure by the Department of Agriculture under the Free-
dom of Information Act' of letters of warning sent to non-federally inspected meat
or poultry processors suspected of being unlawfully engaged in interstate commerce,
information relating to administrative detention of meat or poultry products,'
bi-weekly reports of the Director of the Slaughter Inspection Division, and
minutes of the National Food Inspection Advisory Committee.3 Pursuant to the
enforcement clause of the Act,4 the appellee sought in the United States District
Court of Maryland 5 to compel the appellant, the Secretary of Agriculture, to
produce the items after he had previously refused to do so. Both sides moved
for summary judgment and the appellant moved for dismissal, objecting to dis-
closure of the first two items on the ground that they were part of "investigatory
files" and thus exempt and of the latter two items because they were "inter-
agency or intra-agency" memoranda, also exempt from disclosure under the
Act5 The appellants further argued that the records were not "identifiable ' 8
within the meaning of the Act.9 The district court refused to rule on the latter
two items prior to an in camera inspection of the documents. As to the first two
items, both of the appellants' contentions were rejected and the letters were
ordered disclosed.'0 The appellants contended on appeal that the letters were
part of investigatory files and, additionally, that the due process clause dictated
continued secrecy of the letters." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that all such materials constituted identifiable records, were
not within the "investigatory files" exemption, and that there was no statutory
exemption or constitutional bar to their production. WeUford v. Hardin, 444
F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2. The Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 462 (1970), gives the Secretary of
Agriculture the discretion to prosecute violators "whenever he believes that the public
interest will be adequately served and compliance with the chapter obtained by a suitable
written notice or warning." Id. The Federal Mleat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 676(b), gives
the Secretary a similar option, although limited to "minor violations."
3. Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 176 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.
1971).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
S. Welford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), aft'd, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
7. Id. § 552(b) (5).
9. Id. § 552(a) (3).
9. 315 F. Supp. at 176.
10. Id. at 179.
11. 444 F.2d at 22, 24-25.
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Central to American political philosophy from the inception of the Republic
has been the premise that a well-informed citizenry is the key to democracy.12
Antecedent to the rights of free speech and freedom of the press is the right to
gather information.13 Without this right, the goal of a well-informed citizenry
is endangered. 14
However, it was not until 1946 that the first statutory disclosure plan was
passed. The Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act's
required agencies to publish in the Federal Register, or otherwise make available
to the public, certain governmental information.16 This Act, however, exempted
materials "requiring secrecy in the public interest" or relating "solely to the
12. Former President Johnson recognized this when be signed the Freedom of Information
Act and stated that access to information was "one of our most essential principles." Attorney
General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 20 Ad. L. Rev. 263 (1968). Of course executive and administrative refusal to disclose
information also has its historical roots. See Younger, Secret Papers: Presidents v. Congress,
166 N.Y.L.., Sept. 17, 1971, at 4, col. 3. Most recently in the oral argument on behalf of
the Washington Post in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (per curiam), appellee's counsel suggested that readers of newspapers had a due
process right to know generally. Rogge, The Right to Know, 166 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1971, at
1, col. 4. As Justice Douglas, concurring, stated in this case: "Secrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors." 403 U.S. at 724. Since this
decision, many government bodies have been attacked for impinging on the public's right to
know. See, e.g., Gillers, The Right to Know About the FBI, 166 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1971,
at 4, col. 3; Miller, High Court Secrets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1971, at 47, col. 7; Wise, The
Institution of Lying, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1971, at 47, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1971,
at 46, col. 2 (editorial) (secret trial). See also N.Y. Post, Nov. 8, 1971, at 26, col. 1 (FTC,
SEC, and large corporations).
13. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 838, 843
(1971). The right of newsmen to gather information and to inform the public without fear
of having disclosure of their sources compelled was asserted in Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971). See Comment, Pappas and
Caldwell, The Newsmen's Privilege-Two Judicial Views, 56 Mass. L.Q. 158 (1971); Note,
The Newsman's Privilege and the Constitution, 23 S.C.L. Rev. 436 (1971); Note, The News-
men's Privilege: A Need for Constitutional Protection, 10 Washburn L.J. 387 (1971). An
academic privilege tied to the public's right to know has also been asserted. Reinhold,
Scholars Seeking Right Not to Disclose Sources, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1971, at 29, col. 7.
14. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the Court stated: "The
predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untram-
meled press as a vital source of public information. The newspapers, magazines and other
journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the
public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and
since informed -public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the
suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded
otherwise than with grave concern." Id. at 250. See also H. Cross, The People's Right to
Know 131-32 (1953).
15. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (repealed 1966) (now 8 U.S.C. § 552
(1970)). For the Act's legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
16. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).
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internal management of an agency," final opinions and orders required "for good
cause to be held confidential," and official records sought by persons not "prop-
erly and directly concerned."'. 7 The section was a failure since instead of becom-
ing a vehicle for greater access to government information, it became an excuse
for the withholding of it.'8
In response to the failure of the Public Information section,' Congress, in
1967, passed the Freedom of Information Act.20 This Act has been likened to an
Aristotelian "golden mean" by one commentator,'- and a veritable nullity by
others.22 There are three basic differences between this Act and its predecessorP
First, any person has standing to seek a document2-4 no longer does a party
have to be directly aggrieved. Second, the government has the burden of justify-
ing the withholding of a document.25 The standard is no longer that an agency
may withhold unless there is good reason to disclose; rather an agency must
disclose unless there is good reason to withhold.20 Finally, the Act gives federal
courts the power to make positive use of an injunction and thereby enjoin an
agency from withholding documents which the agency believes are exempted by
the Act.27
The Act is basically uncontroversial except for section b.2 which contains the
17. Id.
18. For example, in 1961, the Secretary of the Navy cited section 3 in ruling that
"'telephone directories fall in the category of information relating to the internal management
of the Navy ... . " 80 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1967). For further criticism of this abuse, see 112
Cong. Rec. 12976 (1966) (remarks of Representative Howard); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong, 2d Sess. 5 (1966) ; HR. Rep. No. 918, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1963) ; S. Rep. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965). It is the consensus of authority that section 3 was counter-
productive to the ends it sought. See Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 48 Texas L. Rev. 1261 (1970); Moss, Public Information
Policies, the APA, and Executive Privilege, 15 Ad. L. Rev. 111, 113-14 (1963); Comment, The
Freedom of Information Act: Access to Law, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 765 (1963); Note, Freedom
of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 Geo. LJ. 18 (1967); Note, The Freedom
of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 150 (1969).
19. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
20. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970)).
21. Address by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, 63rd Annual Meeting
of the American Association of Law Libraries, July 1, 1970, in Rights in Conflict-Reconcil-
ing Privacy With the Public's Right to Know, 63 L. Lib. 3. 551 (1970).
22. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. ChLi. L. Rev. 761, 802-12
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Katz, supra note 18, at 1262.
23. Wozencraft, The Freedom of Information Act-The First 36 Days, 20 Ad. L. Rev.
249 (1968). See generally Davis.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). This provision of the Act seems to have a completely
salutary effect. Compare Katz, supra note 18, at 1261, with Davis 765-66.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
26. Wozencraft supra note 23, at 249.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
28. Id. § 552(b) reads as follows:
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nine exemptions to mandatory disclosure.20 Central to the controversy over the
construction of these exemptions are three factors. The first is the poor draftman-
ship of the Act.3 0 The second is the conflict between the House and Senate
committee reports which are relied upon to establish the legislative intent under-
lying the Act.3 ' The final factor is the delicate balance which must be struck
between the public's right of access to agency files and the agency's need to
carry out its mission effectively,82 coupled with the right of individuals to
privacy-both those individuals who are informants and those who are investi-
gated. Illustrative of this controversy is the evolution of the "investigatory
files" exemption. 3
"(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national
defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available
by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells."
29. Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 Duke LJ. 149,
164-65. Roughly 100 suits have been brought under all sections of the Act. Salosclin, The
Work of The Freedom of Information Committee of the Department of justice, 23 Ad. L.
Rev. 147 (1971).
30. Davis 807-09; Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56
Geo. LJ. 18, 52-53 (1967); see American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Wozencraft, supra note 23, at 251.
31. Compare S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), with H.R. Rep. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). "In general, the Senate committee is relatively faithful to the
words of the Act, and the House committee ambitiously undertakes to change the meaning
that appears in the Act's words. The main thrust of the House committee remarks . . . is
almost always in the direction of nondisclosure." Davis 763; see id. 809-10; Note, The Freedom
of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 150, 153-155 (1969). Thus
agencies favor the House report; pro-disclosure advocates, the Senate report. See, e.g., Uretz,
Freedom of Information and the IRS, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 283, 287 (1967).
32. "The essence of this controversy is that a governmental agency should not have to
'operate in a fishbowl' and neither should a citizen, when attacking an agency decision, have
to 'operate in a darkroom." Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 68, 71 (E.D.
Ky. 1969); see Rehnquist, supra note 21, at 551; 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2421-23
(1966).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
Subsection b(7) of the Act exempts "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency ... .- 34 The purpose of this exemption is to protect the government's
case from premature discovery.3 5 As to the exact coverage of this exception, how-
ever, there is some confusion. The House Report defined "law enforcement" in its
broadest sense36 to cover "investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds
of laws, labor and securities laws as well as criminal laws." The Senate Report,
however, defined the exception narrowly: "These are the files prepared by Gov-
ernment agencies to prosecute law violators." 38 Thus, under the Senate defini-
tion, an agency must have the intention to prosecute. This intention is not
required under the House definition. Since "investigations are often for multiple
purposes, for purposes that change as the investigations proceed, and for pur-
poses that are never clarified,"3 9 this conflict in legislative intent fosters govern-
ment contentions that a file is investigatory and therefore exempL4
The first case to construe the investigatory files exemption was Barceloneta
Shoe Corp. v. Compton,41 in which statements by employees made to NLRB
investigators during the investigation of alleged unfair labor practices were held
to be within the scope of subsection b(7).- The district court therefore denied
disclosure of these statements to the employer corporation prior to a hearing of
the NLRB at which the employees were to testify.P3 Adopting the House Com-
mittee's interpretation" of the exemption, 5 the court balanced the interests of
the parties and decided that the hampering effect which disclosure mould have
upon the NLRB's investigation was greater than the right of the plaintiff to the
information.46 The following year, in a similar case, Clement Brothers Co. v.
34. Id.
35. Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 177-78 (D. Aid. 1970), aflPd, 444 F.2d 21 (4th
Cir. 1971); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 703, 711-12 (ED. Pa.
1968); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966); see Grumman Aircraft Eng'r
Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 Fad 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The exemption has been
construed to mean that if a court would routinely order a document produced in the
discovery process, it should be made available even though the agency might oppose produc-
tion. General Servs. Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969).
36. Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 Geo. LJ. 18, 47
(1967).
37. HLR. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
38. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Ses. 9 (1965).
39. Davis 800.
40. For a vivid example of the abuse of this exemption, see Fellmeth, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Federal Trade Commission: A Study in alfeasance, 4 H1arv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Ia. L. Rev. 345, 361-66 (1969).
41. 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
42. Id. at 593.
43. Id.
44. See notes 36 & 37 supra and accompanying text.
45. 271 F. Supp. at 593-94.
46. Id. at 594. But see WelIford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971). See also
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NLRB)4 7 another federal district court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the
applicability of the exemption was limited to criminal prosecutions. 48
In Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.49 the court distinguished the
situation before it from situations in which the government was actually bringing
forward or contemplating a case.50 In that case, the government was not a party
to the action-a civil suit for damages arising out of the accidental death of
plaintiff's decedent, an employee of the defendant. 1 Since the purpose of the
investigatory files exemption was to prevent premature discovery of the govern-
ment's case and the government, although it initially gathered the data for law
enforcement purposes, had no intention of bringing forward an action, the court
ruled that this exemption was inapplicable.5 2 The court concurred with the
Barceloneta and Clement decisions, "but only within the context in which they
were rendered. For in cases in which an agency hearing or judicial litigation is
impending, the situation is often rife with possibilities for a defendant to intimi-
date witnesses, or anticipate and avoid the government's case .... 3 The court
held that, under facts such as those presented in Cooney, the rationale of
Barceloneta and Clement had no relevance.5 4
The next significant case construing the investigatory files exemption was
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC.5 5 In that case, although the FTC had apparently
intended to proceed against Bristol-Myers for misleading advertising practices,
the complaint was withdrawn more than three years prior to the appellant's
request for disclosure of the documents.5" The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the agency practice of
stamping all its files with the label "investigatory" on the mere basis that pro-
ceedings might be forthcoming at some future unspecified time.67 The court
remanded the case to "determine whether the prospect of enforcement proceed-
ings [was] concrete enough to bring into operation the exemption for investiga-
tory files, and if so whether the particular documents sought by the company
[were] nevertheless discoverable."58 Thus, the Bristol-Myers court implied that,
despite subsection b (7), some parts of an investigatory file may nevertheless be
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436
F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
47. 282 F. Supp. 540 (NJ). Ga. 1968).
48. Id. at 542.
49. 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
50. Id. at 712.
51. Id. at 709.
52. Id. at 710-12.
53. Id. at 712.
54. Id.
55. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
56. Id. at 939.
s7. Id.
58. Id. at 939-40.
[Vol. 40
CASE NOTES
discoverable. 9 This ruling extended to subsection b(7) the policy of the District
of Columbia Circuit with regard to exemptions of trade secrets and confidential
commercial or financial information claimed under subsection b(4) of the Act!c0
This rule, followed in Bristol-Myers"1 and developed earlier by the court in
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,62 provides that in
situations where requested records contain some confidential information, this
information can be deleted and the remaining information disclosed.03 With the
application of this rule to subsection b(7), an agency would be prevented from
exempting items merely by placing them in its investigatory files.
In Wellford v. Hardin,.4 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has further
circumscribed the scope of a subsection b(7) exemption as outlined in Bristol-
Myers65 by requiring the disclosure of letters of warning and dentention. The
threshold question in Bristol-Myers was whether the files sought by Bristol-
Myers could be characterized as incident to an enforcement proceeding. 0 The
Wellford court noted that even if the files were part of an enforcement action, the
written records of enforcement action already taken should be disclosed upon
request.67
The Wellford court distinguished the facts before it from Barceloneta.'8 Rea-
soning that disclosure of materials already in the hands of potential parties to
law enforcement proceedings can in no way be said to interfere with the agency's
legitimate law enforcement functions, the court found that the letters were
clearly not within the investigatory files exemption.' 9 In Barceloneta, the request
for records was made by a party to an adjudication in progress but, in Weliford,
the proceedings were completed when the letters of warning and detention were
sent.7o
The Department argued that the investigatory files exemption served to
protect the identity of informants and the nature of investigative techniques
from disclosure. The court pointed out, however, that since Wellford requested
"no more than the results of the enforcement actions and, at any rate, no more
than was already in the hands of the companies who were warned or whose
59. Id.
60. 5 US.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
61. 424 F.2d at 938-39.
62. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
63. Id. at 580-81.
64. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
65. 424 F2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 824 (1970); see text accompanying
notes 55-59 supra.
66. 424 F.2d at 939.
67. 444 F.2d at 24.
68. 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967); see text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
69. 444 F.2d at 24. Two courts have accepted the Senate report's definition as the
reliable indication of legislative intent. General Servs. Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1969); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796,
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 Fad 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. 444 F.2d at 24.
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products were detained,"'71 neither secret investigative techniques nor the
identity of informants would be revealed.72 The Department also contended
that disclosure of enforcement records may discourage voluntary compliance
with the Meat and Poultry Inspection Acts. 78 After considering a letter sub-
mitted by a former Administrator of the Consumer and Marketing Service
which denied the likelihood of such a result,74 the court held that even if this
consideration were valid, "[t]he Freedom of Information Act was not designed
to increase administrative efficiency, but to guarantee the public's right to know
how the government is discharging its duty to protect the public interest."7
Finally, the Department argued that the investigatory files exemption was
"intended to protect not only the investigator, but also the investigated."70 This
argument was based in part upon a consideration of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.77 In that case, a chief of police, without
notice or hearing, posted the appellee's name in retail liquor stores as a per-
son to whom liquor was not to be sold for a period of one year.78 The Supreme
Court approved the reasoning of the lower court70 that by posting the appellee's
name, the official was exposing the individual to public embarassment and
ridicule without procedural due process.8 0 At first blush, the similarity between
the issuance of letters of detention and warning without a hearing and the
posting in Constantineau is striking. However, the Welliord majority reasoned
that the Supreme Court had realized the possible application of this case to
administrative actions and rejected it when it stated that some federal adminis-
trative procedures are "'summary by reason of necessity'" and involve no due
process right of the individual.8 1 The majority further distinguished the situation
in Wellford from that in Constantineau: "Since the constitutionality of the
Department's unpublicized enforcement of the Inspection Acts is accepted by
both parties, the same proceedings are not rendered unconstitutional simply
because a record of them is released to the public."18 2
Contemporaneous with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Welljord, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, faced with substantially the
71. Id.
72. Id.; see Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1971),
petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1971) (No. 698).
73. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1970); Poultry Products Inspec-
tion Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1970).
74. 444 F.2d at 24 n.4.
75. Id. at 24.
76. Id.
77. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
78. Id. at 435.
79. Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd sub norm.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
80. 400 U.S. at 436. It is significant to note that although the decision was 6-3, all three
dissents were based on procedural rather than substantive grounds.
81. 444 F.2d at 25.
82. Id.
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same facts in a second WeUford v. Hardin,m reached a different result. In that
case, Wellford requested disclosure of records of the Pesticides Regulation
Division of the Agriculture Department." The court, while granting access to
some of the documents, refused to order the disclosure of information which
cited other companies for violations of pesticide regulations.85 Thus this district
court, unlike the Maryland district court in the first Wellford case, refused to
grant the petitioner access to information concerning previously adjudicated
matters s8
Although the two Wellford cases are not totally reconcilable, neither are they
totally incompatible. Together they stand for the proposition that an agency
may no longer decline to disclose information where only part of the requested
information is exempt. The two decisions concur in their condemnation of an
agency's refusal to disclose records which can not be "identified specifically"
when the specific number of the file requested is in the exclusive control of the
agency 87
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Wellford v. Hardin is significant in that it
represents the convergence of two trends in the law-the right of the public to
know what its government is doing and the right of privacy. The court's ruling
goes a long way toward resolving the ambiguity in the investigatory files exemp-
tion of the Freedom of Information Act in favor of greater access. In so doing,
Wellford is a step towards the realization of the goals of the Act-insurance that
it will not suffer the same fate as its predecessor.88
Conflict of Laws-Torts---Guest Statutes in Both State of Accident and
State of Defendant's Residence and Insurance Bar Action in New York
by New York Guest.-Plaintiff, a New York resident, while a passenger in
an automobile owned and operated by defendants, was injured in a two-car'
83. 315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).
84. Id. at 769.
85. Id. at 769-70.
86. See Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 Duke LJ. 149,
182. The District of Columbia Circuit previously reversed a district court decision wherein it
was stated that the exceptions of the Act are almost greater than the grant. Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
87. Compare 315 F. Supp. at 176-77, with 315 F. Supp. at 769-70.
88. The need for change in the Freedom of Information Act is both manifest and great;
however, the vehicle for improving the Act may not be judicial action, but rather congres-
sional amendment. A review of the first four years of the Freedom of Information Act s
being conducted by the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Infor-
mation with a view towards amending the Act. Horton, The Public's Right to Know, 77
Case & Comment 3, 14 (Ian.-Feb. 1972).
1. There were no apparent injuries suffered by anyone in the second car, which was
1972]
accident in Ohio.2 Defendants were residents of Florida, where their car was
registered and insured. Plaintiff, seeking to recover for her injuries, commenced
suit in New York3 and in accordance with New York law pleaded negligence
on the part of the defendant driver. Guest statutes in both Florida4 and Ohio,G
however, barred recovery by a gratuitous passenger absent an allegation of gross
negligence or willful misconduct. The United States District Court for the West-
ern District of New York concluded that the Ohio guest statute was applicable
and accordingly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, holding that New York choice of law rules7 preclude applica-
tion of New York internal law to allow recovery by a New York guest where
guest statutes in both the state of the accident and the state of the defen-
dants' residence and insurance would bar the action. Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d
1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
The traditional choice of law rule applied in tort cases was lex loci delicti,
i.e., the law of the place where the injury occurred.3 Accordingly, the applicable
law governing the duty owed by a host to a guest was that of the site of the
accident.9 In recent years this territorially oriented conflicts rule has come un-
from Tennessee, and no lawsuit arose out of the involvement of that vehicle. Pryor v.
Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. The defendants were on vacation in Wisconsin when they learned of the death of a
relative in Buffalo, New York. They agreed to pick plaintiff up at her summer cottage in
Ohio and take her to the funeral. The accident occurred while they were returning plain-
tiff to Ohio. Id. at 1273.
3. Plaintiff commenced the suit in New York supreme court, obtaining quasi In rem
jurisdiction by attachment of the contractual obligation of defendants' insurer to defend
and indemnify defendants. Id. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Defendants, upon a showing of diversity of citizenship, successfully
petitioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), for removal to the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York. 445 F.2d at 1273.
4. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 320.59 (1968).
5. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4515.02 (1965).
6. 445 F.2d at 1274.
7. A federal court must apply the conflict of laws rule of the forum state. Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
8. See Reiss v. Klein, 8 N.Y.2d 925, 926, 168 N.E.2d 837, 838, 204 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1960)
(mem.) ; Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 66, 80 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1948) ; Restatement
of Conflict of Laws §§ 377-78, 384 (1934). See also Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266 (1961). Lex
loci delicti was premised on the vested rights doctrine, which provided that the right to
recover for tortious conduct depended upon the law of the jurisdiction where the actual
wrong occurred. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 90 (rev. ed. 1968); see, e.g., Cuba
R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
9. See, e.g., Kerfoot v. Kelley, 294 N.Y. 288, 62 N.E.2d 74, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 764
(1945); Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938); Metcalf v. Reynolds, 267
N.Y. 52, 195 N.E. 681 (1935).
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der attack on the ground that its application may often result in irrational and
unjust decisions.10 This criticism has led to the rejection of lex loci delicti in
twenty-two jurisdictions," including New York.'
The New York Court of Appeals replaced the lex loci delicti doctrine with a
"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" test in Babcock v. Jackson. 3 In
that case plaintiff and defendant, residents of New York, had taken a weekend
trip to Ontario where plaintiff guest was seriously injured when defendant lost
control of his car and hit a stone wall.' 4 In a negligence action brought in New
York, the Ontario guest statute 5 was invoked as a defense.10 The court re-
jected the defense, holding that the law of New York, not Ontario, governed
the rights of the guest against his host.17
The court, reasoning that it was not necessary to resolve all issues arising
out of a tort claim with reference to the law of one jurisdiction, compared the
relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in deciding whether
to apply the Ontario guest statute.3 The court noted that the case involved
10. See, e.g., Weintraub, A Method For Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 Cornell
L.Q. 215, 215-16 (1963). See generally Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of
Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960).
11. R_ Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 234-36 n.36 (1971). See also
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145-46 (1971). Several states, however, con-
tinue to follow the traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti. See, e.g., Landers v. Landers, 153
Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965);
Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970) ; White v. King, 244
Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Oshiek
v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 SXE.2d 303 (1964). See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603,
613-17 (1970). A reason given for continued adherence is the predictability of results. See
Friday v. Smoot, 58 DeL 488, 492-93, 211 A.2d 594, 596-97 (1965).
12. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481-82, 191 N.E2d 279, 283, 240 N.YS.2d
743, 749 (1963).
13. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), noted in 32 Fordham L.
Rev. 158 (1963). The court of appeals first enunciated the "grouping of contacts" or
"interest analysis" approach to choice of law cases in a contract case, Auten v. Auten, 308
N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). The court refused to apply the law of the place of the
making of the contract, stating that the applicable law was that of the place "'which has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute?" Id. at 160, 124 N.E2d at 102 (dta-
tions omitted). A subsequent case, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), although not expressly adopting the "grouping of
contacts" or "interest analysis" standard for tort cases, did reject the application of a limita-
tion on recovery in wrongful death actions found in law of the state where the accident
took place.
14. 12 N.Y.2d at 476, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
15. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
16. 12 N.Y.2d at 477, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
17. Id. at 483-84, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52.
18. Id. at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.YS.2d at 750. The court stated that a case
involving rights and liabilities stemming from a guest-host relationship differs significantly
from one in which the issue relates to the manner in which the defendant was driving his
car at the time of the accident. Where the defendant's exercise of proper care in the opera-
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence of a
New York host in the operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and un-
doubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey which
began and was to end there,"10 whereas Ontario's sole relation with the con-
troversy was the "purely adventitious circumstance" that the accident occurred
in Ontario.20 Furthermore, the court recognized that Ontario had no interest in
having its statute applied, since the purpose of the statute was the prevention
of fraudulent claims by guests in collusion with their hosts against Ontario de-
fendants and their insurers, not New York defendants and their insurers.21
The New York Court of Appeals first applied the principles enunciated in
Babcock in Dym v. Gordon.2 2 While plaintiff and defendant, both domiciliaries
of New York, were on their way to a class at the University of Colorado where
they were attending summer school, defendant host's car collided with a vehicle
driven by a Kansas resident, injuring plaintiff guestps At the time the parties
left New York, they had not arranged to meet in Colorado or to ride together
in defendant's car,24 which was registered and insured in New York.25 When
plaintiff brought suit in New York alleging ordinary negligence, the Colorado
guest statute2 6 was pleaded as a defense.21 The court of appeals, in a four to
three opinion, dismissed the complaint, holding that the Colorado guest statute
applied.28
The majority stated that Dym did not represent a departure from the rule
announced in Babcock, but merely exemplified its application, and distinguished
Babcock on several factual grounds.29 Unlike Dym, Babcock involved only a
single car. Thus it was not necessary to consider the interests of injured persons
in other cars with respect to the assets of the negligent driver 80 The Colorado
tion of his automobile is in issue, the locus delicti would generally have the greater interest.
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
19. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
22. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), noted in 34 Fordham L.
Rev. 711 (1966).
23. Id. at 123, 209 N.E.2d at 793, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
26. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963).
27. 16 N.Y.2d at 122, 209 N.E.2d at 793, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
28. Id. at 122, 209 N.E.2d at 793, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
29. Id. at 124-25, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466. The dissenting judges, how-
ever, were of the opinion that there was "no material distinction between the factual situa-
tion (in Dym] ... and that in the Babcock case" and would have applied New York law.
Id. at 129, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (italics omitted). While conceding
that Colorado's contacts were "quantitatively greater" than those of Ontario in Babcock,
the dissenters felt that the contacts were not superior with respect to the specific issue pre-
sented, i.e., did the New York plaintiff have a cause of action against her New York host.
Id. at 133, 209 N.E.2d at 800, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
30. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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guest statute, however, was intended to provide nonguests with a priority for
their claim against the assets of the negligent host.3 ' In addition, the parties
in Dyrn were living in Colorado when the guest-host relationship arose and the
accident grew out of a Colorado based activity.3 2 Thus the fact that the acci-
dent occurred in Colorado could not be termed "fortuitous" as it was in Bab-
cock, where the relationship was dearly seated in New York.a The majority
said that since the parties had chosen to live under Colorado law on a day-to-
day basis and had accepted the benefits of that law for a prolonged period, "it
[was] spurious to maintain that Colorado [had] no interest in a relationship
which was formed there."34
Dyrn was followed by Macey v. Rozbicki35 where plaintiff, a New York resi-
dent, visited defendants, also residents of New York, at their summer home in
Ontario.36 While riding in defendants' car, plaintiff guest was injured in a two-
car collision in Ontario When suit was brought in New York, defendants
interposed the Ontario guest statutess as an affirmative defense.P9 The court
of appeals reasoned that the relationship of the parties was not affected by
their "temporary meeting" in Canada40 and, in striking the defense, held that
New York law governed.4 '
The most recent case decided by the New York Court of Appeals raising a
31. Id. The court stated that "the policy underlying Colorado's law [was] threefold:
the protection of Colorado drivers and their insurance carriers against fraudulent claixns,
the prevention of suits by 'ungrateful guests', and the priority of injured parties in other
cars in the assets of the negligent defendant." Id.
32. 16 N.Y.2d at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
33. Id. Professor Cavers, although a proponent of "territorialism" in the choice of law
process, takes the position that if the issue in the case involved an incident of the guest-host
relationship, "the function of supplying a rule to regulate that incident would seem more
rationally allocated to a state other than the accident state if the former state is more
closely connected with the relationship and also imposes a higher standard of liabilityY
Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts Justice, 9 Duquesne L. Rev. 360, 366-67 (1971) (footnote
omitted); see D. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process 300-04 (1965).
34. 16 N.Y.2d at 125, 209 N.E2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467. In Cashiman v. Evans,
249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a federal court relying on Dym held that the Alberta
guest statute (Alb. Rev. Stat. c. 356, § 132 (1955)) barred an action by a Massachusetts
guest against his New York host for injuries received in a two car accident in Alberta. The
court stated that the presence of plaintiff in defendant's car in Alberta was not fortuitous
since they were travelling through Canada together as part of a road show, and that because
the trip was to begin and end in Alberta, the guest-host relationship could be said to have
been formed in Alberta. 249 F. Supp. at 275. Further, the court concluded that Alberta had
an interest in preventing the dissipation of the negligent defendant's assets. Id.
35. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
36. Id. at 291, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
37. Id.
38. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
39. 18 N.Y.2d at 291, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
40. Id. at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The court assumed that arrange-
merits for the Ontario visit had been made in New York. Id.
41. Id. at 291, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
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choice of law question involving a guest statute is Tooker v. Lopez.4 2 A New
York domiciliary was killed in a Michigan accident while a guest in an auto-
mobile driven by a New York host.43 The car was owned by the driver's father,
a New York resident, and was registered and insured in New York.44 In a
wrongful death action brought on behalf of the decedent guest's estate, the
court dismissed the defense of the Michigan guest statute,45 stating that "Mich-
igan [had] no interest in whether a New York plaintiff is denied recovery
against a New York defendant where the car is insured [in New York]."4
In reaching its decision, the majority attempted to resolve what it viewed as
"inconsistency" in prior guest statute cases.47 The court stated that it is not
important whether the accident is a single or multi-car accident, since it con-
cluded that it had been "mistaken" in Dym in finding that one of the policies
underlying guest statutes is the marshaling of the host's assets in favor of non-
guests. 48 It also made clear that neither the length of the stay in the state of
the accident49 nor the expectations of the parties 0 is relevant in determining
the applicable law. These statements caused Judge Burke, in his concurring
42. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), noted in 38 Fordham L.
Rev. 111 (1969).
43. Id. at 571, 249 N.E.2d at 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
44. Id.
45. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257A01 (1966).
46. 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525. The accident also seriously
injured another passenger, who was a Michigan resident. Id. at 580, 249 N.E.2d at 400, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 528. The Tooker court, however, did not find it "necessary or desirable" to
decide whether the Michigan guest could have successfully maintained a suit in a New York
court, but simply stated that "it [was] not at all clear that Michigan law would
govern . . . ." Id. at 580, 249 N.E.2d at 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528. The three dissenting
judges concluded that it was "implicit" in the majority decision that the Michigan passenger
could not recover in New York. Id. at 597, 249 N.E.2d at 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
In Hepp v. Ireland, 66 Civ. 2128 (S.D.N.Y., June 9, 1970), a case posing a problem
similar to that suggested by the Michigan passenger in Tooker, an Illinois plaintiff brought
a claim to recover for injuries sustained in Colorado while a passenger in a Kansas Insured
auto which the New York defendant had borrowed from the Kansas owner. Although
Colorado, Illinois, and Kansas all had guest statutes, the court held that they did not bar
plaintiff's recovery. Record at 7, 32-34.
47. 24 N.Y.2d at 572, 249 N.E.2d at 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
48. Id. at 574-75, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24. The Michigan courts had
suggested that the purpose of the Michigan guest statute was to protect the owner. Id. at
577 n.1, 249 N.E.2d at 399 n.1, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525 n.1.
49. Id. at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525. "Where the guest-host relation-
ship 'arose' or is 'centered' is wholly irrelevant to policies reflected by the laws in conflict."
Id. at 579 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at 400 n.2, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 527 n.2. Accord, Pfau v. Trent
Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); cf. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267
A.2d 854 (1970).
50. 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 526; see Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d 12, 20, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741 (1968).
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opinion, to conclude that Dynt was overruled 51 and that New York was com-
mitted to an interest analysis approach. 52
Chief Judge Fuld, in his concurring opinion, attempted to lay down some
guidelines for future litigants in multi-state highway accident cases. He sug-
gested that when the guest-passenger and driver-host are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is registered there, that state's law should controlpas If the
accident occurred in the domicile of either of the parties, that law should con-
trol, "in the absence of special circumstances."54 In all other situations the
applicable law should be "that of the state where the accident occurred but
not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will ad-
vance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth work-
ing of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants." 55
In Pryor v. Swarner,56 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was presented with a guest statute case involving the laws of three
states. It determined that the following factors were important in analyzing
the interests of the various states: the domicile of the parties, the place where
the defendants' car was registered and insured, and the site of the accidenL5t
The origin of the guest-host relationship and the fact that there was a second
car involved were considered to be irrelevant in determining the applicable
law.5 8
Looking to the interests of the three states, the court stated that because the
case involved Florida defendants and because their "insurance premiums were
calculated with Florida's guest statute in mind," Florida had a substantial
interest in having its policy of protection of insurers applied. Likewise, Ohio,
as the site of both the accident" and the invitation to travel,0 ' had an interest
51. 24 N.Y.2d at 591, 249 N.E2.d at 407, 301 N.Y.S2d at 538; see 34 Albany L. Rev.
140 (1969); 38 Fordliam L. Rev. 111 (1969); 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 146, 147-48 (1970).
52. 24 N.Y.2d at 591, 249 N.E.2d at 407-08, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 538; see 38 Fordham L.
Rev. 111, 119 (1969); 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 146, 155 (1970). It has been suggested that Dym
"was not an application of, but rather a perversion of state-interest conflicts analysis." R.J.
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 241 (1971).
53. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (concurring opinion). See
generally, R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 103 (rev. ed. 1968); Ehrenzweig, TFalse Con-
flicts" and the 'Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 Va. L. Rev.
847, 851 (1967).
54. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532. See Hancock v. Holland,
63 ffsc. 2d 811, 313 N.YS.2d 455 (Sup. CL 1970).
55. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
56. 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 1275. judge Keating said in his concurring opinion in Macey that "Etlhe only
facts having any significant bearing on the applicable choice of law in guest statute cases
are the residence of the parties and the place in which the automobile is insured and regis-
tered." 18 N.Y.2d at 295, 221 N.E2d at 383, 274 N.YS.2d at 595.
58. 445 F.2d at 1275; see notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
59. 445 F.2d at 1277.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1273.
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in having its guest statute applied, since one of the policies underlying the
statute was "that it is 'ungrateful' for a guest to seek recovery for mere negli-
gence.1162 Regarding New York's interest, the court noted that, while the state's
policy did allow recovery by a guest against his host upon a showing of ordinary
negligencens New York's only connection with the accident was that the plain-
tiff was a resident.64 On the basis of these competing interests, the Pryor court
concluded "that the New York courts would not apply New York's own internal
law to allow recovery by the plaintiff against the common policy of the lex loci
[sic] and the state where the defendants reside and obtained insurance. 0 r8
Although the Pryor court did not reach the issue of whether Ohio or Florida
had the greater interest in the resolution of the controversy, 0 it did appear to
hold that both Florida and Ohio had interests superior to those of New York.0 7
The New York Court of Appeals has generally not considered the interests of
the locus delicti to be very substantial, referring to the site of the accident as
"purely adventitious"68 and "not particularly significant.1 09 These references,
however, were made in the context of cases in which only two jurisdictions were
involved, and all other contacts were with New York.70 In any event, the only
62. Id. at 1277. See also note 31 supra.
63. 445 F.2d at 1276-77.
64. Id. at 1275. The court in Tooker specifically rejected the contention that the New
York "choice-of-law rule ... merely amounts to a rule which will always result in the ap-
plication of New York law." 24 N.Y.2d at 580, 249 N.E.2d at 401, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
65. 445 F.2d at 1277.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court's opinion, of course, might be construed as holding that New York's
contact with the defendants or their conduct was not sufficient to justify application of
New York law. See generally note 75 infra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, the use of the language "common policy" in the court's opinion
might suggest that the court felt that the cumulative interests of Florida and Ohio were
greater than those of New York. Such a reading of the holding, however, would introduce
a new concept into the New York jurisprudence of choice of law-the concept that the
interests of two states having similar laws can be added together to defeat the application
of the law of a third state.
68. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750
(1963).
69. Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 221 N.E.2d 380, 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593
(1966).
70. See Macey, 18 N.Y.2d at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593; Babcock, 12
N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. See also Hancock v. Holland, 63
Misc. 2d 811, 313 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267
A.2d 854 (1970).
In Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd mem., 26
App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966), the court suggested that the site of
the accident might be important. Plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was Injured in a one car
accident in New York. Id. at 993, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Although the defendant was also a
resident of Ontario, where his car was licensed and registered and where the guest-host
relationship arose, the court held New York law applicable. Id. at 995, 263 N.Y.S.2d at
650. The identical factual situation was also presented in the subsequent case of Arbuthnot
policy which Ohio had an interest in protecting was its notion that it is ungrate-
ful for a guest to seek compensation from his host even though the host has
been negligent.7 ' Although New York courts have recognized that this policy is
one of the legislative purposes underlying guest statutes,' 2 it does not appear
that Ohio's policy should be considered applicable under an interest analysis
approach when the issue involves the relationship between a Florida defendant
and a New York plaintiff .73
Florida, on the other hand, did have a significant interest in the outcome of
Pryor, since an award of damages would affect insurance premiums paid by
Florida policy-holders.74 Furthermore, Florida had a substantial contact with
the defendants, whereas it might be argued that New York did not have a
sufficient nexus with the defendants or their conduct to make it reasonable for
New York to assert its interest.75 On the other hand, Miller v. Miller70 decided
v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.YS.2d 391 (3d Dep't 1970). The court, however,
held that the Ontario guest statute was a defense, stating that Kell had been decided on a
"procedural" ground. Id. at 316, 316 N.YS.2d at 392.
Under Judge Fuld's guidelines enunciated in Tooker, the law of the accident state should
seemingly apply in a Pryor-type case. See 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S2d
at 532-33. The Pryor court, however, did not proceed under Judge Fuld's guidelines, but
rather looked at the relative interests of New York, Ohio, and Florida, stating that it could
"treat the suggested results of the Chief Judge's hypotheticals only as a slender indication
of what (the New York Court of Appeals] might do when confronted with actual cas
falling within the scope of his 'interest analyses.'" 445 F.2d at 1276.
71. The "ungrateful guest" justification of guest statutes has been criticized on the ground
that the host's immunity is immaterial where he has liability insurance, since he would in
no event feel the effect of a judgment. A. Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws § 220, at 577-78
(1962).
72. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 209 NX.2d 792, 794, 262 N.YS.2d 463,
467 (1965).
73. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 574, 577, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397, 398-99, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519, 523, 525 (1969).
74. 445 F.2d at 1277. While insurance premiums do reflect the number of and cost of
accidents caused by residents of a specified area, claims exceeding the coverage limits re-
quired by a state's financial responsibility law (generally $10,000 per person injured, $20,000
for personal injury per accident, $5,000 for property damage, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 324.021
(7) (1968)) are excluded in calculating the premiums for such insurance. See McNamara,
Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 Ins. Counsel J. 398, 405 (1968); Stern, Ratemakng
Procedures for Automobile Liability Insurance, 52 Proceeding Cas. Act. Soc'y 139, 154-S5
(1965). Furthermore, rates for greater coverage are generally the same in every state since
they are determined from nationwide data. McNamara, supra, at 405-06; Stem, supra, at
155. Thus, the maximum effect the Pryor claim could have had on Florida premiums in
the aggregate was $10,000, regardless of the type of policy held by the defendants. It has
been persuasively shown that the actual effect would be significantly less. Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process--The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 594, 574-76
(1961).
75. See R-J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 248 (1971). The due
process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution also impose limitations on a
state's choice of laws rules. Professor Currie has concluded from his review of Supreme
Court cases that whenever the forum has an interest in applying its own law, it may con-
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by the New York Court of Appeals in 1968, may be read as suggesting that it
would not only be reasonable for New York to assert its interest, but that its
interest might be superior.
In Miller, a New York plaintiff brought a wrongful death action to recover
for the death of her husband resulting from injuries sustained in an auto acci-
dent in Maine allegedly caused by the negligence of the decedent's host. 7 The
defendants, who had been Maine residents at the time of the accident but had
moved to New York before the commencement of the action 7 8 interposed
Maine's monetary limitation" on recovery in wrongful death actions.80 Find-
ing the limitation inapplicable, the court stated that it was "New York rather
than Maine which [had] the most significant relationship with the issue in the
case ... and the most significant interest in the application of its law."81
stitutionally do so. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 22 (1958). His article, however, does not
explore "whether the power of an interested state to apply its law is qualified if the party
adversely affected has not in some fashion 'subjected' himself to that law." Id. at 72
n.283. Professor Sedler argues that "the forum may apply its own law on the ground that
the plaintiff is a resident of that state where: (1) the fact of residency gives it an interest
in applying its law on the issue as to which a conflict exists, and (2) the application of its
aw does not produce fundamental unfairness or defeat the legitimate expectations of the
other party." Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of
a State Line, 9 Duquesne L. Rev. 394, 403 (1971) (emphasis omitted). See generally Miller v.
Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 19-20, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 740 (1968).
76. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
77. Id. at 14, 237 N.E.2d at 878, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36.
78. While the court noted that the change in domicile abrogated any interest of Maine
in protecting its residents in the wrongful death action, it also recognized that the change
did not affect Maine's interest in maintaining low insurance rates for its residents. Id. at
21-22, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42.
79. Ch. 165, § 10, [1954] Me. Laws 125, as amended, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2552
(Supp. 1972). Although the Maine statute was amended in 1965 to repeal the limitation
on recovery in wrongful death actions (Ch. 255, § 2552, [1965] Me. Laws Spec. Ses. 348),
the court said the amendment was not to be given retroactive effect. 22 N.Y.2d at 15 n.1,
237 N.E.2d at 878 n.1, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736 n.1.
80. 22 N.Y.2d at 14, 237 N.E.2d at 878, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
81. Id. at 22, 237 N.E.2d at 883, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43. See Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31
App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d
942, 250 N.E.2d 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1969) (mem.). In Tjepkemap a New York resident
was killed in Missouri when he collided with another car being driven by a Misouri resi-
dent. Although the defendant never left Missouri, the Missouri limitation on a wrongful
death action (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.090 (Supp. 1967)) was held not to apply, since the
plaintiff's intestate was a New York resident, the estate was being administered in New
York, and the plaintiff (widow and administratix) and other distributees (children) were
in New York. 31 App. Div. 2d at 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77. But see Hancock v. Holland,
63 Misc. 2d 811, 313 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1970). A New York domiciliary, while riding
in a car as a guest of a Georgia resident, was injured in Georgia when the vehicle collided
with another Georgia registered car. The Georgia "guest statute" (Ga. Code Ann. § 68-301
(1971)) was held to be a valid defense, the court stating that "Georgia simply [had] a
superior connection with this particular accident and a superior interest in having its law
applied." Id. at 813, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
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The Miller case, although indicating that New York has an interest in insur-
ing that persons do not become public charges of the state,82 may not be
apropos to a non-death personal injury case.su The interest which a decedent's
domicile has in a wrongful death action could well be considered something
quite different and far more substantial than the interest of the plaintiff's domi-
cile where no death occurs. In addition to being concerned with the compensa-
tion of decedent's next-of-kin, the decedent's domicile is also interested in the
administration of the decedent's estate.8 4 Nevertheless, variations on the Tooker
fact pattern such as that presented in Pryor remain to be resolved by the New
York Court of Appeals.
Constitutional Law-Jurisdiction of Military Courts-O'Callaban v.
Parker Denied Retroactivity by Fifth Circuit.*-Petitioner, a member of the
United States Air Force stationed in Wyoming, allegedly raped a civilian while
off-base pursuant to a pass. He was taken into military custody and charged with
a violation of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).' A
general court-martial was convened in 1966 and convicted petitioner of the offense
of rape.2 After having exhausted the multiple review procedures provided by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice,. he filed an application for a writ of habeas
82. One writer has suggested that where a "court finds that the forum state has an
interest in the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though
the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy ... ." Currie,
Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke LJ. 171, 178. Other
commentators propose "application of the better rule of law.' R. Leflar, American Conflicts
Law § 110 (rev. ed. 1968). Several courts have employed this approach to avoid the ap-
plication of guest statutes. See, e.g., Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254
(1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). See generally Annot., 29 A.-R.3d 603, 646-50 (1970).
83. The Milier decision was not discussed by the Pryor court.
84. See Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E2d 796, 266
N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.YS.2d 175 (1st Dep't)
(per curiam), appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 942, 250 N.E.2d 68, 302 N.YS.2d 580 (1969)
(mem.).
* The Second Circuit rule is to the contrary. United States ex reL Flemings v. Chafee,
No. 71-1997 (2d Cir., March 28, 1972).
1. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1970). This article provides: "Any person subject to this chapter
who commits an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, by force and without
her consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as
a court-martial may direct." Id. § 920(a).
2. Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753, 754 (5th Cir. 1971). The conviction was affirmed in
United States v. Gosa, ACM No. 19,784 (decided May 22, 1967).
3. United States v. Gosa, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 648 (1967) (petition for grant of review
denied); United States v. Gosa, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 41 C.M.R. 327 (1970) (peition for
reconsideration denied). The procedures for review are codified at 10 US.C. §§ 859-76
(1970).
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corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.4
Petitioner contended that his confinement was invalid in light of the intervening
decision in O'Callahan v. Parker5 in that the general court-martial which tried
him lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied his application for habeas
relief.0 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the ground that O'Callahan v. Parker was not entitled to retroactive
effect. Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971).
A judicial decision which overrules a prior decision can either be accorded
prospective or retrospective effect. A prospective application would mean that
the overruled decision was valid until the court handed down the overruling
decision and that all judgments relying upon the overruled decision would
retain their efficacy. On the other hand, when a decision is given retroactive
effect, the overruled decision is deemed void and all judgments relying upon that
decision may be attacked.
Under the common law, judicial decisions were in all cases given retroactive
effect.7 The rationale behind this judicial philosophy was based on the premise
that judges were "the discoverers, not the creators" of the law.8 Thus, court
decisions themselves were not the law, but rather, only evidence of a body of
pre-existing law9 Under this theory, the overruled decision was at no time the
law and, therefore, had no validity.10 Thus, it followed that overruling decisions
should naturally be given retroactive effect.
In 1866, in Norton v. Shelby County,"1 the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated its adherence to this traditional view by stating: "An uncon-
stitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties ... it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.1 12 In
1932, this concept was qualified in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co.,'8 where the Court was confronted with the "novel stand ... that
4. Gosa v. Mayden, 305 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
1971).
5. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
6. 305 F. Supp. at 1187.
7. See generally 1 Y. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.09 (1988). Mr. Justice
Holmes substantiated this principle when he declared: "Judicial decisions have had retro-
spective operation for near a thousand years." Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349,
372 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
8. "The Law... is identical with the rules laid down by the judges, but those rules are
laid down by the judges because they are the law, they are not the Law because they are
laid down by the judges . . .the judges are the discoverers, not the creators, of the Law."
J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 93 (2d ed. 1921).
9. Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 593 (1917).
10. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *70.
11. 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
12. Id. at 442. Similar declarations were enunciated by the Court in following years.
E.g., Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566 (1913); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 376 (1880).
13. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). The principle of mandatory retroactivity had already been
substantially eroded by some state courts. E.g., Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551,
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the constitution of the United States is infringed by the refusal" of a state court
to apply one of its decisions retroactively.14 A unanimous Court disagreed with
this contention by holding that "[a] state in defining the limits of adherence to
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward opera-
tion and that of relation backward."'I5 Furthermore, the Court expressly stated
that the United States Constitution had no voice on the issue of retroactivity.21
In 1940, the death blow to the common law rule of mandatory retroactivity
was struck in Chicot County Drainage District V. Baxter State Bank. 7 The
Chicot Court abrogated that traditional theory by conceding that "[t]he actual
existence of a statute, prior to ... a determination [of its constitutionality], is
an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. " i sa Rather, each
case had to be decided after an examination of its own peculiar aspects.!
Linkletter v. Walker20 was the first significant discussion of retroactivity in
the criminal law area. Linkletter involved the retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio,21
which held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the search and
seizure provisions of the fourth amendment is required of states by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.22 The Linkietter Court, reiterating
the Sunburst rationale, stated that "the Constitution neither prohibits nor
requires retrospective effect."2a It then set forth three factors to be considered
in determining retroactivity: 1) the purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance
placed upon the old doctrine, and 3) the effect that a retrospective application
of the new rule would have on the administration of justice.24
The Court determined that the purpose of the Mapp rule was to deter the
police from engaging in lawless conduct,- 5 not to protect defendants from being
convicted of crimes they did not commit. Secondly, the states and the accused
10 So. 635 (1892); State ex rel. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Haid, 327 Mo. 367, 38 S.W.2d 44
(1931); State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904). It had also been criticized in
various law review articles. E.g., Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive
Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 230, 250-51 (1918); Von
Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 409, 426-27 (1924).
14. 287 U.S. at 364, aff'g 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927 (1932). The railroad commission of
Montana decided that its rates were excessive and lowered them. Plaintiff-shipper sued
defendant-railroad to recover payments made while the excessive rates were in effect. The
Montana supreme court held that although these excessive rates could no longer be charged,
plaintiff was not entitled to recovery. 91 Mont. at 218, 7 P.2d at 929.
15. 287 U.S. at 364.
16. Id.
17. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
18. Id. at 374.
19. Id.
20. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
21. 367 US. 643 (1961).
22. Id. at 655.
23. 381 U.S. at 629.
24. Id. at 636.
25. Id. at 636-37.
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themselves were found to have substantially relied upon the previous standard.20
Finally, the Court concluded that a retrospective application of Mapp "would
tax the administration of justice to the utmost.127 The Court indicated that in
three prior criminal law decisions to which it had given retroactive effect, 28 "the
principle that [the Court] applied went to the fairness of the trial-the
very integrity of the fact-finding process.120 Consequently, since "the fairness
of the [Linkletter] trial [was] not under attack, '80 the Court reached the con-
clusion that Mapp need not be applied retroactively.31
In 1966, the Court in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shot 8 2 considered the
retroactivity of Griffin v. California,'3 which held that adverse comment upon a
defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.8 4 After an examination of the three factors
enunciated in Linkletter, the Court denied retroactivity.8, It laid great stress
upon the third consideration, stating that a retrospective application of Griffin
would have "an impact upon the administration of [states'] criminal law so
devastating as to need no elaboration."38 But despite this emphasis, the crucial
question remained whether the infringement hindered the ascertainment of truth.
The Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was not designed to enhance the ascertainment of truth but rather to protect
"the right of each individual to be let alone." 37
The following year the criteria set forth in Linkletter were again utilized by
the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey,8 where the Court found that Escobedo v.
Illinois"9 and Miranda v. Arizona4° need not be given retroactive effect.41 At the
26. Id. at 637.
27. Id.
28. The three decisions were Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (right of accused to
effective exclusion of coerced confession from trial held violative of fourteenth amendment) ;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial of right of counsel to indigent defendant
in criminal trial held violative of fourteenth amendment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (state's denial of appellate review solely on account of defendant's inability to pay
for transcript held violative of fourteenth amendment). The holdings in Jackson and
Gideon were applied retroactively by the Court in the decision itself, while Griffin was
applied retroactively in Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per
curiam).
29. 381 U.S. at 639.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 640.
32. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
33. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
34. Id. at 615.
35. 382 U.S. at 419.
36. Id. For a criticism of this third factor, see Note, Prospective Overruling and Retro-
active Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907, 950-51 (1962).
37. 382 U.S. at 416.
38. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
39. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. 384 U.S. at 734.
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outset, the Court pointed out that "the choice between retroactivity and non-
retroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee
involved." - Although the Miranda and Escobedo decisions were designed to
enforce the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court found that their pri-
mary contribution was to safeguard the privilege in those situations where the
abusive practice fell short of overt coercion. 3 Therefore, since prior case law
adequately protected petitioner's rights against overtly coerced confessions,44
the effect on the fact-finding process where the Escobedo and Miranda safe-
guards were lacking was not great enough to require retroactivity.4
Another significant retroactivity case was DeStefano v. Woods,40 which re-
fused retroactive application to Duncan v. Louisiana- and Bloom v. Illinois. s
These two cases involved the right to jury trial in serious criminal 9 and serious
criminal contempt cases 0o respectively. The Court held that all three factors
of the Linkletter test favored prospectivity in the Duncan situation 0 ' Regard-
ing the Bloom rule, the Court decided that, even if the purpose factor might
be construed to favor retroactivity, the reliance and effect considerations dearly
pointed toward a prospective application. 2
42. Id. at 728.
43. Id. at 729-30.
44. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 US. 433
(1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
45. 384 U.S. at 730. The following year, United States v. Wade, 388 US. 218 (1967), and
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), were denied retroactivity in Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967). Wade and Gilbert required the exdusion of identification evidence ob-
tained by exhibiting the accused in a lineup in the absence of counsel While admitting that
the purpose of this new rule was aimed at enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding
process, the Court nevertheless decided that the heavy reliance on the previous norms and
the substantial impact upon the administration of justice had "overriding significance." Id. at
298-300.
46. 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
47. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
48. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
49. 391 U.S. at 157-58.
50. 391 US. at 201-02.
51. 392 U.S. at 633.
52. Id. at 634-35. During the 1968-69 term, the Court handed down four per curiam
opinions which granted retroactivity to prior decisions. Berger v. California, 393 US. 314
(1969) (per curiam), gave retroactive effect to Barber v. Page, 390 US. 719 (1968) (absence
of witness from jurisdiction does not justify use at trial of preliminary hearing testimony
unless state made good-faith effort to secure witness' presence); Arsenault v. Massachusetts,
393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam), gave retroactive effect to White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59
(1963) (absence of counsel when defendant pleaded guilty at arraignment held violative of
fourteenth amendment); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 US. 2 (1968) (per curiam), gave retro-
active effect to Mempa v. RIhay, 389 US. 128 (1967) (counsel required for felony defendant
in proceeding for parole revocation and imposition of deferred sentencing by sixth amend-
ment); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 1968) (per curiam), gave retroactive effect to
Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 123 (1968) (admission at joint trial of codefendant's
extrajudidal confession implicating defendant violated defendant's right of cross-examination
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In 1971, the Supreme Court set forth its most recent pronouncement on re-
troactivity standards in Williams v. United States,63 wherein the Court was
asked to determine the retroactivity of Chimel v. California,64 which narrowed
the scope of permissible searches incident to arrest.o5 In holding that Chimel
was not to be applied retroactively, the Williams Court deemphasized the sec-
ond and third considerations of Linkletter"6 and cogently summed up the crucial
standard for retroactivity:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of
the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises
serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has
been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal
authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the
administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these cir-
cumstances.57
In Gosa v. Mayden,58 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has attempted to
predict 9 whether the Supreme Court will apply its decision in O'Callahan v.
Parker60 retroactively. O'Callahan was a habeas corpus proceeding by a peti-
tioner who had been convicted by a court-martial for attempted rape, house-
breaking and assault. 61 The O'Callahan Court held that "since petitioner's
crimes were not service connected, he could not be tried by court-martial but
rather was entitled to trial by the civilian courts."62*
under the sixth amendment). In all these cases, retroactivity was granted because the now
rules related to the fact-finding process. Berger v. California, supra at 315; Arsenault v.
Massachusetts, supra at 6; McConnell v. Rhay, supra at 3-4; Roberts v. Russell, supra at
294-95. The Court never discussed reliance upon the old standards or the effect on the
administration of justice-factors which possess prime importance in decisions which have
denied retroactivity.
Two other decisions decided that term which denied retroactive application were Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (denying retroactivity to Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967)), and Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (per curiam) (denying retro-
activity to Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968)).
53. 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
54. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
55. Id. at 755.
56. 401 U.S. at 651-53. For the three Linkletter standards, see text accompanying note 24
supra.
57. 401 U.S. at 653 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
58. 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971).
59. "The sole, inexorable issue presented by this appeal requires us to predict whether
the Supreme Court of the United States will apply its decision in O'Callahan v. Parker . . .
to comparable proceedings . . . [completed] prior to . . . the date that decision was
announced." Id. at 754 (italics omitted) (citation omitted).
60. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), for the purpose of deciding the retroactivity and scope of
O'Callahan v. Parker, but the Court found that the crime in Relford had a service connec-
tion which O'Callahan lacked, and thus deemed a decision on retroactivity inappropriate.
61. 395 U.S. at 260.
62. Id. at 274. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 365 (1971), enumerates twelve
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Initially, the Gosa court examined the contention that lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was the underlying basis of the O'CaWlhan decision. If this were
true, a court would be confronted with the well-established principle of law
that a decision by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void.0a The
question would then become whether such a jurisdictional defect necessitates
full retroactive application of the O'Callahan decision, or whether the Linkletter
standards for "selective retroactivity" continue to be applicable in this situa-
tion."
Most of the courts which have faced this dilemma have chosen the latter
course.65 In United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee," however, a federal dis-
trict court sitting in New York ignored recent precedents and adhered to the
traditional rule. The Flemings court decided that the Supreme Court's use of
the phrase "lack of jurisdiction" was intended to mean lack of power over the
subject matter67 and rejected the theory that the O'Callahan limitation was
merely functional or procedural.68 The court based its decision on the language
used by the O'Callahan Court,69 which it reasoned was concerned with the
fundamental differences between the civilian and military courts70 and not with
factors which would render a crime service connected. O'Callahan was another indication
that the Supreme Court wished to curtail the jurisdiction of military courts as much as
constitutionally permissible. Previous decisions which have limited the jurisdiction of the
military courts by excluding categories of potential defendants include McElroy v. United
States ex re. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (overseas civilian-employee); Reld v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957) (civilian accompanying overseas serviceman); United States ex re. Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (discharged serviceman). For an analysis of O'Callahan v.
Parker and its significance, see Birnbaum & Fowler, O'Caliahan v. Parker: The Relford
Decision and Further Developments in Military justice, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 729 (1971);
Bimbanm & Fowler, Military Appellate Decisions Following O'Callahan v. Parker, 38
Fordham L. Rev. 673 (1970).
63. See In Re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U .S. 371 (1880).
64. Gosa v. M ayden, 450 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. In United States v. King, ACM No. 20361, 40 C.M.R. 1030, review denied, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 595,40 C.M.R 327 (1969), the Air Force Board of Review handled the problem
by holding that the existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction was never in issue. It reasoned
that the Supreme Court was '"nerely withhold[ing] the exercise of military jurisdiction over
offenses which are not service-connected in a significant way!' 40 CZLR. at 1039. The
lower court in Gosa conceded the fact that the Supreme Court had talked in terms of a
lack of jurisdiction (how could it be denied?) but decided that the general retroactivity
rules were applicable. Gosa v. Mayden, 305 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Fla. 1969), af'd, 450 F.2d
753 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.Mf.A. 264, 265-66, 41 ClR . 264,
265-66 (1970). A federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania, which considered the retro-
activity of O'Callahan, never discussed the issue. Thompson v. Parker, 303 F. Supp. 904
(M.D. Pa.) appeal dismised, No. 18,868 (3d Cir., April 24, 1970).
66. 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); accord, Mercer v. Dillon, 19 US.CM.A. 264,
268-74, 41 C.M.R 264, 268-74 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
67. 330 F. Supp. at 196.
68. Id. at 195-96.
69. Id. at 196.
70. Id.
1972] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
mere procedural defects. The Flemings court thus held that, since O'Callahan
was based on a lack of jurisdiction, the recent retroactivity cases were not
"compelling precedents ' 'rh and O'Callahan must be given retroactive effect.72
The Flemings decision was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.73 The court of appeals concurred in the district
court's reasoning by holding that "O'Callahan must be applied retroactively be-
cause that decision was grounded in the absence of jurisdiction to adjudicate
.... "74 The court held that recent precedents weren't applicable since they were
not based on lack of jurisdictional power but rather on "abuse[s] of properly
vested adjudicatory power."7 5 The Gosa court expressly agreed 0 with the
Flemings rationale that lack of jurisdiction was the basis of O'Callahan but
nevertheless held that this did not "inevitably lead to the necessity for full retro-
spective application" of O'Callahan in light of the "more than half-decade of
precedent for selective retroactivity . . .,
The fact that O'Callahan overruled a legislative enactment presented the
Gosa court with a unique problem in that all the retroactivity precedents of
the Supreme Court had involved the overruling of judicial decisions. Thus, the
court had to determine whether the retroactivity standards were applicable to
a decision which annulled legislative action. Noting that a "completely novel
issue" was presented, 78 the court opted for the retroactivity criteria of Link-
letter.7 9
The purpose of O'Callahan was phrased in two ways. Affirmatively, it was
to secure "the constitutional right of grand jury presentment or indictment
and petit jury trial to servicemen on active duty who were accused of crimes
having no service connection." 98 0 The court decided that if the holding was
stated in such a way, DeStejano v. Woods8l indicated that O'Callahan would
be given only prospective application by the Supreme Court.8 2 It found De-
Stefano to be analagous to O'Callahan because the right to trial by jury was
required in both.
Negatively, the purpose of the O'Callahan holding was that "[it] denied
military jurisdiction which exceeded the least possible power which the Con-
stitution reposed in Congress and did so to avoid numerous incidents and func-
tions of military justice considered less satisfactory to the determination of
guilt than procedures available in civilian courts that would occupy the juris-
71. Id. at 202.
72. Id. at 200.
73. United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, No. 71-1997 (2d Cir., March 28, 1972).
74. Id. at 2418.
75. Id. at 2414.
76. 450 F.2d at 757.
77. Id. at 758.
78. Id. at 757.
79. Id. at 758; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
80. 450 F.2d at 763.
81. 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
82. 450 F.2d at 763.
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dictional vacuunm.11 3 At first glance, this statement appears to fall into the Wil-
liams criterion that rules of criminal procedure which are enacted to enhance
the accuracy of guilty verdicts will be applied retroactively. After admitting
that its conclusion would be largely a subjective one,85 the court faced the
problem of the Williams standard. It set forth six passages"0 which were ex-
tremely critical of the entire system of military justice. Then, somewhat para-
doxically, it stated: "Our direct quotations here are solely for the purpose of
demonstrating that, demeaning of military justice as these remarks may be...
[t]here was no determination that the UCMJ carried a clear danger of con-
victing the innocent, nor . . .substantially impaired the truth-finding func-
tion."87 Indeed, the court found that defendants under military justice have
"many procedural rights which are even more conducive to fact accuracy than
most civilian forums accord."88 The court concluded that O'Callahan held "that
a civilian court trial with grand and petit jury protections would tend to pre-
vent arbitrariness and repression and be fairer."8 9 It again relied on DeStefano
v. Woods in stating that this belief was insufficient to "warrant retroactivity
if other criteria point[ed] strongly to prospective application." 90
The criterion of justified reliance on the old standard was held to dearly
favor prospectivity since the court failed to find any indications that O'Calla-
han was foreshadowed in previous opinions.91 The court handled the problem
of the effect on the administration of justice with the same ease. The hundreds
of thousands of possible appeals weighed heavily against a retroactive applica-
tion of O'CallahanY2
83. Id.
84. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
85. 450 F.2d at 763.
86. Id. at 764.
87. Id. at 765.
88. Id. See generally Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian
Practice, 15 U.CL.A.L. Rev. 1240 (1968). The noted trial attorney F. Lee Bailey has ob-
served: "In my opinion, despite all the criticism leveled at the military, the odds are that a
military court will produce a more accurate verdict in a disputed issue of fact than a civilian
jury' F. Bailey, The Defense Never Rests 259 (1971).
89. 450 F.2d at 765.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 765-66.
92. Id. at 766. The Army has stated that one-half of its military prisoners might be
affected by a retroactive application of O'Callahan v. Parker. It also estimated that 450,000
courts-martial dating from 1951 might be set aside. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, § 1, at 75,
col 3.
An illustration of the types of actions which would result from a retroactive holding of
O'Callahan is a petition by O'Callahan himself, under 28 US.C. § 1491 (1970), for his
military pay from the date of his discharge to the date of the Supreme Court's decision in his
case. The United States Court of Claims held that the six-year statute of limitations, 28
U.S.C. § 2501 (1970), barred his suit. The court stated that the statute began to toll at
the time of his discharge (1961) and not at the time of the Supreme Court decision (1969).
O'Calahan v. United States, 451 F.2d 1390 (Ct. CL 1971); see Crowe v. United States, 452
F.2d 1034 (Ct. CL 1971).
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Subsequent to the Gosa decision, the Second Circuit, applying the Linkletter
criteria in the Flemings case, reached an opposite result. Although the Second
Circuit based its holding on the lack of jurisdiction of military courts to adjudi-
cate non-service connected crimes, it went on in dictum to conclude that the
application of the three-pronged test of Linkletter would still require O'Callahan
to be applied retroactively.9 3 The court expressly disagreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit in regard to the purpose criterion of Linkletter. The Second Circuit held that
the court-martial procedures employed in O'Callahan raised a "clear danger of
convicting the innocent"'9 4 since they were not conducive to the effective presen-
tation of a defense. 5 But perhaps of greater significance was the Second Cir-
cuit's belief that the impact of a retroactive holding would not be as "staggering"
as the Fifth Circuit had predicted.96 Finally, the court discussed the "far-reach-
ing institutional considerations" which reinforced its conclusion that O'Callahan
must be applied retroactively. It pointed out that since "the Supreme Court
always has applied new rules announced in habeas corpus cases retroactively," 7
O'Callahan-a habeas corpus proceeding-was also entitled to retroactive appli-
cation.98
As Williams v. United States indicated, the fundamental question in a deter-
mination of retroactivity is whether there is a substantial chance that petitioner
would have been acquitted if he was afforded his full constitutional privileges.
In other words, did the deprivation of petitioner's rights deprive him of a fair
trial? Thus, the issue becomes one of due process.
The Supreme Court will grant retroactivity if the old standard had a sub-
stantial chance of depriving innocent people of their constitutional rights and
convicting them. However, the Court will not grant retroactivity if the old
norm merely deprived guilty people of their rights by unconstitutionally con-
victing them. The purpose factor in the Linkletter test99 remains important in
this schema. If the purpose of the new rule is designed to improve the reliability
93. United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, No. 71-1997, at 2418 (2d Cir., March 28,
1972).
94. Id. at 2423.
95. The court pointed to two deficiencies in court-martial procedures: First, that the
officer assigned as counsel to a defendant was not required to have any legal training; and
secondly, "the right to compulsory process for obtaining evidence and witnesses was, to a
significant extent, dependent on the approval of the prosecution." Id. at 2422.
96. Id. at 2423-25. The Second Circuit relied on four factors in reaching this conclusion:
(1) Many petitions would be eliminated if the offense involved was within the Relford
standards for service-related crimes (see notes 60 and 62 supra), (2) each branch of the
military had established procedures which would adequately handle the claims, (3) very
few servicemen had actually sought collateral review of their convictions under O'Callahan,
and (4) the administrative burden could be further reduced if Congress adopted a short
statute of limitations.
97. Id. at 2426, citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
98. United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, No. 71-1997, at 2426-27 (2d Cir., March
28, 1972).
99. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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of the fact-finding process, it decreases the possibility that innocent people will
be convicted. Therefore, under this analysis, O'Callahan would not be entitled
to retroactive application since it was not designed to enhance the fact-finding
processes of military trials. Furthermore, the substantial reliance by the mili-
tary authorities on the old rule and the enormous impact on the administration
of justice would militate against a ruling of retroactivity.
The fact remains that Gosa is unlike the previous retroactivity cases which
have come before the Court. In those cases, the Court was solely concerned
with functional and constitutional issues, while O'Callahan presented a juris-
dictional issue. The Flemings rationale0 0 is logically correct if the basis of the
O'Callakan holding was that military courts lacked jurisdiction over non-service
related crimes. If this were the case, recent retroactivity precedents would be
dearly inapplicable to the O'Callalzn situation. On the other hand, the Gosa
result would avoid the calamitous effect on the military justice system which
may result from a retroactive application of O'Callahan.
It is now the task of the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict between the
circuits.' 0 ' If the Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Gosa, it should
attempt to reconcile this holding with the principle that judgments rendered by
a court which lacks jurisdiction are void-a task which the Gosa court avoided.
Since the O'Callahan Court was not explicit in explaining its rationale, it is
tenable that the Court will be able to achieve such a reconciliation by demon-
strating that the underlying basis of O'Calhhan was functional rather than
jurisdictional. In so doing, the Court will have at least met the contention that
the jurisdictional issue in O'Callaln necessitates mandatory retroactivity.
Criminal Law-Right to Appeal-Failure of Counsel to Advise Defendant
of His Right to Appeal After a Plea of Guilty Held Insufficient Ground to
Require a Montgomery Hearing.-Petitioners Lynn' and Saundersi- in un-
100. See text accompanying notes 66-75 supra.
101. Compare Schlomann v. Moseley, No. 433-70 (10th Cir., March 24, 1972), and Gosa
v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), and Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904 (M.D.
Pa.), appeal dismissed, No. 18,868 (3d Cir., April 24, 1970), with United States ex rel.
Flemings v. Chafee, No. 71-1997 (2d Cir., March 28, 1972).
1. Lynn was indicted for murder in the first degree. After proceeding to trial, the defen-
dant chose to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
manslaughter in the first degree. As a second felony offender, Lynn was sentenced on Dec.
28, 1951 to a term of not less than 10 years nor more than 30 years imprisonment. On
May 29, 1969, more than 17 years after he had been sentenced, defendant submitted an
application for a writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had entered a plea of guilty
with the understanding that he would receive a sentence of no longer than 20 years, that
counsel failed to inform him of his right to appeal and that until two recent decisions of
the court he was unaware that he had such a right. People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 199,
269 N.E.2d 794, 795, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (1971).
2. Saunders was indicted for robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree
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related cases pleaded guilty to manslaughter and robbery respectively. Subse-
quently, while serving their sentences, each applied for a writ of error coram
nobis,3 alleging that counsel had failed to advise them of their right to appeal.4
The supreme court denied their petitions, distinguishing People v. Montgomery,o
wherein the New York Court of Appeals held "that every defendant has a
fundamental right to appeal his conviction .... "a The appellate division7 and
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The court of appeals held
that where a defendant has pleaded guilty, he must allege more than a failure to
be informed of his right to appeal; he must also allege that he was not aware
of his right to appeal, and that he had "a genuine appealable issue" which he
might have raised had he been aware of his right to appeal. People v. Lynn, 28
N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E.2d 794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971).
The right to appellate review of criminal convictions was not available at
and assault in the second degree. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the crime of
robbery in the second degree in satisfaction of all charges against him and on Feb. 6,
1962 was sentenced to a term of S to 10 years imprisonment. On Sept. 5, 1968, more than
6 years after he had been sentenced, defendant submitted a letter which the court treated
as an application for a writ of error coramn nobis alleging counsels failure to inform him
of his right to appeal. Id. at 200, 269 NE.2d at 795-96, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
3. "A writ of error coram nobis is a common law writ of ancient origin devised by the
Judiciary and used to bring before a court a judgment previously rendered by it for the
purpose of review or modification, on account of some error of fact and not of law affecting
the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which was not brought into Issue at
the trial thereof. The writ differs from an ordinary writ of error in that it does not re-
move the case to a higher court for review and that it lies only for errors of fact not
apparent of record, instead of only for errors of law apparent of record." People v. Martine,
103 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89-90 (Kings County Ct.), rev'd mem., 278 App. Div. 966, 105 N.Y.S.2d
673 (2d Dep't 1951), aff'd mem., 303 N.Y. 789, 103 NXE.2d 897 (1952); see People v.
Wurzler, 300 N.Y. 344, 90 N.E.2d 886 (1950) (per curiam) (only the court in which
defendant is tried and convicted has power to hear application for writ of error coram
nobis); People v. Snelling, 33 Misc. 2d 735, 227 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962) (writ
of coram nobis may not be used to review errors of law); People v. Hoffner, 191 Misc.
419, 76 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Queens County Ct. 1947) (motion for writ of coram nobis denied
where record failed to indicate that verdict was induced by fraud or that constitutional
rights of defendant were violated and there was no fact to be reviewed which had not
already been reviewed by the appropriate court). See generally Lyons v. Goldstein, 290
N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943) (reopening judgment of conviction after defendant had
begun term of imprisonment). For a discussion of post-conviction relief in general and
coram nobis relief in particular, see Cohen, Post-Conviction Relief in the New York Court
of Appeals: New Wine and Broken Bottles, 35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1968).
4. 28 N.Y.2d at 199-200, 269 N.E.2d at 795-96, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77.
5. 24 N.Y.2d 130, 247 N.E.2d 130, 299 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1969).
6. Id. at 132, 247 N.E.2d at 132, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159. See text accompanying note 23
infra.
7. People v. Saunders, 35 App. Div. 2d 591, 313 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.),
aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E.2d 794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971); People v. Lynn, 35 App.
Div. 2d 589, 314 N.Y.S.2d 346 (2d Dep't 1970) (mer.), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E.2d
794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971).
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common laws and is not guaranteed by the United States ConstitutionP In
Griffin v. Illinois ° Justice Frankfurter wrote in a concurring opinion:
The right to an appeal from a conviction for crime is today so established that this
leads to the easy assumption that it is fundamental to the protection of life and liberty
and therefore a necessary ingredient of due process of law... [However,] . ..it
is now settled that due process of law does not require a State to afford review of
criminal judgments."
The present system of criminal appeals in most states is a product of legislative
enactments and judicial construction of the individual state, and as a result is
far from uniform.l2 The dispute over the existence of a constitutional guarantee
has become academic, since virtually all states have recognized the right to
appellate review of convictions for significant crimes 3
In New York, the first statute granting the right to appeal from a criminal
conviction was enacted in 1881; 14 its modem equivalent is codified in the
8. Hood, The Right of Appeal, 29 La. L. Rev. 498, 499 (1969); Note, Late Filing of
Criminal Appeals, 17 Hastings LJ. 132 (1965).
9. The United States Constitution does not provide for the right of appellate review.
The argument has been presented that such a right exists under the due process clause of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. However, this view has never been accepted by the
Supreme Court. In McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), the Court stated: "An
appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of
constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review by an appellate court
of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused
is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a necessary element of due process
of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a
review." See, e.g., Grfin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S.
293, 297-98 (1895); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895). See also Carter v.
Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946), where the Court stated that, except for limitations im-
posed by the federal criminal code, the prosecution of crime, including the establishment
of systems of review in criminal cases, is within the discretion and power of the individual
states. One author has pointed out that although the federal constitution does not guarantee
a right of appeal, it does provide that the Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction
in a very limited number of cases, thereby intimating that in some cases a litigant should
have an absolute right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Hood, supra note 8, at 503.
10. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11. Id. at 20-21 (concurring opinion); see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365
(1963) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
12. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals
§ 1.1, commentaries a, b, c, d at 15-22 (Approved Draft, 1970). See also Note, Failure to
File Timely Notice of Appeal in Criminal Cases: Excusable Neglect, 41 Notre Dame Law.
73, 77-80 (1965), for a discussion of treatment of the timely appeal problem by various
states.
13. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 1235, 1237, 1237.5, 1239 (West 1970); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 23-113 (1967); Fla. Stat. Ann. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.850 (1967); I. Rev. Stat. ch. l1OA,
§§ 601-05 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, § 18 (1968); AMinn. Stat. § 632.01 (1967); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.02 (Page Supp. 1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1181-82, 1188-89
(1964).
14. Law of June 1, 1881, ch. 442 [1881] N.Y. Laws 104th Sess. 601.
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Criminal Procedure Law.1 5 The early New York cases held the right to be ex-
clusively statutory and therefore construed it strictly.10 The leading contempo-
rary New York case on the right to appeal is People v. Montgomery.1 In
Montgomery the defendant, a boy of fifteen, was tried and found guilty of
second degree murder, receiving a sentence of 25 years to life in the state
prison.' 8 No appeal was taken from this conviction. Ten years later, Mont-
gomery applied for a writ of error coram nobis,'0 alleging that due to his "indi-
gency, ignorance and infancy at the time of his conviction," 20 he was denied his
right of appeal. He maintained that he was not informed either by court-
appointed counsel or anyone else of his absolute right to appeal.21 Furthermore,
he claimed that since he was an indigent, the state had an obligation to inform
him of this right.22 Thus the court of appeals was faced with a question as to
whether or not defendant's allegation that he was not informed of this right
raised an issue of fact which required a hearing to determine the truth of the
contention. In response the court said:
The time has come for us to announce clearly that every defendant has a fundamental
right to appeal his conviction and that, accordingly, basic fairness and due process
require that the right not be dissipated either because the defendant was unaware
of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an
appeal.23
The court qualified this broad statement, however, with the caveat that courts
15. N.Y. Crim. Pro. L. § 450.10 (McKinney 1971). The law states: "An appeal to an
intermediate appellate court may be taken as of right by the defendant from the following
judgment, sentence and order of a criminal court:
1. A judgment other than one including a sentence of death;
2. A sentence other than one of death, as prescribed in subdivision one of section 450.30;
3. An order, entered pursuant to section 440.40, setting aside a sentence other than one of
death, upon motion of the People." Id.
This section provides the basic right to appeal from all criminal convictions. Id.
§ 450.70 provides for direct appeal to the court of appeals as a matter of right upon
a sentence of death.
16. E.g., People v. Rossi, 5 N.Y.2d 396, 157 N.E.2d 859, 185 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1959); People
v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427, cert. dismissed, 326 U.S. 687 (1945); People v.
Reed, 276 N.Y. 5, 11 N.E.2d 330 (1937); People v. Zerillo, 200 N.Y. 443, 93 N.E. 1108
(1911); People v. Green, 137 App. Div. 763, 122 N.Y.S. 571 (1st Dep't 1910) (per curiam).
17. 24 N.Y.2d 130, 247 N.E.2d 130, 299 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1969).
18. Id. at 131, 247 N.E.2d at 131, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
19. Id., 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
20. Id., 247 N.E.2d at 131-32, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
21. Id., 247 N.E.2d at 132, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159. See text accompanying notes 9-15
supra.
22. 24 N.Y.2d at 131, 247 N.E.2d at 132, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159. See Note, Late Filing of
Criminal Appeals, 17 Hastings L.J. 132, 137-38 (1965), where the author discusses the
plight of the indigent criminal defendant who often loses his right to appeal because as.
signed counsel fails either to advise him of his right to appeal or to aid him in perfecting
that right.
23. 24 N.Y.2d at 132, 247 N.E.2d at 132, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
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should not try to "second guess counsel," 24 since often the decision to file or not
to file an appeal is part of the overall trial strategy. In further discussing the
role of court appointed counsel, the court noted: "An indigent defendant cannot
lose his right to appeal simply because the courts have deputized a lawyer to
fulfill the function and he has failed properly to carry out his duties.'" - The
court was cognizant of the fact that the defendant had no previous experience
with the law, and therefore he could not have been presumed to have been
aware of his right to appeal.20 The court held that Montgomery should be
accorded a hearing to determine whether in fact he had been informed of his
right to appeal. If the hearing determined that he had not been so informed,
then he had dearly been denied the equal protection of the law and should
be resentenced to start the time for appeal running anew. 7
The practical application of the broad Montgomery rule of right to appeal
has resulted in diverse decisions among the various departments of the appel-
late division, particularly in regard to a defendant's right to appeal from a plea
of guilty. s In People v. Lo Piccolo- the first department affirmed, without
opinion, the denial of defendant's application for coram nobis relief where the
defendant alleged that he had been unaware of his right to appeal and his
assigned counsel had failed to inform him of this right.3o In the original order
denying the coram nobis application,31 the lower court had stated: "'The issue
here presented is whether Montgomery, supra, should be interpreted as requir-
ing a reinstatement of a defendant's right to appeal in every case in which
a defendant asserts the magical words that he had not been advised of his
right to appeal. Such pro forma application of Montgomery is clearly unwar-
24. Id.; accord People v. Bell, 36 App. Div. 2d 406, 321 N.YS.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1971).
25. 24 N.Y.2d at 133, 247 N.E.2d at 133, 299 N.YS.2d at 160.
26. Id. judge Breitel, in a dissenting opinion joined by judges Sdleppl and Jasex, as-
serted that the majority had been swayed by the harsh sentence given to the young defen-
dant. Although he acknowledged the fact that of the three co-defendants Montgomery
fared the worst, he also noted that Montgomery was the "actual killer" and expressed his
belief that his three court-assigned lawyers had "done quite well for him," observing that
if the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder he would have faced the pos-
sibility of a death sentence. Id. at 135, 247 N.E.2d at 133-34, 299 N.YS.2d at 161-62.
Judge Breitel concluded that Montgomery had chosen to forego his right to appeal, and
that it was only in light of his co-defendant's successful appeal that Montgomery regretted
his choice. He stated that "[tlhe harsh sentence is no reason for condoning false applica-
tions or creating unwise rles of general application." Id. at 136, 247 N.E2d at 135, 299
N.Y.S.2d at 163.
27. Id. at 134, 247 N.E.2d at 133, 299 N.YS.2d at 161.
28. See People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E2d 794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971), for a
discussion of the conflict within and among the various departments. See also notes 29-52
infra.
29. 35 App. Div. 2d 1086, 316 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Ist Dep't 1970) (mem.).
30. Record, vol 347, Brief for Respondent at 4, People v. Lo Piccolo, 35 App. Div. 2d
1086, 316 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1st Dep't 1970) (mem.).
31. Id.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ranted.' ",32 Lo Piccolo is representative of the decisions of the first department
on this question. Generally the court has affirmed, without opinion, the order
of any lower court denying coram nobis relief where the defendant alleged the
failure of his counsel to inform him of his right to appeal 38
In People v. Powe34 the second department reviewed an order denying de-
fendant's application for coram nobis in which he sought to be resentenced
after completion of his term of imprisonment on the ground that counsel had
failed to advise him of his right to appeal. The supreme court distinguished
Powe from Montgomery on the factual basis that Powe had been convicted
upon a plea of guilty and had completed serving his sentence before the ap-
plication for coram nobis relief was submitted, whereas Montgomery had been
convicted after a trial and was serving his sentence at the time of the applica-
tion.3 5 The second department, holding that those distinctions could not form
a basis for denying defendant's application, reversed and ordered a hearing.80
Similarly, in People v. Nostro, 7 the second department held that defendant's
allegation that counsel had failed to advise him of his right to appeal from a
conviction upon a plea of guilty was sufficient to require a hearing.88 However,
in People v. Greene,89 the second department altered its earlier standard. In
this case the allegation of a failure to be informed of a right to appeal from
a conviction upon a plea of guilty was held insufficient.40 The new standard
required that the defendant allege: 1) that he was not informed of his right
to appeal; 2) that he was not aware of his right to appeal; and 3) that he
would have appealed had he been aware. 4'
The third department in People v. Welsh' 2 held that a defendant's allegation
of counsel's failure to advise him of his right to appeal after a plea of guilty
raised an issue of fact sufficient to require a hearing.43 Subsequently, in People
32. Id. at 4-5, quoting the same judge's earlier opinion in People v. Albano, 162
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1969, at 17, cols. 5-8 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
33. See, e.g., Record, vol. 34, Brief for Respondent at 3, People v. Kancar, 36 App. Dlv.
2d 513, 317 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1970), aft'd, 28 N.Y.2d 868, 271 N.E.2d 233, 322
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1971) (mem.); Record, vol. 51, Appendix for Appellant at A13, People v.
Carlos, 26 N.Y.2d 797, 257 N.E.2d 664, 309 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1970) (mem.).
34. 34 App. Div. 2d 961, 312 N.Y.S.2d 3 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
35. Id., 312 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4.
36. Id., 312 N.Y.S.2d at 4; accord, People v. Brown, 33 App. Div. 2d 1031, 309
N.Y.S.2d 120 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
37. 33 App. Div. 2d 693, 306 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.).
38. Id., 306 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
39. 35 App. Div. 2d 587, 313 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
40. Id., 313 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
41. Id.; accord, People v. Seible, 36 App. Div. 2d 828, 321 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1971)
(mem.), holding that allegations in an application for a writ of error coram nobis that de-
fendant was unaware of his right to appeal at the time of his conviction upon a plea of
guilty and that he would have appealed if aware were sufficient to require a hearing. Id. at
828-29, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
42. 35 App. Div. 2d 854, 315 N.Y.S.2d 256 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
43. Id., 315 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
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v. Ali " the third department altered this test by adding the requirement "that
during the time allowed for taking an appeal defendant disputed the validity
of the judgment of conviction but was nevertheless prevented from prosecuting
an appeal by reason of ignorance or improper advice as to his rights."41
In People v. Haynes" the fourth department reversed the lower court's de-
nial of an application for a writ of error coram nobis,47 asserting that a defen-
dant should not be "required to prove that his appeal has substantial merit
before he is entitled to the hearing"48 and granted a hearing on the basis of
defendant's allegation that he had not been informed of his right to appeal
after a plea of guilty. 9 The court qualified this position in People v. Murphy, °
however, holding that more than a mere allegation of a failure to be informed
of the right to appeal is required.51 In addition, a defendant must allege that
"during the time allowed for taking an appeal he disputed the validity of the
judgments of convictions, or that he had a valid ground for appeal."5 2
These cases dearly indicate a gradual shift in the two years following the
Montgomery decision.53 In the first department one standard was applied con-
sistently throughout the periodYr1 In each of the other departments, the appel-
late division altered its earlier standard and began to require more than the
mere allegation that the defendant had not been advised by his counsel of his
right to appeal after a plea of guilty.Y5
44. 35 App. Div. 2d 435, 317 N.Y.S.2d 377 (3d Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 437, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 380. Two separate appeals were involved in this decision.
In People v. Ali, the court held that although it was error to decide without a hearing
whether defendant was advised by counsel of his right to appeal, a hearing was unnecessary
because of defendant's failure to allege that he wished to appeal and would have done so
had he been informed of his right. Id. In People v. Shaw, defendant alleged that he had
asked his assigned counsel to appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty and was
told it was not appealable. The court aflirmed the denial of the application for coram nobis
relief based on the "absence of verified allegations." Id. at 439-40, 317 N.Y.S2d 382-83.
46. 33 App. Div. 2d 992 (4th Dep't 1970) (mere.).
47. People v. Haynes, 60 Misc. 2d 671, 303 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Monroe County CL 1969),
rev'd, 33 App. Div. 2d 992 (4th Dep't 1970) (mere.).
48. 33 App. Div. 2d at 992.
49. Id.
50. 36 App. Div. 2d 684, 319 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1971) (mere.).
51. Id. at 685, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
52. Id.
53. Compare People v. Powe, 34 App. Div. 2d 961, 312 N.Y.S.2d 3 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mere.), with People v. Greene, 35 App. Div. 2d 587, 313 N.YS.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.). Compare People v. Welsh, 35 App. Div. 2d 854, 315 N.Y.S.2d 256 (3d Dep't 1970)
(mere.), with People v. All, 35 App. Div. 2d 435, 317 N.Y.S2d 377 (3d Dep't 1971) (per
curiam). Compare People v. Haynes, 33 App. Div. 2d 992 (4th Dep't 1970) (mem.), with
People v. Murphy, 36 App. Div. 2d 684, 319 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1971) (mem.).
54. See People v. Lo Piccolo, 35 App. Div. 2d 1086, 316 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1st Dep't 1970)
(mem.); text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
55. E.g., People v. Murphy, 36 App. Div. 2d 684, 319 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1971)
(mem.); People v. Ali, 35 App. Div. 2d 435, 317 N.Y.S.2d 377 (3d Dep't 1971) (per
curiam); People v. Greene, 35 App. Div. 2d 587, 313 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1970) (mere.).
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The petitions of Lynn and Saunders presented the court of appeals with the
opportunity to clarify the test which was to be applied in this area. In Lynn
and Saunders the issue was more refined than in Montgomery, since it involved
defendants who had waived the right to litigate their innocence and had chosen
instead to plead guilty. 6 The question presented was whether a defendant's
allegation that he was not informed by counsel of his right to appeal from a
judgment entered upon a plea of guilty would be sufficient in itself to merit
a hearing. The supreme court, in both Lynn and Saunders, denied the coram
nobis applications without a hearing on the ground that they were distinguish-
able from Montgomery since they involved a plea situation, and the appellate
division affirmed. 57 Thus the issue before the court of appeals was whether such
a factual distinction could stand as the basis for denying a hearing.58
The court discussed the differences between a plea of guilty and a conviction
after trial, relative to the right to appeal. The court said: "A plea of guilty
'is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it
is itself a conviction [and] nothing [else] remains but to give judgment and
determine punishment.' "9 Furthermore, a plea of guilty is a decision by the
defendant not to litigate the question of his guilt, and is the result of trial
strategy which chooses to forego certain constitutional rights 0 in exchange for
a lessening of the charges. "Considering trial strategies," the court said, "it
seems somewhat absurd, as a general matter, to require that the defendant be
so advised [of his right to appeal] where he is well satisfied with the bargain
he has struck and stands to lose those very benefits on review."0 1 In view of
these circumstances, the court asserted that a defendant should not years later
be allowed to assert that he was denied his right to appeal when the prosecu-
tion may not then be prepared to prove its case.0 2 The court noted that a trial
indicates that the defendant intends to litigate the legal or factual issues and
it may be presumed that the defendant would continue to contest the court's
findings through appellate review.63 On the other hand, the court stated, in the
plea situation a defendant "tacitly indicates that no further judicial inquiry
56. People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 201-02, 269 N.E.2d 787, 796-97, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74,
78-79 (1971).
57. People v. Saunders, 35 App. Div. 2d 591, 313 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.),
aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 NXE.2d 794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971) ; People v. Lynn, 35 App. Div.
2d 589, 314 N.Y.S.2d 346 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), aff1d, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E.2d 794,
321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971).
58. 28 N.Y.2d at 201, 269 N.E.2d at 796, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
59. Id., 269 N.E.2d at 797, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 78, quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969).
60. 28 N.Y.2d at 201-02, 269 N.E.2d at 797, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court mentioned
waiver of the right to confrontation, the privilege against self incrimination, and the right to
trial by jury, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970); Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 403 U.S. 926 (1971).
61. 28 N.Y.2d at 202, 269 N.E.2d at 797, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
62. Id., 321 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79; see notes 1, 2 & 26 supra.
63. 28 N.Y.2d at 202, 269 N.E.2d at 797, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
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is required"6 4 and it may be presumed that the defendant would "desire to
forego appellate review."16 5 The court concluded that the nature of the guilty
plea dictated that a different result follow.10 It ruled, therefore, that the test
in a plea situation should be that "during the time allowed for taking an ap-
peal, the defendant disputed the validity of the judgment of conviction but,
by reason of ignorance or improper advice of counsel, was prevented from
prosecuting an appeal." *t
The court of appeals was presented with the opportunity in Lynn and Saun-
ders to resolve the conflict which existed between the departments of the ap-
pellate division by establishing a uniform interpretation of Montgomery with
respect to a defendant who pleaded guilty. One extreme which the court could
have adopted would have been the literal application of the rule, namely to
allow a hearing solely on defendant's allegation that he had not been informed
of his right to appeal. The other extreme would have been to require the de-
fendant to show that his appeal had substantial merit in his coram nobis pe-
tition before allowing a hearing. The former would certainly have allowed
groundless appeals in pursuit of a technical right, whereas the latter would
undoubtedly have precluded legitimate appeals. In a practical approach to the
problem, the court chose the middle ground and demanded that the defendant
allege that he disputed the validity of the judgment of conviction. This appears
to be a sound rule since it questions the sincerity of the defendant's claim,
requiring him to rebut the natural presumption that in pleading guilty he chose
to forego appellate review. All the defendant need allege is a dissatisfaction
with the conviction during the time that he would have been allowed to appeal.
The mere claim of a technical right without a reason is a claim without sub-
stance and should be denied. The decisiones should be hailed as a small victory
for common sense and the integrity of the concept of right to appeal. The para-
mount consideration is the sincerity of defendant's petition. This is admirable,
as "[t]he law deals with remedies, not rituals."0 9
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 203, 269 N.E.2d at 798, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
68. The court noted that there were situations where the mere allegation of a failure to
be advised of the right to appeal would require a Montgomery hearing. This would include
a "viable" claim of excessive sentence, citing People v. Rastorfer, 35 App. Div. 2d 703, 314
N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1st Dep't 1970) (mere.), as well as claims under sections 813-c and 813-g
of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, (N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. §§ 813-c, 813-g
(McKinney 1958), superseded by N.Y. Crim. Pro. L. art. 710 (McKinney 1971)). 28 N.Y.2d
at 203, 269 N.E.2d at 798, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
69. People v. Haynes, 60 Misc. 2d 671, 673, 303 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (Monroe County Ct.
1969).
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Domestic Relations--Contribution by Donee to Cost of Pre-Nuptial Gift
Creates a Lien on the Gift to the Extent of Contribution but Does Not De-
feat Right of Donor to Recover the Gift upon Failure of the Engagement.-
Plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband were divorced in May, 1960 after seven
years of marriage, yet resumed living together two months later with "the ex-
pectation that they would ultimately remarry."1 This period of reconciliation
extended until the spring of 1962 when the plaintiff moved out of the family
home. During this time, the defendant purchased two parcels of real property.
At the request of the defendant, title to both parcels was vested in "'Elmer
Gaden, Jr., and Dorothy J. Gaden, his wife . . . .,-2 The sales necessitated loan
commitments which were obtained by the defendant and then secured by promis-
sory notes executed by both parties. Down payments were furnished solely by
the defendant as were the subsequent principal and interest payments. In De-
cember, 1967 plaintiff, as a tenant in common, brought this suit for partition of
both parcels based on her assumption of legal liability under the promissory
notes. Defendant counterclaimed for the imposition of a constructive trust and
for rescission, based on a claim that the creation of a tenancy in common was a
gift conditioned upon remarriage of the parties.3 The trial court dismissed the
complaint and granted the counterclaim on the condition that plaintiff be released
from all liability on the notes.4 The appellate division reversed on the law, dis-
missed the counterclaim and granted partition.5 On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the parcels of land in question were
recoverable as pre-nuptial gifts under section 80-b of the New York Civil Rights
Law6 and that such recovery should be determined without regard to the fault of
either party. Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 272 N.E.2d 471, 323 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1971).
At common law, New York traditionally granted the donor of an engagement
gift a qualified right to sue for the return of the gift upon the cancellation of
the prospective marriage.7 The rationale underlying this right of recovery was
that the gift was conditioned on the consummation of the contemplated marriage
and that title to the gift reverted back to the donor upon the breaking of the
engagement. 8 Although this remedy was also available to third party donors, D
1. Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 83, 272 NE.2d 471, 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1971).
2. Id. at 83, 272 N.E.2d at 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
3. Id. at 83-84, 272 N.E.2d at 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
4. Id. at 84, 272 N.E.2d at 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
5. Gaden v. Gaden, 34 App. Div. 2d 550, 309 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), rev'd,
29 N.Y.2d 80, 272 N.E.2d 471, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1971).
6. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
7. E.g., Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 34, 276 N.Y.S. 232, 233 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd mem., 267 N.Y. 570, 196 N.E. 584 (1935); Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 730-33,
262 N.Y.S. 716, 718-20 (1st Dep't 1933); see H. Clark, Jr., Domestic Relations § 1.6 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Clark]; Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579, 588-89 (1952). See also Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 1365 (1961), for a discussion of rights in wedding gifts as between spouses.
8. Clark § 1.6.
9. Id. at 23.
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it was generally considered to stem from the common law action for breach of
promise to marry.' ° As such, the donor's right of return was subject to the same
defenses available in a breach of promise suit." The donor, therefore, could
not recover where the cancellation had resulted from his or her own unjustifi-
able breach of promise to marry.'
The common law cause of action for breach of a marriage promise originated
in seventeenth century England.'3 It was spawned by the essentially commer-
cial function which marriages frequently served at that time, and was designed
to afford relief to a party aggrieved by a broken engagement. 4 Engaged couples
were considered parties to a contract and entitled to legal recognition of the
rights and liabilities which traditionally flowed from that contract.15 Despite
the contractual form of the action, however, tort damages were recoverable,' 0
including punitive damages in an aggravated case.' 7 Fault was thus an impor-
tant element in determining not only whether the plaintiff recovered but also
the extent of his or her recovery.'8
The early decisions of the lower New York courts construing rights in con-
ditional gifts given in contemplation of an abortive marriage were divided on
the question of whether such gifts were subject to an express or implied condi-
tion. 9 Those which adopted the former view presumed that all engagement
gifts perfected by delivery were absolute in the absence of any showing that
the donor and donee had, by means of an express condition, specifically con-
tracted with reference to the gift.20 Recovery was permitted only upon pleading
and proof that the gift was made expressly conditional upon marriage, and that
this condition had been accepted by the donee upon receipt.21
On the other hand, New York courts which adopted an implied condition
10. Id. § 1-5, at 18.
11. Id. § 1.3. Among the defenses recognized were fraud or unwillingness to marry on
the part of the plaintiff, infancy on the part of the defendant, and mutual rescission of the
engagement. Id.
12. Id. § 1.6, at 23.
13. Id. § 1.1, at 1; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm", 33 Mich. L. Rev.
979, 980 (1935).
14. Clark § 1.1, at 2.
15. Id.; see Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579, 582-85 (1952).
16. Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). Damages were awarded
in the sound discretion of the jury. Id. at 261.
17. Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N.Y. 474 (1870); Johnson v. Jenkins, 24 N.Y. 252 (1862).
The award of punitive damages in a suit for breach of promise to marry is an exception
to the rule that exemplary damages should only be allowed in tort actions. See McCormick,
Damages § 111, at 402 (1935).
18. See Clark § 1.3.
19. See cases cited notes 20-22 infra.
20. Wertheimer v. Baum, 59 Aisc. 527, Ill N.YS. 18 (App. T., Ist Dep't 1903); Strom-
berg v. Rubenstein, 19 Mlisc. 647, 44 N.YS. 405 (App. T., Ist Dep't 1897).
21. Wertheimer v. Baum, 59 Misc. 527, 528, 111 N.Y.S. 18, 19 (App. T., Ist Dep't
1908); Stromberg v. Rubenstein, 19 Misc. 647, 648-49, 44 N.YS. 405, 405-06 (App. T.,
Ist Dep't 1897).
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theory held that only gifts delivered before the actual engagement were abso-
lute." A condition implied by law, however, would be attached to any gift
given after the engagement.23 Under this theory, a gift was recoverable unless
there was a showing of an express intention on the part of the donor to make
the gift absolute.24 The net effect of this implied condition was that gifts were
presumed conditional rather than absolute and the burden of rebutting that
presumption was necessarily placed on the donee .2  Moreover, in imposing an
implied condition, these New York courts and the majority of American courts
that have considered the question have taken notice of the practical circum-
stances surrounding engagements and the giving of engagement gifts.20 Unlike
seventeenth century England, engagements in the twentieth century do not or-
dinarily take place in a commercially contracted environment where parties are
generally deemed to be dealing at arm's length.27
This split in New York authority was tentatively resolved in favor of the
express condition requirement in 1924 when the issue first came before the ap-
pellate division in Rosenberg v. Lewis.28 Relying on an implied condition theory,
the plaintiff in Rosenberg sought to recover articles of jewelry given as engage-
ment gifts to the defendant who then allegedly broke the engagement. 29 The
appellate division, however, apparently endorsed the express condition doctrine
when it dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to al-
lege an agreement or understanding between the parties that the gifts would
be returned if the engagement was broken. The court declared:
Gifts of the kind referred to may be conditionally made, but to state a cause of
action for their recovery the complaint must allege facts to show that there was an
understanding that they were so presented to the donee.... The complaint fails to
show that the defendant knew that any such condition attached to the gifts or that
she agreed to return them if she failed to marry the plaintiff.80
22. See Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N.Y.S. 100 (App. T., 1st Dep't
1922) (gifts other than engagement rings held subject to an implied condition); Benedict
v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189 N.Y.S. 104 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1921) (engagement rings
subject to implied condition); Cushing v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N.Y.S. 200 (Sup. Ct.
1922) (money held subject to implied condition).
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
24. See Clark § 1.6.
25. Id. at 22. "Most courts avoid too minute an examination of the probable intent
of the parties as revealed by the circumstances of the gift, by holding that if the gift Is
made after the parties become engaged, it is in contemplation of their marriage, and Is
assumed to be conditioned upon the marriage's taking place." Id. (footnote omitted).
26. Id.; see, e.g., Humble v. Gay, 168 Cal. 516, 143 P. 778 (1914); Lumsden v. Arbaugh,
207 Mo. App. 561, 227 S.W. 868 (1921); Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 A. 279
(1890); Burke v. Nutter, 79 W. Va. 743, 91 S.E. 812 (1917). See also notes 31-35 infra
and accompanying text.
27. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
28. 210 App. Div. 690, 206 N.Y.S. 353 (1st Dep't 1924). The court specifically relied
on Stromberg v. Rubenstein, 19 Misc. 647, 44 N.Y.S. 405 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1897). 210
App. Div. at 692-93, 206 N.Y.S. at 354.
29. 210 App. Div. at 691, 206 N.Y.S. at 353.
30. Id., 206 N.Y.S. at 354.
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Rosenberg appeared to be the law in New York until 1933 when the appellate
division recognized the implied condition theory in Beck v. Cohen.31 Beck dealt
only with the return of an engagement ring following a breach by the donee
of her promise to marryP The court stressed the ring's special symbolism,
and found an implied promise to return inherent in its natureP The court held
that:
[A]n engagement ring is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of marriage and
that if the recipient break the contract, she should return the ring.... Such a ring
is a symbol hallowed by social usage. That it is a conditional gift seems inherent in
its very purpose. Possession should be retained during the engagement, which it sym-
bolizes, and is changed into firm ownership upon marriage. When the engagement fails,
the symbol of its existence should be returned to him who gave it.34
In view of the court's emphasis on the symbolic nature of engagement rings,
the implied condition in Beck might have been limited to cases involving similar
property. The court, however, also cited with approval the "weight of authority"
which held "that any gift to the lady to whom the donor is engaged to be mar-
ried, made in contemplation of marriage, is conditional and upon breach of the
marriage engagement by the recipient, the donor may recover the property.'1*
This endorsement of a broad application of the implied condition theory, when
coupled with the same court's sweeping condemnation of the strict application
of contract principles to engaged parties in Wilson v. Riggs,3 0 decided the fol-
lowing year and subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals, would indicate
that New York regarded all pre-nuptial gifts as subject to an implied rather
than an express condition, if such gifts had been bestowed after a formal en-
gagement. In Wilson, the donor claimed that his engagement to the donee had
been mutually rescindedP7 The donee claimed that the New York rule on mu-
tual rescission of contracts required that the court leave the parties as it found
them, since there was no mutual agreement to the contrary, and deny return
of the engagement ring.38 Refusing to apply this rule, the court held that "prin-
dples of law which are used in the interpretation of business contracts . . .
should [not] be applied to... an agreement of... marriage ... "9 In the
31. 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N.Y.S. 716 (1st Dep't 1933).
32. Id. at 730, 262 N.Y.S. at 717.
33. Id. at 730-31, 262 N.Y.S. at 718.
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 731, 262 N.YS. at 718, citing e.g., Richmond v. Nye, 126 Mich. 602, 8 N.W.
1120 (1901); Cushing v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N.Y.S. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Antaramlan
v. Ourakian, 118 Mfisc. 558, 194 N.Y.S. 100 (App. T., 1st Dept 1922) ; Benedict v. Flannery,
115 Bisc. 627, 189 N.Y.S. 104 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1921); Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 Ex.
532.
36. 243 App. Div. 33, 276 N.Y.S. 232 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem, 267 N.Y. 570, 196
N.E. 584, 274 N.Y.S. 1012 (1935).
37. Id. at 33-34, 276 N.Y.S. at 232-33.
38. Id., 276 N.Y.S. at 233; see Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., 252 N.Y. 468, 169 NX. 648
(1930). For a comprehensive explanation of the mutual rescission rule, see 1. Calamari & J.
Perm1o, Contracts § 339 (1970).
39. 243 App. Div. at 34, 276 N.Y.S. at 233.
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court's opinion, the conditions which attached to the engagement gifts were
enforceable despite the alleged mutual decision not to marry.
40
This implied rejection of contract analysis in both Beck and Wilson was
perhaps an attempt to justify recovery on the basis of the policy against unjust
enrichment rather than on a breach of marriage contract ground.41 Although
exemption of engagement gifts from the strict contractual demands of express
conditions greatly enhanced the donor's prospects of recovery, return of the
gifts upon termination of the engagement was by no means guaranteed, since
both Beck and Wilson recognized the continuing validity of fault on the part
of the donor as an affirmative defense.42 This position was illustrated by the
New York municipal court in Beer v. Hart,43 decided the same year as Wilson.
The court refused to construe Beck as simply holding "'no marriage, no ring
... ' "44 Instead the court, citing Beck itself as authority, held that recovery
was subject to a further requirement of good faith on the part of the donor.45
The court concluded that "[wihether or not the lady may retain her ring de-
pends entirely upon the determination of the question as to whether the engage-
ment was unjustifiably breached by her act."40
The courts in New York thus adhered to the notion that those considerations
of fault relevant to a breach of promise action for tort damages should also
control the final disposition of the gifts.47 If the donee could make out a prima
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The Beck court stated: "It seems clear that if the engagement ring was delivered to
the defendant (donee] as a token of a promise of marriage induced by fraud [of the donor]
.. he should not be permitted to reclaim his gift, for he is the one whose conduct prevented
the marriage and her refusal to perform the engagement would be justified." 237 App. Div.
at 733, 262 N.Y.S. at 720-21. Moreover, the same court in Wilson was of the opinion that:
"Since the engagement was canceled by mutual consent, the principle applies that the ring
was given and received upon the condition subsequent that it would be returned If the
parties did not wed without the fault of either." 243 App. Div. at 34, 276 N.Y.S. at 232-33.
43. 153 Misc. 277, 274 N.Y.S. 671 (Mun. Ct. 1934).
44. Id. at 278, 274 N.Y.S. at 672. The breaching donor here sought to recover the gift
on the basis of the language in Beck to the effect that "'[wi hen the engagement fails, the
symbol of its existence should be returned to him who gave it'... ." Id.
45. Id. at 277-78, 274 N.Y.S. at 672.
46. Id. at 278, 274 N.Y.S. at 672, quoting the language of Beck that "' [the gift being
conditional, the donor [who] would, by his conduct have rendered it impossible for the
condition to be performed ... [should] not be entitled to recover the ring.'" Id.
47. In declaring fault relevant in a gift case, the New York courts in Beck, Wilson and
Beer necessarily drew the interpretation of fault as an "unjustifiable breach" from the
common law breach of promise action. See Clark § 1.3 & § 1.6 and notes 11-12 supra and
accompanying text. It should be noted here that most American decisions have held that the
donor cannot, upon his own "unjustifiable breach" of the engagement, require the donee to
return betrothal gifts. Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579, 592-95 (1952). See, e.g., Simonlan v.
Donoian, 96 Cal. App. 2d 259, 215 P.2d 119 (1950); Mate v. Abrahams, 62 A.2d 754 (N.J.
Essex County Ct. 1948). But see Albanese v. Indelicate, 25 N.J. Misc. 144, 51 A.2d 110
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fade case against the donor for breach of promise, this would suffice as a bar
to the donor's recovery.4 s
The breach of promise action itself, however, had by this time come under
widespread criticism as a relic of anachronistic social patterns and practices.3
The theory underlying the action-that once a promise to marry had been
made it should be kept at all costs-was directly opposed to the modem Amer-
ican concept of freedom of marriage choice.50 Not only did this cause of action
serve no useful purpose, but the easy availability of large tort damages 1 had
also created a legally sanctioned breeding ground for fraud and blackmail,
since the plaintiff's cause of action could generally be established through mere
circumstantial evidence and character assassination.52
This criticism soon stiffened into strong legislative opposition in New York
which climaxed in 1935 with the passage of Article 2-A of the Civil Practice
Actss the so-called "Heart Balm" Act. Enacted for the purpose of preventing
"unjust enrichment" and the "perpetration of frauds " 54 the statute abolished
all causes of action "to recover sums of money as damage for . . . breach of
contract to marry,"5 5 and further provided that "[n]o contract to marry . . .
shall operate to give rise . . . to any cause or right of action for the breach
thereof."50 Despite the statute's sweeping denunciation of suits based on the
breach of a marriage promise, the status of gifts given in consideration of re-
spective marriage promises was not mentioned in the act. This absence of any
dear statutory language plus the statute's emphasis on preventing the "re-
(Jersey City Dist. Ct. 1947), which stated that an engagement ring must be returned to the
donor upon termination of the engagement regardless of which party, if either, is to blame.
48. Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 34, 276 N.Y.. 232, 232-33 (1st Dep't 1934), afi'd
mem., 267 N.Y. 570, 196 N.E. 584 (1935); Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 733, 262
N.Y.S. 716, 720-21 (1st Dep't 1933); Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc. 277, 278, 274 N.Y.S. 671,
672 (Mun. Ct. 1934); see Clark § 1.6.
49. See, e.g., Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 474 (1929); Feinsingae,
Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm?', 33 Mich. L. Rev. 979, 979-86 (1935); Wright, The
Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 Va. L. Rev. 361 (1924).
50. See Clark § 1.1. But see Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S.W.2d 27 (1934), where
the court took a particularly mercantilist view of the engagement relationship.
51. Juries have been notoriously generous in this area. See, e.g., Syfert v. Solomon, 95
Ca]. App. 228, 272 P. 810 (1928) ($40,000 jury award reversed on appeal); Cleavenger v.
Castle, 255 Mich. 66, 237 N.W. 542 (1931) ($450,000 damage award by jury-remittitur to
$150,000 affirmed on appeal); Campbell v. Fitzsinons, 4 NJ. Misc. 937, 134 A. 89S (Sup. Ct.
1926) (per curiam) ($20,000 jury award affirmed on appeal). See generally C. McCormick,
Damages § 111 (1935).
52. See Clark § 1.2, at 3; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm", 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 979, 984-85 (1935).
53. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, ch. 263, art. 2-A, § 61-a, [1935] N.Y. Laws 158th Sess. 732.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 61-b.
56. Id. § 61-d. Sections 61-b and 61-d have been incorporated into section 80-a of the New
York Civil Rights Law. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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covery of damages" led the early lower court decisions following passage of
the act to ignore the statute and apply the common law rules for the recovery
of gifts. 57
This interpretation was subsequently checked when the issue of recovery of
gifts under the Heart Balm statute reached the court of appeals in Andie v.
Kaplan58 and Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution.60 In both actions
the court, in memorandum decisions, held that the statute barred a suit for
return of pre-nuptial gifts upon breach by the donee of the promise to marry.00
The apparent rationale of these two decisions was that in such a suit the breach
of the underlying marriage contract in effect gave rise to the donor's cause of
action and therefore was barred by the express wording of the statute."1
A split quickly developed in the lower New York courts over interpretation
of Andie and Josephson. Some courts construed them as banning all suits for
the return of gifts.0 2 Others held that the application of the decisions should
be limited to cases involving a breach by the donee and allowed suits where
there had been a mutual rescission3 or a subsequent agreement to return by
the donee.P These courts reasoned that a breach of promise did not give rise
to the donor's right of action in such cases since proof of a breach was not re-
quired to establish a common law right of recovery. 5
57. See Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1938)
(mere.); Hutchinson v. Kernitzky, 23 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. T., 2d Dep't 1940) (per curlam).
58. 288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942), aff'g mem., 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429
(2d Dep't).
59. 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944), aff'g mem., 266 App. Div. 992, 45 N.Y.S.2d 120
(lst Dep't 1943).
60. Josephson v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 292 N.Y. at 666, 56 N.E.2d at 96; Andle v.
Kaplan, 288 N.Y. at 685, 43 N.E.2d at 82.
61. Clark § 1.5, at 18. Andie and Josephson were generally followed in New York where
the donor's right of return arose upon breach by the donee. Morris v. Baird, 269 App. Dlv.
948, 57 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1945) (mem.) ; Alberelil v. Manning, 185 Misc. 280, 56
N.Y.S.2d 493 (App. T., 1st Dep't 1945) (per curiam).
62. See, e.g., Morris v. Baird, 269 App. Div. 948, 57 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1945)
(mem.); Hecht v. Yarnis, 42 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 268 App. Div.
771, 50 N.Y.S.2d 170 (st Dep't 1944). See also Grishen v. Domagalski, 191 Misc. 365,
366-67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948), where the court, although denying
recovery, severely questioned the validity of Andie and Josephson.
63. Unger v. HIrsch, 180 Misc. 381, 39 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
64. Spitz v. Maxwell, 186 Misc. 159, 59 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
65. In Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 383, 39 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943),
the court found that: "Plaintiff's claim to recover in the instant case is therefore in no way
based either upon the contract to marry or upon a breach of that contract.
Nor can the complaint in the instant case be construed as an attempt to evade the [Heart
Balm] statute .... ." In Spitz v. Maxwell, 186 Misc. 159, 160, 59 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (Sup.
Ct. 1945), the court again held that: "An examination of the [Heart Balm statute] clearly
indicates that the purpose and intent of the Legislature was to outlaw actions to recover
damages for breach of contract to marry.... [Plaintiff's complaint] makes no such claim.
It alleges that the parties mutually agreed to cancel their contract to marry."0 Recovery was
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This conflict, as well as the unjust enrichment which resulted from denying
any recovery to a faultless donor upon breach by the donee, led the 1947 New
York Law Revision Commission to suggest a relaxation of the Andie/Josephson
rule in the "proper case.1 66 Though the Commission's proposed amendment was
passed by the legislature,6 7 it was vetoed by Governor Dewey.0s
The split in authority thus continuedo until 1965 when the legislature
enacted section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law which removed the bar to recov-
ery.70 At the time it was passed, the legislation was considered by at least one
commentator to be a resurrection of the full panoply of the common law rules
relating to pre-nuptial gifts.71 This position was also taken by the New York
also generally permitted in cases involving a third party donor. E.g., Costas v. Mlarmarellis,
200 Mlisc. 912, 111 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App. T., 2d Dep't 1951) (per curiam).
66. 1947 Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 227; 1947 N.Y. Legis. Doe. No. 65("). The pro-
posal provided that: "This article shall not be deemed to prevent a court in a proper care
from granting restitution for property or money transferred in contemplation of the per-
formance of an agreement to marry which is not performed." Id. (emphasis deleted).
67. Sen. Int. No. 116, Pr. No. 116 [1947] 1 N.Y. Sen. 3., 170th Sess. 44; Asrem. Int.
No. 120, Pr. No. 120 [1947] 1 N.YAJ., 170th Sess. 29.
68. Public Papers of Thomas E. Dewey 286 (1947). No message explaining the governor's
disapproval of the bill accompanied his veto. See id.
69. Several courts disallowed recovery of gifts by holding that the action was based on a
breach of promise to marry. See, e.g., Grunberg v. Grunberg, 199 Misc. 249, 99 N.Y.S.2d 771
(Sup. CL 1950); Reinhardt v. Schuster, 192 Misc. 919, 81 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. T., 1st Dep't
1948) (per curiam); Nichols v. Gesselien, 191 Mlisc. 641, 78 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. T., 1st Dep't
1948) (per curiam); Bressler v. Bressler, 133 N.YS.2d 38 (N.Y. Mun. CL 1954). Recovery,
however, was permitted where the action was based on the breach by the donee of an agree-
ment to return the gifts following the failure of the engagement. See Levy v. Gersten, 196
Misc. 255, 94 N.Y.S.2d 484 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949). See also Bates v. Engelman, 201 Misc. 288,
115 N.YS.2d 426 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951). In addition, where a plaintiff had been induced to
change a bank account into a joint account, recovery of the money contributed was per-
mitted following failure of the engagement upon the theory that no allegations concerning
the marriage contract were necessary in order to recover the money which rightfully
belonged to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Farone v. Bianchi, 10 App. Div. 2d 790, 198 N.Y.S.2d 521
(3d Dep't 1960) (mem.); Splendore v. Guglielmo, 205 Misc. 941, 129 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
1954); Warneck v. Kielly, 68 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. CL 1946). But see Afastersanti v. Mascioli,
13 App. Div. 2d 865, 214 N.Y.S.2d 932 (3d Dep't 1961); Brandes v. Agnew, 275 App. Div.
843, 88 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2d Dep't 1949) (mem.); Hallstrom v. Erkas, 124 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup.
Ct. 1953), where the courts refused to apply this rationale for recovery to cases involving
transfers of real property interests made in contemplation of marriage. For a criticism of the
harsh results of the statute see Note, The Heart Balm Act and Ante-Nuptial Gifts, 13 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 174 (1947); Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 242 (1952); 48 Cornell L.Q. 186 (1962).
70. Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 333, § 2, [1965] N.Y. Laws 188th Sess. 1075, codified as
amended, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
71. Kharas & Koretz, Property, 1965 Survey of N.Y. Law, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 247
(1966). Since the statute, by its terms, sought to remove the previous bars to recovery
rather than create a new cause of action, this interpretation would seem, at first blush, to
be a reasonable conclusion.
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City civil court in Goldstein v. Rosenthal72 which was the first decision to con-
strue section 80-b. The court held that the donee upon her breach was required
to return the ring to the plaintiff or pay him full value for the ring.78 In so
holding, the court noted that: "The new section [80-b] presumably restores
the common-law rules which were in effect prior to the enactment of the anti-
heart balm's [sic] statute.17 4
Since the common law's implied condition of return hinged on the existence
of an underlying contract to marry and a further determination of whether
failure of the engagement was due to the fault of the donor," the ghost of the
abolished tort action remained very much a part of New York law in this area.
In Lowe v. Quinn, 7 decided by the court of appeals in 1971, breach of promise
considerations were again deemed relevant and determinative of the rights in
a pre-nuptial gift. The donor in Lowe had been married at the time the gift,
an engagement ring, was given to the doneeY7 Both parties at that time had
contemplated marriage following the donor's divorce.78 The court held that,
since public policy would not allow such a marriage contract to be enforced
at common law, the implied condition attaching to gifts arising out of that con-
tract was unenforceable.79 The court reasoned that:
An engagement ring "is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of marriage".
and, under the common law, it was settled-at least in a case where no impediment
existed to a marriage-that, if the recipient broke the "engagement," she was required,
upon demand, to return the ring on the theory that it constituted a conditional gift.
... [A] different result is compelled where, as here, one of the parties is married. An
agreement to marry under such circumstances is void as against public policy . . .
and ... the gift of the engagement ring [is] part and parcel of, [and] directly re-
lated to, [that] agreement to wed.80
The gift of the engagement ring was thus considered absolute, notwithstanding
the alleged breach of the engagement by the donee.81
72. 56 Misc. 2d 311, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civ. Ct. 1968). See Fetters, Property, 1968 Survey
of N.Y. Law, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 376, 381 (1969).
73. 56 Misc. 2d at 314, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
74. Id.
75. See notes 31-48 supra and accompanying text.
76. 27 N.Y.2d 397, 267 N.E.2d 251, 318 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1971), aff'g 32 App. Div. 2d 269,
301 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep't 1969). See 38 Fordham L. Rev. 359 (1969).
77. 27 N.Y.2d at 399, 267 N.E.2d at 252, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 400-02, 267 N.E.2d at 252-53, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 468-70. The dissent argued
vigorously that although the contract was against public policy, recovery should be allowed
since the action sought neither to enforce the contract nor to obtain damages for its breach.
Id. at 404, 267 N.E.2d at 255, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
80. Id. at 400-01, 267 N.E.2d at 252-53, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69 (citations omitted).
81. Id. The court noted that the same decision had been reached in other jurisdictions
based on public policy and the equitable principle of clean hands. Id., 267 N.E.2d at 252, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 469; accord, e.g., Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alas. 407 (1951); Morgan v. Wright, 219
Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d 341 (1963) (unclean hands on the part of a man who gave an engagement
ring to a married woman); Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wash. 2d 672, 171 P.2d 830 (1946) (donor
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In Gaden. v. Gaden,82 the issue raised by the defendant-husband's counter-
claim was whether the tenancy in common was in fact a gift and therefore
recoverable under section 80-b. The statute provides that: "Nothing in this
article . . . shall be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery [of
property] . . . when the sole consideration for [its] transfer ...was a con-
templated marriage which has not occurred .... 2s3
The appellate division was of the opinion that the plaintiff incurred a legal
obligation by signing the promissory notes and thus furnished legal considera-
tion.s4 The majority, therefore, concluded that the statute was inapplicable
since plaintiff's promise of marriage was not the sole consideration for the giftYa
Having found the statute irrelevant, the appellate division held that plaintiff
was entitled to partition, the relief afforded to tenants in common by the com-
mon law. 6
The court of appeals, however, rejected this common law contractual ap-
proach. Instead, the court sought to ascertain the meaning of the words "sole
consideration" from a reading of the entire statute87 In addition to the "sole
consideration" section, the statute provides that the trial court shall be granted
the discretion, if "justice so requires ... [to] award the [donee] a lien upon
the [gift] for monies expended in connection therewith or improvements made
thereto .... ,,88
The court, in holding for the defendant-donor, stressed this discretionary
remedy of a lien as evidence that the statute necessarily included a gift of the
type present in Gaden.89 The court stated:
[TJhe statute specifically contemplates that the donee may contribute to some extent
towards the gift in question. Making this contribution, however, does not defeat the
don[or]'s right to the return of the gift under the statute, but rather only provides the
donee with a lien to the extent of the contribution. 90
The possibility of a lien on the property, then, led the court to construe the
meaning of "sole consideration" as something other than what courts would
consider "legal consideration." 9' According to the court, the "consideration"
was a married man). But see Norman v. Burks, 93 Cal. App. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 815 (Dist. CL
App. 1949), where the donor was permitted to recover-despite the fact that one of the
parties was married at the time the gifts were given-on the ground that neither the engage-
ment nor recovery of the gifts promoted divorce since a complete ground for divorce
existed before the engagement was made.
82. 29 N.Y.2d 80, 272 N.E2d 471, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1971).
83. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
84. Gaden v. Gaden, 34 App. Div. 2d 550, 551, 309 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 550, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
87. 29 N.Y.2d at 85-87, 272 N.E.2d at 474-75, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61.
88. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (McKinney Supp. 1971).
89. 29 N.Y.2d at 86, 272 N.E.2d at 474-75, 323 N.YS.2d at 960.
90. Id. (footnote omitted).
91. 29 N.Y.2d at 86, 272 N.E.2d at 475, 323 N.Y..2d at 960.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
described in the statute must be interpreted to mean "motive or reason" so
that the statute would thus read "'the sole [motivation or reason] for the
transfer . ..was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred." 0 2 The
court found such to be the case in Gaden since from the facts "[ilt stretche[d]
credulity to argue that the reason for including [plaintiff's] name on the deeds
was to enable the defendant to obtain [the] necessary financing ... ."3 Thus
the court held the statute applicable so that the implied condition of return
attachedP4
Beyond this threshold question of whether an implied condition of return
attached to the real property in Gaden, the court was faced with the further
issue of whether the return of engagement gifts would continue to remain sub-
ject to the common law principles of fault.95 The court, however, had no diffi-
culty in abolishing this fault defense which had for so long been a part of the
law of engagement gifts.9 6 In eliminating the defense of fault, the decision
pointed to the same criticisms of the breach of promise action which had led
to the passage of the Heart Balm ActY7 The act was viewed as part of a leg-
islative scheme to avoid the litigation of fault "where the 'wounded' party ap-
pears in court to unfold his or her sorrows before a sympathetic jury" S in hopes
of a large damage award. To allow this type of litigation, the court observed,
"would only burden our courts with countless tales of broken hearts and frus-
trated dreams."*9
As a further policy ground for removing fault from this area of the law, the
court noted that this vestige of the breach of promise action violated modern
notions as to the major purpose of the engagement period,100 namely, "to allow
a couple time to test the permanency of their feelings .... ,,101 In the opinion of
the court, "it would seem highly ironic to penalize the donor for taking steps
to prevent a possibly unhappy marriage.' 10 2
92. Id. This liberal interpretation of consideration was necessary, according to the court,
in order "to give effect to the intention of the Legislature-to authorize actions seeldng
recovery of gifts given in contemplation of marriage." Id., 272 NE,2d at 474, 323
N.Y.S.2d at 960.
93. Id. at 87, 272 N.E.2d at 475, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 87-88, 272 N.E.2d at 475, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
96. Id. at 87-89, 272 N.E.2d at 475-76, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62.
97. Id. at 88, 272 N.E.2d at 475-76, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62.
98. Id., 272 N.E.2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62.
99. Id. at 89, 272 N.E.2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (footnote omitted),
100. Id. at 88-89, 272 N.E.2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The court also mentioned the
fact that fault had "become largely irrelevant to modern divorce proceedings" as a further
policy ground for declaring it irrelevant to the donor's right to recover engagement gifts. Id.
at 88, 272 NXE.2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 962. See Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 35,
256 N.E.2d 513, 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 351 (1970).
101. 29 N.Y.2d at 88, 272 NXE.2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
102. Id. The dissent, while agreeing with the legal principles laid down in the majority
opinion, challenged their application to the facts in Gaden: "The 'gift' of the interest In
the common dwelling was no more than a resumption of de facto marital relations, and, as
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The Gaden court's conception of a conditional engagement gift thus repre-
sents both a logical departure from, and a significant change in, the New York
law of pre-nuptial gifts. In holding that a donor may recover property trans-
ferred in contemplation of marriage despite the furnishing of traditional contract
consideration by the donee, the court has taken a further step in formulating
a distinct area of engagement law suited to the practical realities peculiar
to that relationship. In denying the long accepted defense of fault, the court has
realistically removed itself as the arbiter of broken engagements. Gaden has, in
effect, struck a long overdue balance between the legislative purpose behind the
"Heart Balm" statute and the blanket denial of a recovery of engagement gifts
which the Andie and Josephson courts had fostered. The decision has not only
generally eliminated the destructive contract and fault principles of the breach
of promise action but has also strengthened the public policy against unjust
enrichment by returning the parties to the position they occupied before the
engagement without attempting to either reward or punish them.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Discovery--Claims of
Absent Members of Class Dismissed for Failure to Respond to Interrog-
atories.-A class action for fraud was brought against Midwestern United Life
Insurance Company in the northern district of Indiana.' The court directed that
notice pursuant to Rule 23(c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceduree be
sent to all prospective members of the class. Prior to this order, Midwestern filed
requests under Rules 333 and 344 for the production of certain documents and
the husband honestly testified, he wanted the home in both their names to impress his wife
with his good faith in the reconstruction of their marriage. The property disposition was
no more a gift in sole consideration of an anticipated ceremonial marriage, than were the
clothing, food, and whatever else the husband bought the wife during the two-year period
while they cohabited and were not husband and wife de jure." Id. at 89-90, 272 N.E.2d at
477, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 963 (emphasis deleted).
1. Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (NJ). Ind. 1966).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) provides: "In any class action maintained under subdivision
(b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel."
3. Id. K. 33 provides in part: "(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may
serve upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served ....
Interrogatories may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint
upon that party... The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve
a copy of the answers, and objections if any, within 30 days after the service of the
interrogatories .... The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting
the interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection
to or other failure to answer an interrogatory.
4. Id. R. 34 provides: "(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request
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records and for answers to interrogatories by the named plaintiff and each
member of her class. The court granted this request and ordered all class mem-
bers to comply. Many, including movants, failed to submit to discovery although
they had been notified of the court's order on several occasions. The district
court ordered them to show cause why their claims should not be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to answer the interrogatories. Pursuant to Rule 37,
the court dismissed with prejudice the claims of those class members who failed
to respond either to the interrogatories or the show-cause order.5 Subsequently,
the fraud action against Midwestern was tried and judgment was entered for
plaintiffs.0 The movants later filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 to set aside
the district court's order dismissing their claims.7 The court denied the motion,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
stating that "absent class members may, under certain circumstances, be re-
quired to submit to discovery under Rules 33 and 34 .... "8 Movants' failure
to answer defendant's interrogatories--characterized by the court as "sideline
sitting" 9 -was held to justify the dismissal of their claims with prejudice.
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972) (No. 71-778).
The discovery procedures contained in the Federal Rules' 0 were formulated in
order to avoid surprise at trial and provide for a "fair contest" in the courtroom,
thus eliminating the game of "blindman's bluff."'" In general the discovery
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to
inspect and copy, any designated documents . . .which are in the possewsion, custody or
control of the party upon whom the request is served .... The party submitting the request
may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure
to respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection as re-
quested?'
5. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th dir. 1971), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972) (No. 71-778). The court dismissed movants',
cause of action under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2), which provides In part:
"If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including and [sic]
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule ... the court in which the action is pending
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
... (C) An order ... dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering
a judgment by default against the disobedient party ... .
6. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
7. The movants proceeded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) which provides: "(b) Mistake;
inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment Is
void... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
8. 450 F.2d at 1004 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 1003.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
11. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see Southern Ry. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134 (8th
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procedures are used to narrow the issues, to obtain evidence for use at the trial,
to secure information as to the existence of evidence and to ascertain who is in
possession of the evidence.12 In order to achieve the above purposes the Rules
provide various means of obtaining discovery which include depositions, inter-
rogatories to parties, production and inspection of documents and requests for
admissions.' 3 Each discovery Rule is intended to aid the court in the truth
finding process.' 4
The Rules permitting discovery,' 5 however, are restricted in the manner in
which they may be used by the parties. Rules 27, 30 and 31 which govern
depositions, provide that a party may take the testimony of any pcrson.20 On the
other hand, Rule 33, which governs interrogatories, Rule 34, which governs the
production of documents and physical objects and entry upon land for inspec-
tion, and the rules governing physical examinationsY and requests for admis-
sions,' 8 provide that a party or the court may serve a request or order on any
other party.'9
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Iunsrance Co.20 the movants-absent
class members-ignored the district court's orders to submit to discovery under
Rules 33 and 34. The district court, pursuant to Rule 37,21 dismissed movants'
claims with prejudice. Therefore, the case presented the Seventh Circuit with two
questions: first, whether in a class action, identifiable absent members of the
representative plaintiffs class may be required to submit to discovery under
Rules 33 and 34;2 and second, the propriety of a dismissal of their claims with
prejudice for failure to respond.2s
However, before turning to a discussion of these questions, it is necessary to
examine the reasoning the court employed in reaching the merits of this case.24
Cir. 1968); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964); Guilford Nat'l
Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962); Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp.,
253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958). "The elimination of the 'sporting theory' of justice, the simpli-
fication of procedure, and the prompt disposition of controversies on the merits are the great
objectives of the new federal civil practice." Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 205 (1942). See also Pike & Willis, The New
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure (pts. I & 1l), 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1179, 1436 (1938).
12. Holtzoff, supra note 11, at 205-06.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a); see Holtzoff, supra note 11, at 206.
14. See Guilford Nat'I Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962); Tiedman v.
American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958).
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
16. Id. RR. 27, 30 & 31.
17. Id. R. 35.
18. Id. R. 36.
19. Id. RR. 33-37; see Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rich, 20 F.R.D. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
20. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971).
21. For the pertinent portion of Rule 37 see note 5 supra.
22. 450 F.2d at 1001.
23. Id.
24. The court noted that a Rule 60(b) motion invoking clauses (1), (2) and (3) of that
rule must be brought within a one year time limit, while a motion invoking clauses (4), (5)
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Movants sought appellate review of the district court's denial of their Rule
60(b) motion brought to vacate the dismissal of their claims.2 Bypassing the
restriction on appellate review28 which would limit it to scrutiny of abuses of
judicial discretion,2 7 the court said: "[W]hile Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for
an appeal and the finality of judgments ought not be disturbed except on very
narrow grounds, a liberal construction should be given the rule to the end that
judgments which are void or are vehicles of injustice should not be left stand-
ing."28 Therefore, the decision to review the denial of movants' Rule 60(b)
motion by the court was based on two considerations. First, that the order
dismissing movants' claims may have been void 29 and second that movants'
failure to promptly appeal the dismissal of their claims may otherwise have
deprived them of any effective appellate review.80
The requisites for a valid judgment are that the court have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and jurisdiction over the parties.81 The district court clearly
and (6) need only be filed within a "reasonable time." Id. at 1003. In rebutting Midwestern's
argument "that the unreasonable two and one-half year interval between the dismissal of
movants' claims and the filing of their Rule 60(b) motion foreclose[d] consideration of the
merits of movants' challenge to the discovery ordered by the district court," the court said:
"[O]ur function is not to determine whether the court was substantively correct in entering
the judgment from which relief is sought but is limited to deciding whether the judge abused
his discretion in ruling that sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment
were not shown in a timely manner." Id.
25. Id.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. In Wojton v. Marks, 344 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1965), the court stated: "Plaintiff must
rely on a claim for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6) for 'any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.' This clearly lies within the sound discretion of the
district court." Id. at 225. See also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (190);
Wagner v. United States, 316 F2d 871 (2d Cir. 1963). "The order denying the motion under
Rule 60(b) is appealable ... but the appeal brings up only the denial of the motion and
not the judgement itself .... The catch-all clause of Rule 60(b) (6), authorizing the court to
relieve a party from judgment for 'any other reason justifying relief? cannot be read to
encompass a claim of error for which appeal is the proper remedy .... " Id. at 872 (citation
omitted). In Russell v. Cunningham, 279 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1960), the court remarked: "We
realize that a Court has wide discretion in passing upon a motion under section 60(b) and
that its action should not be set aside lightly without a clear showing of abuse of discretion."
Id. at 804.
28. 450 F.2d at 1003. The Brennan court relied on Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S.
601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949), where the Supreme Court stated: "In simple English, the
language of the 'other reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests
power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is ap-
propriate to accomplish justice." Id. at 614-15.
29. 450 F.2d at 1003. "EI]f we accept movants' contention that the district judge er-
roneously assumed the power to direct interrogatories to 'absent' class members, it is at least
arguable that the dismissal of movants' claims is void." Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (4) autho-
rizes the vacation of a void judgment.
30. 450 F.2d at 1003.
31. 7 3. Moore, Federal Practice 1 60.25 [2], at 301 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited by
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had jurisdiction over the subject matter since the plaintiff alleged that Md-
western had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193 4 .P
The district court also had personal jurisdiction over the movants pursuant to
Rule 23(c) (2) and (3) which rendered them bound by its judgmentY3 However,
the majority in Brennan concluded that the issuing of an improper discovery
order may have rendered the district court's judgment void and on this basis felt
it appropriate to grant appellate review.34
The court then considered whether the movants had otherwise been deprived
of effective appellate review. 5 A party who makes a voluntary choice not to
appeal a decision will not normally be afforded a right of review under Rule
60(b) (6). 6 Nevertheless, the court determined that although the movants had
chosen not to appeal the decision of the district court dismissing their claim
with prejudice37, under a liberal construction of Rule 60(b) the circumstances
justified appellate review of the propriety of the discovery orders. 38
After deciding that it could hear the merits of movants' challenge to the
dismissal of their claims, the court turned to the question of whether an absent
class member may be required to submit to discovery under Rules 33 and 34.
The Rules state that one party may serve interrogatories and requests on
another party to the action. 9 Therefore, it would appear that in order to decide
whether Rules 33 and 34 were properly applied, the court of appeals would have
to determine whether or not the movants in Brennan were parties to the action.
volume as Moore]. "Many cases state two requisites for a valid judgment, that the court:
have jurisdiction over the subject matter; and jurisdiction over the parties ... ." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The district courts jurisdiction is granted by section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 US.C. § 78aa (1970). 'By jurisdiction over the
subject matter the cases mean that the court must have jurisdiction or power to deal with
the class of cases in which it renders judgment." 7 Moore, 1 60.25 [2], at 302. (footnote
omitted).
33. C. Wright, Federal Courts § 72, at 314 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
"It is dearly contemplated that every judgment in every class action will bind all of the
members of the class, except for those who have asked to be excluded in a (b) (3) action."
Id. (footnote omitted). "[Tihe rule is intended to provide due process to absentees and it
plainly contemplates that they will be bound." Id.
34. 450 F.2d at 1003. But see 7 Moore ff 60.25 (2), at 304. "'Ilf a court has the general
power to adjudicate the issues in the class of suits to which the case belongs then its interim
orders and final judgment, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack....r
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. 450 F.2d at 1003.
36. Ackermann v. United States, 340 US. 193, 198 (1950); Annat v. Beard, 277 F.2d 554,
559 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 US. 908 (1960). "Absent exceptional and compelling circum-
stances, failure to obtain relief through the usual channels of appeal is not another reason
justifying relief." 7 Moore 60.27 [2], at 353 (footnote omitted).
37. 450 F.2d at 1003.
38. See notes 24-36 supra and accompanying text.
39. "Any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered
by the party served ... ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). "Any party may serve on any other party
a request (1) to produce ... any designated documents ...." Id. R. 34(a).
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The Rules provide that absent members of a class will be bound by a judgment
of the court,40 and are sometimes referred to as parties in that context.41 On the
other hand, the residence of absent class members not named as representative
parties will not defeat federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and
in this context they are not considered to be parties.4 2 However, prior to Bren-
nan, there was no authority as to whether absent class members are parties to an
action for the purpose of applying Rules 33 and 34.
The Brennan court did not expressly decide whether absent class members
should be considered parties for the purpose of these discovery rules, even though
the movants raised the question in their argument. 43 The court bypassed this
apparently crucial issue by treating the scope of Rules 33 and 34 as coextensive
with the notice requirements of Rule 23.44 Rule 23(d) provides that a district
court may make appropriate orders to class members in order to insure "fair
conduct of the action."45
At the outset of its discussion the court noted that a "paucity" of recorded
precedent exists in this area.46 The court cited cases where it was held that the
notice requirement of Rule 23(d) allowed some form of discovery of class
members.40 7 In Harris v. Jones48 members of the class were directed to file "simple
statements of their claims upon furnished forms," 49 pursuant to the power the
court believed it had by virtue of Rule 23 (d) ." The court in Harris also entered
an order to the effect that if such statements were not filed within the specified
time the action could be dismissed with "prejudice as to defaulting members." 5'
40. Id. R. 23(c) (3). "The judgment, then, has res judicata effect as to all members of
the class who have not opted out." 3B Moore ff 23.60, at 23-1202 (2d ed. 1969) (footnote
omitted) ; accord, Wright § 72, at 314. See note 33 supra. See also Note, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device and its Utilization, 22 U. Fla. L. Rev. 631
(1970).
41. See 24 Sw. L.J. 354 (1970). "A judgment under the amended rule is res judicata as to
all parties who have not chosen to withdraw." Id. at 357. See also Hansberry v, Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties
and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 509, 516 (1967).
42. Wright § 72, at 314-15. "It has long been the rule that in a class action only the
citizenship of the named representatives is to be considered, and that it is no objection to
jurisdiction that other members of the class, not named as parties, are of such citizenship as
would defeat diversity." Id. (footnote omitted); see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921). See also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. LJ.
1204, 1219-22 (1966).
43. 450 F.2d at 1004.
44. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2).
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
46. 450 F.2d at 1004.
47. Id., citing Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966). See also 3B Moore 11 23.55, at 23-1161.
48. 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
49. Id. at 74.
50. Id. at 74-75 n.9.
51. Id. at 75.
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In Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp.,52 Rule 23(c) (2) was held to re-
quire members of the class to give notice of their claims by returning "something
in the nature of a verified proof of claim form... ."1 The Minnesota court also
stated in dictum that the defendants might be allowed to pose so-called "trans-
action" interrogatories to plaintiffs, but only after the proofs of claims were
filed and the members of the class determined.54 In Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co. 5 the court stated that it saw "no reason why
those class-members who do not elect exclusion from the class may not be re-
quired to take some kind of minimal affirmative action as a condition of ulti-
mate recovery." 50 It is clear that the above cases" do allow a limited form of
discovery of absent class members through the notice provisions of Rule 23,
but none of these cases sanctioned the use of Rules 33 and 34 to obtain this
discovery.
Nonetheless the Brennan court extended the rationale of these decisions to
permit the service of Rule 33 interrogatories on the movants. 5s In finding that
the "spirit" of Rule 23 allowed the use of Rule 33 interrogatories, the majority
apparently chose not to decide whether absent members of a class were in fact
parties to the action. Instead, the court interpreted the "spirit" of Rule 23 to
indicate that "if the trial judge determines that justice to all parties requires
that absent parties furnish certain information... he has the power to authorize
the use of Rules 33 and 34 discovery procedures.150 By sanctioning the use of
Rules 33 and 34 on that basis, the court dealt only with the extraordinary cir-
cumstances presented by the record before it,6 0 -particularly movants' blatant
"sideline sitting"--and no attempt was made to formulate a general rule govern-
ing the use of Rule 33 and 34 discovery methods.
Finding that Rule 33 and 34 discovery was properly employed, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision dismissing movants' claims with
prejudice.6 ' The dismissal of a claim with prejudice is one of the more drastic
methods of dealing with a refusal to comply with discovery orders.02 In most
cases the court will not use this sanction unless there is a "serious showing of
52. 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Mlinn. 1968).
53. Id. at 577.
54. Id. at 582 (dictum). This case involved a civil antitrust suit with a nominal plaintiff.
The court did not say under what rule "the transaction!' interrogatories were to be served.
55. 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED). Pa. 1968).
56. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
57. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia
Elec. Co., v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (El). Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones,
41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
58. 450 F.2d at 1005.
59. Id.
60. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
61. 450 F.2d at 1004 n.2. But cd. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 FIRLD. 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (DR.I. 1969).
62. See 4A Moore II 37.03"2.-5], at 37-67 to 37-69 (2d ed. 1971). See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 449 F2d S1 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3398 (US. Feb. 22, 1972) (No. 827).
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wilful default." 63 One method of deciding if the trial judge overstepped his dis-
cretion is to weigh the party's fault against the hardships encountered in com-
plying with the discovery orders.64 In view of the Seventh Circuit's disapproval
of "sideline sitting," 65 the majority must have concluded that movants' fault in
failing to answer the interrogatories outweighed any hardship the movants
could allege. 6
The policy that apparently impelled the court to entertain the merits of this
case6 7 was to discourage absent members in class actions from reaping the
benefits of a suit in which they wilfully refused to take part ("sideline sitting").
However, the decision loses much of its impact in view of some of the reasoning
the court employed to reach its conclusion.
In view of the fact that the Brennan court relied on cases which were decided
on the basis of Rule 23, it is uncertain whether the court assumed that absent
class members are parties to the action for the purpose of Rules 33 and 34. Since
the court believed that the "spirit" of Rule 23 authorized the use of both Rules
in this case, it apparently did not think it was necessary to definitively state
whether movants were parties. However, if the majority did not view the absent
class members as parties, its holding that interrogatories were properly served
on the movants would directly contradict the clear language of both Rules.6 8
Therefore, it could be argued that the court must have viewed absent class
members as parties to an action. However, the court went on to state that
"absent class members should not be required to submit to discovery as a matter
of course," 69 and that it would be up to the discretion of the trial judge whether
or not to allow discovery in a given instance.7 0 Once it is decided that the use
of interrogatories is a proper method of discovery, Rule 33 places no limitation
on its use by one party against another. The employment of interrogatories as a
means of discovery is a decision left to the party seeking the information. 71
Therefore, it may be contended that the court did not consider the movants
to be parties to the action, because if it did, the unambiguous language of Rule 33
would not permit the court to place a limitation on the use of interrogatories. If
the court thought that the movants were not parties, Rules 33 and 34 should
have been unavailable to the defendant. If, however, the court was of the
opinion that the absent class members were parties, the use of Rules 33 and 34
63. Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate
Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480 (1958).
64. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. v. Lyster, 328 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1964).
65. 450 F.2d at 1005; see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
66. 450 F.2d at 1005.
67. See notes 24-36 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
69. 450 F.2d at 1005.
70. Id. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
71. Wright § 86. "Where the person who has the information sought is a party, whether
to use interrogatories . . . is a choice dependent on practical considerations." Id. at 380.
(footnote omitted). The only limitation that was previously placed on the use of interro-
gatories pertained to the scope of the questions asked. Id. at 381. However this limitation
no longer exists. 4A Moore ff 33.10, at 33-66.
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should have been unrestricted. It is therefore submitted that the majority erred,
whatever view of the movants' status it adopted 2
This judicial expansion of the scope of the federal discovery rules might be
desirable, if not logically justified, in view of the policy considerations with
which the court sought to deal in Brennan. The court must have believed that
the movants' total inaction during the trial and subsequent attempt to benefit
from the favorable judgment was such a blatant case of "sideline sitting" that
justice demanded an extreme penalty. Therefore, it was permissible in the
majority's view for the trial court to make limited use of Rules 33 and 34 if
the judge in his discretion thought that justice would thus be served. However,
such a vague standard, absent further qualification of the movants' status as
parties, can hardly serve as a meaningful guideline for trial courts in similar
situations. 73
At best, Brennan should be given a very narrow interpretation74 by courts
dealing with similar issues in the future. If the case is given a broad interpreta-
tion or if the decision signals a trend toward wider discovery in class actions,
corporate defendants may be afforded a tactic by which to diminish a particular
class by disingenuously serving interrogatories on unadvised absent class mem-
bers resulting in the dismissal of their claims with prejudice. Such a result would
be at odds with the very purpose of a class action which is to "serve the
interests both of judicial administration and of justice."75 Fortunately, the
Brennan court took great pains to limit the scope of its holding70 and it is hoped
that if judges find the Brennan reasoning persuasive, they will apply it only
under the most extraordinary circumstances.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur Applied in Two-plane Aviation Disaster
Against Multiple Defendants Although Instrumentality of Injury Not
Under any Defendant's Exclusive Control.-Plaintiffs were passengers on
Eastern Airlines Flight 853, which collided with Trans World Airlines Flight 42
over Carmel, New York, on December 4, 1965.1 Suit in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York was premised on diversity jurisdiction, and
the trial resulted in a directed verdict2 in favor of defendant Trans World Air-
72. The dissent was of the opinion that the "movants were not parties to the litigation."
450 F.2d at 1006.
73. Should a court deem it necessary to implement discovery orders similar to those in
this case it might issue the order pursuant to Rule 23(c) and (d) and in this way avoid the
confusion encountered by the Brennan court when it attempted to use Rules 33 and 34.
74. A broad application of the decision is possible only if it is construed as dening absent
class members as parties. However, such an interpretation would be so plainly at variance
with the language of Rules 33 and 34 as to render the Brennan decision completely untenable.
75. Wright § 72, at 306.
76. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
1. Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S D.N.Y. 1971).
2. Id. at 692.
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lines and against defendant Eastern Airlines on the issue of liability, the jury
thereafter awarding damages.3 At a pretrial hearing, the district court, applying
New York law, concluded that although the agent or instrumentality of injury
was not within the exclusive control of either of the defendants, the defendants
were the only parties arguably responsible for the accident, and therefore the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 4 was applicable against both defendants. Colditz
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The plaintiff in a negligence action must ordinarily prove that the defendant
breached a duty of care owed to him and that the breach of this duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.6 The mere fact that an accident or
injury has occurred, absent further proof, is not evidence that anyone has been
negligent.7 Negligence, like any other fact, may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.8 Where direct evidence of specific acts of negligence is unavailable, but
where the circumstances of the injury suggest negligence, the plaintiff may rely
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 9 The conditions generally necessary for the
3. Id.
4. The Latin phrase, which literally means "the thing speaks for itself," was derived
from the English case of Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863), where a barrel
of flour rolled out of a warehouse window and fell upon a passing pedestrian. The principle
was later clarified by Chief Justice Erle in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co.,
159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Ex. 1865).
5. In a pretrial motion, defendants claimed that the suit was barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel because the action had not been consolidated with an action brought
by the crew of the Eastern plane. The court held that failure to consolidate did not estop
the plaintiffs from asserting their claims. 329 F. Supp. at 694-95. The defendants renewed
their motion at the end of plaintiff's case, and the motion was denied, the court concluding
that the suit against Eastern was not precluded because in the prior suit against Eastern
and Trans World Airlines, the issue of Eastern's liability was immaterial to the ultimate
finding. Id. at 695; see White v. Trans World Airlines, 320 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6. W. Prosser, Torts § 30 "(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Presser].
7. Id. § 39, at 211; see Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 100 N.E.2d 113
(1951).
8. Prosser § 39, at 212. See generally 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 25 (3d cd. 1940).
9. "A res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial evi-
dence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the
mere occurrence of the event and the defendant's relation to it." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 328 D, comment b at 157 (1965); see Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194
N.Y. 37, 86 N.E. 805 (1909); Mercatante v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 265, 142
N.Y.S.2d 473 (1st Dep't 1955); Curley v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1st Dep't 1947); 2 G. Mottla, New York Evidence: Proof of Cases § 1211, at 378 (2d ed.
1966).
The doctrine is said to impart a common sense appraisal of the probative value of cir-
cumstantial evidence. United States v. Ridolfi, 318 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1963); Panlco v.
American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Manley v. New York
Tel. Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 25, 100 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1951). "When the facts and circumstances
from which the jury is asked to infer negligence are those immediately attendant on the
occurrence, we speak of it as a case of 'res ipsa loquitur;' when not immediately connected
with the occurrence, then it is an ordinary case of circumstantial evidence." Griffen v.
Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 196, 59 N.E. 925, 927 (1901) (emphasis omitted).
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application of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the event must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of plaintiff; (2) the event must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; and
(3) the event must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the ex-
clusive control of the defendant. 10 Some courts have suggested a fourth condi-
tion-that evidence or knowledge of the event be more accessible to the defen-
dant than the plaintiff.1
Although almost all jurisdictions utilize the res ipsa loquitur principle, there
is substantial disagreement with respect to the procedural effect which should be
accorded it.L 2 The majority view is to permit, but not compel, the trier of fact to
10. Panico v. American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); see Prosser § 39, at
214; Richardson on Evidence § 93 (Prince ed. 1964).
11. Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1959); Schneider
v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Nahay v. Ta-E-Yetos Realty
Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 1075, 1076-77, 234 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91-92 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Prosser § 39, at
214, 225.
Dean Prosser argues that superior knowledge is not an element in res ipsa loquitur.
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183, 202-04 (1949). Dean
Wigmore refers to the element of superior knowledge as the "particular force and justice
of the rule." 9 3. Wigmore, Evidence § 2509, at 382 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Prosser § 40, at 228. This confusion, according to Prosser, is the result of the merger
of two distinctly different origins of the doctrine: one asserting that res ipsa loquitur pre-
sumes that the only reasonable conclusion which can be drawn from the circumstances of
an unusual accident is that the defendant was probably at fault; the other asserting that,
with respect to the special relationship between a common carrier and its passengers, the
carrier had the burden of proving that it was not negligent. Id. § 39, at 213; see Prossr,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183, 184-85 (1949).
There has been further disagreement as to the effect of the plaintiff's allegations of specific
negligence in his pleadings or the introduction of evidence of specific negligence at trial upon
the use of res ipsa loquitur. Compare Bressler v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 270 N.Y.
409, 1 N.E.2d 828 (1936), and Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 271
N.Y.S.2d 866 (Ist Dep't 1966), and Cunningham v. Lence Lanes, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 238,
268 N.Y.S.2d 609 (3d Dep't 1966), and Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 App. Div.
660, 1 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1937), and Whitcher v. Board of Educ., 233 App. Div. 184, 251
N.Y.S. 611 (3d Dep't 1931), with Christensen v. Surface Transp. Corp. of New York, 283
App. Div. 349, 128 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1954), and DeRoire v. Lehigh Valley R.R, 205
App. Div. 549, 199 N.Y.S. 652 (4th Dep't 1923). This controversy was settled in New York
in the case of Abbot v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 245 N.E.2d 388, 297 N.Y.S.2d 713
(1969), where the New York Court of Appeals indicated that merely because proof of specific
negligence was unnesessary in cases where us ipsa loquitur was applied, specific proof was not
necessarily inconsistent with the permissible inference raised by the application of the
doctrine. Id. at 513, 245 N.E.2d at 394, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 721. The court concluded that
merely because the plaintiff sought to bolster his case by introducing specific evidence of
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff should not then be compelled to forego the benefit of
res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 511, 245 N.E.2d at 393, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 720. Thus, the court
allowed the plaintiff to plead and prove specific acts of negligence and to rely, at the same
time, on the res ipsa principle. Id. at 514, 245 N.E.2d at 395, 297 N.Y..2d at 722.
"The view which now tends to prevail is that res ipsa loquitur may still be applied, to the
extent that the inference to be drawn supports the specific allegation or the specific proof;
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infer negligence from the circumstances of the case.' 8 Thus the plaintiff survives
a motion to dismiss since there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury, but the
burden of proof is not thereby shifted to the defendant.14 A second theory holds
that more than a mere permissible inference is derived from the evidence in that
it creates a presumption against the defendant, thereby requiring him to offer
evidence sufficient to meet the presumption in order to avoid a directed verdict
against him.15 A third view is that the doctrine of res ipsa shifts to the defendant
the ultimate burden of proof, requiring him to introduce evidence of greater
weight than that of the plaintiff.16
New York is in the majority17 with respect to the effect to be accorded res
ipsa loquitur. Thus, where res ipsa is applied, the burden of proof does not
shift to the defendant, but rather the plaintiff must still prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 8 The often quoted statement of the majority
view was made by the United States Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Erving:10
[R]es ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of
negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence
to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explana-
tion or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a case to be
decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict.... When all the evidenco is
in, the question for the jury is, whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff.20
The application of res ipsa does not compel the defendant to offer an explana-
tion.2 ' If the trier of fact is justified in drawing the inference, then the burden
of going forward shifts to the defendant.22 Thus, under the majority view as
and that where the specific allegation of negligence is accompanied by a general allegation,
res ipsa loquitur may be relied on in support of the general allegation." Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 328 D, comment m at 165 (1965).
13. Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143, 145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966
(1955); Century Indem. Co. v. Arnold, 153 F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
854 (1946); Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Calhoun
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 532, 533 (SJ).N.Y. 1959); Prosser § 40, at 229.
14. E.g., Calhoun v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 532, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Nahay v. Ta-E-Yetos Realty Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 1075, 1076, 234 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
15. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 19.11, at 1103 (1956); Prosser § 40, at 230; Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 328 D, comment m at 165 (1965).
16. Prosser § 40, at 230. Prosser cites "Colorado, Louisiana, and perhaps Mississippi" for
this view of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Id.
17. E.g., George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941).
For similar holdings in other jurisdictions see, e.g., Levine v. Union & New Haven Trust Co.,
127 Conn. 435, 17 A.2d 500 (1941); Merriman v. Kraft, 144 Ind. App. 33, 242 N.E.2d 526
(1968).
18. E.g., Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N. 504 (1922).
19. 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
20. Id. at 240.
21. E.g., Calhoun v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
22. Id. at 533; Neuhoff v. Retlaw Realty Corp., 289 N.Y. 293, 295, 45 NX.2d 450, 451-
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expressed by the New York Court of Appeals in George Foltis, Inc. v. City of
New York,23 a plaintiff who brings himself within the res ipsa doctrine makes
out a prima fade case which entitles him to go to the jury, but he still must
persuade the jury that the defendant was negligent, even though the defendant
has presented no explanation of the accident. -2 4
The New York courts have traditionally required that, in order for the res
ipsa loquitur principle to be applicable, the defendant had to be in "exclusive
control" of the instrumentality causing the injury. 5 The defendant need not be
in actual physical control of the instrumentality at the time of the accident, for
the "exclusive control" is provided when the defendant has the right to control
the instrumentality.26 This exclusive control concept presents little problem
where the action involves a single defendant. However, where multiple defen-
dants are involved, it may be difficult to establish the negligence of a particular
defendant. Unless there is vicarious liability or shared control, the usual rule is
that the plaintiff does not make out a prima facie case against either of two or
more defendants merely by showing that the plaintiff has been injured by the
negligence of one of the defendants 27
An application of this rule can be found in the case of Wolf v. American
Tract Society,2 8 wherein the plaintiff was injured by a brick which fell from a
building owned by the defendant. Also joined as defendants were some of the
independent contractors who were working on the building at the time of the
alleged negligence.29 The New York Court of Appeals, indicating that the plain-
tiff had failed to establish the particular defendants responsible for his injury,
concluded that, although the case was appropriate for the application of res
ipsa, the better policy was to allow the plaintiff to go without redress rather than
52 (1942); Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 233, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935); Nahay v. Ta-E-
Yetos Realty Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 1075, 1076, 234 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (Sup. CL 1962).
23. 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941).
24. Id. at 118-19, 38 N.E.2d at 461-62. In Century Indem. Co. v. Arnold, 153 F2d 531
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 854 (1946), Judge Swan stated that under the previous law,
a plaintiff could obtain a directed verdict if the defendant offered no explanation, but he
felt that Foltis had changed the law. Id. at 532; see Hogan v. Manhattan Ry., 149 N.Y.
23, 43 N.E. 403 (1896). It is generally believed that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
can receive a directed verdict where res ipsa loquitur is applicable. 2 Harper & James, Torts
§ 19.11, at 1900 (1956).
Res ipsa is merely a rule to guide the appraisal of the probative force of evidence which
enables the injured party to establish a prima fade case that the injury was caused by the
defendant's negligence, and therefore the direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff would
be unjustified. George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 119, 38 N.E2d 455, 461
(1941).
25. See cases cited note 10 supra.
26. Jungjohann v. Hotel Buffalo, 5 App. Div. 2d 496, 173 N.YS.2d 340 (4th Dep't
1958); Cole v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 Misc. 2d 694, 254 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. CL 1964).
27. Prosser § 39, at 221.
28. 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31 (1900).
29. Id. at 32-33, 58 N.E. at 31-32.
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to hold a possibly innocent party liable.8 0 A recent appellate division case,
Murphy v. City of New York, 31 involved circumstances where persons indepen-
dent of the defendants had access to the instrumentality of harm. In this case,
plaintiff was injured when the metal door of a lamppost owned by the city
struck him.3 2 The court found that res ipsa was inapplicable against the city
and an independent contractor whose duty it was to maintain the post because
the general public also had access to the pole.
33
Several New York cases have allowed some departures from this previously
requisite element of exclusivity.34 Thus, in Schroeder v. City and County Savings
Bank,35 the New York Court of Appeals extended the application of the res ipsa
doctrine to defendants in successive control of the instrumentality of injury. In
Schroeder, the plaintiff was injured when struck by a falling barricade which
had been erected by one of two defendant contractors pursuant to a contract
between the defendant owner and a lessee for improvement of the building30 At
the time of the injury, the contractor employed by the owner had completed his
work and thus had neither actual control nor a right to control the barricade.
Nevertheless, the court allowed res ipsa against the owner and both contractors
because they had all been in possession of the barricade either simultaneously or
in succession and because a nondelegable duty of supervision remained in the
owner 3 7
In a more recent New York Court of Appeals decision, Corcoran v. Banner
Super Market, Inc.,38 the traditional requirement of exclusive control was further
eroded. In this case, plaintiff was injured when struck by a board which had
been affixed in part to a building owned by the defendant and in part to a build-
ing owned by a person not made a party to the suit.80 In concluding that res
30. Id. at 34, 58 N.E. at 32. "Cases must occasionally happen where the person really
responsible for a personal injury cannot be identified or pointed out by proof ... and then
it is far better and more consistent with reason and law that the injury should go without
redress than that innocent persons should be held responsible upon some strained construc-
tion of the law developed for the occasion." Id.
31. 19 App. Div. 2d 545, 240 N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1963) (mene.), afi'd mem., 14
N.Y.2d 532, 197 NYE.2d 781, 248 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1964).
32. Id., 240 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
33. Id. at 546, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85. "It was not established that defendants or either
of them had exclusive control of the post . . . and the situation was not one in which the
facts as to the cause of the accident were necessarily accessible to the defendants and
inaccessible to the plaintiff. . . . Under such circumstances, to charge defendants with
negligence would be mere speculation, guess or surmise .. . ." Id. (citations ornitted).
34. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
35. 293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
36. Id. at 373, 57 N.E.2d at 58.
37. Id. at 374, 57 N.E.2d at 59. The court did not mention plaintiff's failure to join the
lessee as a defendant, but stated that it was the duty of the joined defendants to explain their
conduct. Id.
38. 19 N.Y.2d 425, 227 N.E.2d 304, 280 N.Y.S.2d 385, modified, 21 N.Y.2d 793, 235
N.E.2d 455, 288 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1967), noted in 32 Albany L. Rev. 251 (1967).
39. Id. at 429, 227 N.E.2d at 305, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87. The court concluded that
1972] CASE NOTES 983
ipsa loquitur was applicable, the court stated that "[t ] he exclusive control re-
quirement is thus subordinated to [res ipsa loquitur's] general purpose, that of
indicating that it probably was the defendant's negligence which caused the
accident." 40 To support this proposition, the court cited the California case of
Ybarra v. Spangard,41 where the plaintiff sued a surgeon, several nurses, an
anaesthetist and a hospital for injuries apparently incurred during an appendec-
tomy.2 The California supreme court applied res ipsa loquitur against all the
defendants, 43 despite the fact that it was apparent that not all of the defendants
were negligent, that all defendants did not have exclusive control of the plain-
tiff's treatment, and that neither the agent nor instrumentality of harm were
singled out by the plaintiff.
The use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine against a common carrier in an action
by one of its passengers for damages incurred in a collision is not novel to New
York law.45 However, its applicability is generally limited to a passenger pro-
ceeding against his carrier, and not against the other carrier involved in the acci-
dent.46 In Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,47 however, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that the doctrine was applicable against
both defendants. 48 The court acknowledged that "[a] bsent either a special rela-
tionship or some basis for imposing joint responsibility, the applicability of res
ipsa loquitur against multiple defendants where there is more than one possible
agent or instrumentality of negligence [was] a question of first impression under
New York decisional law."49 The court noted that Corcoran had cited Ybarra,
and was therefore a "strong indication that the New York Court of Appeals
the owner of the abutting building was not a necessary party to the action since the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur would be proper against either or both ownes. Id. at 432-33, 227
N.E.2d at 307, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
40. Id. at 432, 227 N.E.2d at 306, 280 N.YS.2d at 389 (footnote omitted).
41. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). For materials concerning the application of rcs
Ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases see Adamnson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Rcs
Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950); Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who Should
Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy Part of His Body?, 1969 Utah L. Rev.
1; Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Case for Flexibility in Medical Malpractice, 16 Wayne
L. Rev. 1139 (1970); 56 Geo. L.J. 805 (1968).
42. 25 CaL 2d at 487-88, 154 P.2d at 688.
43. Id. at 492, 154 P2d at 691.
44. Id. at 492-93, 154 P2d at 690-91.
45. See Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R.R., 162 N.Y. 380, 56 N.E. 988 (1900).
46. Prosser § 39, at 222. But see Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 245 N.E.2d
388, 297 N.YS.2d 713 (1969).
47. 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
48. Id. at 693.
49. Id. For cases supporting the inference of negligence from the occurrence of a single
airplane crash see Citrola v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 Fa2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959); Lobel v.
American Airlines, Inc., 192 Fad 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952);
Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 245 N.E.2d 388, 297 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1969);
Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Serv., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N.YS. 251 (2d Dep't 1930) (mem.).
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would approve invocation of the doctrine in a case such as this one."50 The de-
fendants, the court stated, were the only parties arguably responsible for the
accident and therefore the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be applied against
both defendants.5 '
The Colditz court went on to acknowledge that under the majority rule, where
the defendant offers no explanation of the event, the jury should nevertheless
normally determine whether the inference of negligence is warranted. 2 The
court, however, cited George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York 8 which, although
it "squarely overruled prior authority that the court may direct a verdict [where
res ipsa is applied], left open the possibility that ' [t]here may be cases where the
prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence arising there-
from is inescapable if not rebutted by other evidence.' ,,54 In directing a verdict
against the defendant, the Colditz court thought it pointless to allow the jury to
decide the case primarily because "of the high probability ... of either opera-
tional negligence or defective functioning of the aircraft equipment for which
the carrier as well as the manufacturer is held strictly liable." r5
The effect of the Colditz decision with respect to multiple defendants should
seemingly be limited to cases where a higher duty of care is required on the part
of both defendants. A broad extension of the doctrine as implemented in Colditz
would, in addition to amending traditional rules of New York evidence, in effect
impose a stricter liability for negligence against all multiple defendants, where
previously such liability was incurred only where a special relationship existed
between the plaintiff and his carrier. The facilitation of plaintiff's burden of
proof would seem to be unjustified against all multiple defendants, and should
be limited in application to multiple defendants in circumstances only where a
higher degree of care is imposed on the defendant by substantive law.
The procedural effect given to res ipsa by the Colditz court created a legal
presumption of negligence rather than a permissible inference. The effect was to
place the burden upon the defendant to come forward with evidence sufficient to
negate the existence of the presumed fact, and the question of whether the
presumption was rebutted was therefore an issue for the court to decide. The
trier of fact was thereby precluded from rejecting the inference of negligence
since a presumption "requires that a particular inference must be drawn from an
ascertained state of facts."55 As the Colditz court indicated, the New York
Court of Appeals in Foltis did not preclude direction of a verdict where the
proof is so convincing that an inference of negligence is inescapable. 7 Thus the
50. 329 F. Supp. at 693.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 694.
53. 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941).
54. 329 F. Supp. at 694, quoting George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108,
121, 38 N.E.2d 455, 462 (1941).
55. Id.
56. Platt v. Elias, 186 N.Y. 374, 379, 79 N.E. 1, 2 (1906).
57. George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 121, 38 N.E.2d 455, 462
(1941).
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Colditz decision has extended the res ipsa doctrine beyond the present perimeter
of the law of New York and followed the Foltis dictum. This view is in accord
with several other jurisdictions55 which approve a directed verdict when "the
inference of negligence is so clear that no reasonable man could fail to accept
it .... ,59 The added effect given to res ipsa loquitur is justified because the
burden of explanation is imposed only when the trier of fact would be unreason-
able if it did not draw the permissible inference.
Securities Law-Rule I ob-5-Persons Not Corporate Insiders Censured for
Use of Non-Public Information.-Twelve respondents, all investment partner-
ships or investment advisers, received non-public information from a broker-
dealer concerning a sharp drop in Douglas Aircraft's forecasted earnings. The
respondents knew that the broker-dealer was the prospective managing under-
writer of that corporation's impending debenture offering and thereby had access
to this inside information.' When the respondents subsequently sold and short
sold the corporation's stock before the information became public,2 the Securities
and Exchange Commission's hearing examiner held3 that such acts by a "tippee"
were in violation of the anti-fraud provision of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19344 and Rule 10b-5.5 The Commission" reviewed the find-
58. E.g., Whitley v. Hix, 207 Tenn. 683, 343 S.W2d 851 (1961); Moore v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry, 28 Ill. App. 2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960).
59. Prosser § 40, at 230. "In other words, the procedural effect of a res ipsa case is a
matter of the strength of the inference to be drawn, which will vary with the circumstances
of the case." Id.
1. Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July
29, 1971) [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,163, at 80,515-16 [here-
inafter cited as SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267].
2. Id. at 80,516.
3. Id. at 80,515.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
The defendants were also found to be in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at
80,515. However, since the 1934 Act is the broader of the two statutes, and in "tippee"
cases a violation of section 17(a) will also constitute a violation of section 10(b), a discus-
sion of the latter will suffice.
6. It must be kept in mind that SEC decisions are quasi-judicial and do not carry the
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
ings on its own motion and affirmed, holding that the respondents were tippees
and subject to the same standard as corporate insiders concerning non-public,
undisclosed information. In finding violations7 of the statute, the Commission
comprehensively set forth the necessary elements for such a violation: 1) that
the information be material and non-public; 2) that the tippee, regardless of
whether he receives the information directly or indirectly, know or have reason
to know that the information is non-public and had been obtained improperly;
3) that this information be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction.8
The SEC did not, however, require that the defendant have a relationship with
the corporation, but said one would be inferred if the other elements were
present. Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 9267 (July 29, 1971) [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 78,163, at 80,514.
Prior to the passage of the federal securities acts in the 1930's, recovery was
rare in cases involving insider trading and undisclosed information. This was
partially due to the fact that the plaintiff was required to sue in common law
fraud and difficulty was often encountered in proving the requisite elements of
scienter, reliance and causation.' 0 However, recovery was occasionally granted
when "special facts"" could be shown or when the defendant was a fiduciary. 12
The inadequacy of these remedies to cope with the morass of stock manipula-
tions and frauds perpetrated during the 1920's prompted the passage10 of the
securities acts of 193314 and 1934.'r The intent of Congress in enacting the anti-
same weight as a court holding. However, the importance of the Commission's expert opinion
on securities law should not be underestimated as "it has developed many of the important
precedents in the area." 2. A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5 § 10.1,
at 234 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg].
7. The censuring of the defendants in this case serves as a strong warning that harsher
sanctions, such as suspension or revocation, may be imposed if similar violations occur In
the future. See 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (5) (1970).
8. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519.
9. Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 P. 879 (1914); Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho
464, 196 P. 208 (1921); O'Neile v. Ternes, 32 Wash. 528, 73 P. 692 (1903); see Cahall v.
Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 A. 224 (1921); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E.
659 (1933) ; Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1917) ; 3 L. Loss, Securities Reg-
ulation 1446-48 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 3 Loss].
10. 1 Bromberg § 2.7(1).
11. E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202
N.W. 955 (1925).
12. Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) ; accord, Oliver v. Oliver, 118
Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
13. 1 Bromberg § 2.2(100); see Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerg-
ing Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1120-21 (1950).
14. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970)).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970)).
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fraud provisions contained in these acts was to place the buyer and seller of
stocks in an equal bargaining position through complete disclosure.-1
The wording of the anti-fraud provisions, especially section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 is very broad, as is the language in Rule
10b-S established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942.18
When first promulgated, Rule 10b-S did not result in a great deal of contro-
versy. 19 It was used more frequently, however, once its potential as a remedy in
cases of insider trading had been recognized. -0 Although section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 apply to many disclosure violations, their impact on insider and tippee
trading involving non-public information has been felt most strongly in the past
decade.21
Cases which have dealt with this type of Rule 10b-5 violation have focused
on the issues of what persons fall under the ambit of Rule l0b-5- and whether
the information was material These questions were particularly significant in
Investors Management, although other issues were involved. ' For example,
the Commission was faced with the issues of whether the information was non-
public2 5 and whether the defendant had the required knowledge, actual or con-
structive, of that fact.26 In resolving these issues, the SEC comprehensively
enunciated the criteria it employed in reaching its conclusions. -'7
Prior to Investors Management, a definition of materiality had evolved in
the courts. Rule 10b-5 28 was held to be violated when an insider failed
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833, 847-49 "(2d Cir. 1968), crt.
denied, 394 US. 976 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co, 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963);
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1943), cert, denled, 321 US.
786 (1944); Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at
80,517. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 US.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 US.C. § 78(j)(b) (1970).
18. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental
Fim. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 993-94 (S.D. Fla. 1963). See generally SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.. 180 (1963). The text of the rule may be found at note 5
supra.
19. 1 Bromberg § 2.2(420).
20. 3 Loss 1448-56. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 803 (D. Del. 1951);
Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (ED. Pa. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798 (ED. Pa. 1947).
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 US. 180 (1963); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 394 US. 976 (1969);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (SD.N.Y. 1962); 1 Bromberg § 2.2(460).
22. See cases cited notes 42-61 infra.
23. See cases cited notes 28-41 infra.
24. See notes 75-90 infra and accompanying text.
25. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519-20; see cases cited notes
75-85 infra.
26. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,520-21; see cases cited notes 71-
77 infra.
27. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,514-15.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
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to disclose a material fact to a purchaser or seller in a stock transaction." This
rule was firmly established in the case of Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,80 where
the corporation offered to buy its own shares without disclosing its true in-
ventory. The court held that "[t]he rule is clear. It is unlawful for an in-
sider.., to purchase the stock... without disclosing material facts ... ."1 Until
recently, information was regarded to be material if a reasonable man would
have attached import to the information or if it would have affected his de-
termination to complete the stock transaction. 2 This reasonable man test has
been criticized by several commentators because it frequently presents a con-
fusing question of fact.83
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,3 4 the
question of materiality was one of the main issues. Here a few insiders knew that
a certain mining area had much greater potential than was publicly known.
Using this information, the insiders bought stock which subsequently rose in
value as the true potential of the mining strike became general knowledge.83
The district court defined material data as "information which, if known,
would clearly affect 'investment judgment'. . . ."30 The court went on to ex-
plain that this test must "necessarily be a conservative one, particularly since
many actions under section 10(b) are brought on the basis of hindsight."37
Using this construction of materiality, the lower court found that the undis-
closed facts did not become material until a certain date, before which pur-
chases by insiders did not violate the statute.,8 Instead of following this
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 St. John's L. Rev. 699,
710-13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Painter].
30. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
31. Id. at 828-29 (emphasis added).
32. John R. Lewis Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1971); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 803, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (ED. Pa. 1947). If the position is taken that the stock market Is a
collection of reasonable men a second, complementary test can be formulated: A "material
fact" is one which "would have a significant effect on the market price of the company's
stock." Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271, 1288 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Fleischer]; see In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961); Painter 712.
33. E.g., Fleischer 1289-90; Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Develop-
ment of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1368-69 (1965);
Painter 711.
34. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
35. Id. at 847.
36. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 281-85. The first test core was drilled on November 12, 1963. Between that time
and 7:00 P.M., April 9, 1964, the results of that drill core plus one other were held not to
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restrictive construction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court on this point and broadly construed the
reasonable man test of materiality to encompass "any fact... which... might
affect the value of the corporation's stock. . ."30 The court specifically stated
that this test would include "those facts which affect the probable future of the
company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or
hold the company's securities." 40 Such a construction is seemingly broad enough
to include all but the most trivial information. As one commentator viewed the
result of this holding, "materiality depends upon the facts of each case, retroac-
tively determined by the particular court in which you happen to be sued .... ,1
Therefore, prior to Investors Management the question of what facts were ma-
terial was uncertain at best, and practically indefinable if Texas Gulf Sulphur
was literally followed.
However, before the SEC in Investors Management could discuss the ele-
ments of an alleged violation, it had to find that the defendants as tippees
came within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.4 2 Although the traditional meaning of
"insider" included only those persons having a direct relationship with the
corporation-such as officers, directors, or controlling shareholders-the courts
in recent years have expanded this definition to include many more persons.43
A leading case where the coverage of Rule 10b-5 was at issue was In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.4 In this case defendant Robert Gintel, a broker-dealer, re-
ceived word from his associate, who was a member of the board of Curtis
Wright, of a dividend reduction by that corporation. Knowing that the news
had not yet become public, Gintel effected sales of 2,000 shares and short sales
of 5,000 shares.45 In holding that Gintel violated section 10(b) and Rule
be material, even though they were "unusually good and ... excited ...those who knew
about it." Id. at 282. The results were too remote "to have had any significant impact on the
market, i.e., to be deemed material." Id. at 283 (citation omitted). However, the completion
of a third drilling on April 9th was held to be material as it constituted "real evidence that a
body of commercially mineable ore might exisL" Id. at 282. Therefore, it was only after
April 9, 1964 that the defendants could violate Rule 10b-5. Id. at 285.
39. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 394
US. 976 (1969).
40. Id. (emphasis added). Using this construction, the court held the undisclosed informa-
tion to have been material as of November 12, 1963. All subsequent stock transactions by
those having knowledge were held to have violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 852.
41. Painter 711; see Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Symposium:
Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009, 1023-25 (1966) ; cf. Sandier & Conill, Texas
Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 225, 249 (1969).
42. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519.
43. See 3 Loss 1445; cases cited note 76 infra.
44. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act
Rule lob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 121 (1962).
45. 40 S.E.C. at 909. The SEC made no attempt to define public or non-public informa-
tion, since it was not at issue here with only the Board and Gintel knowing of the fact. See
notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text.
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lob-5, the Commission stated that the anti-fraud provisions covered "any per-
son," not simply corporate insiders such as officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders 4 6 The Cady, Roberts panel established a two part test to deter-
mine whether a particular defendant was covered by the statute. According to
this standard a court should look for
first, the existence of a relationship [between the defendant and the corporation]
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.47
The Commission concluded that Gintel had such a relationship with the cor-
poration through his business association with a director. 48 Moreover, his use
of the information was unfair, and therefore the duties normally charged to a
corporate insider would be "imposed" upon him as if he were an insider.40 Thus,
the SEC equated Gintel with a corporate insider since his relationship with the
corporation gave him access to inside information, although technically, no
traditional, 0 or direct relationship existed.
A few years later in Ross v. Licht,5 ' a federal district court relied heavily
on the test established by Cady, Roberts in determining that insiders also in-
cluded close family relations and friends of corporate insiders.52 More important,
the court held in the alternative that if these close friends were not "insiders"
they would at the very least be "tippees" and thereby "subject to the same duty
as insiders."58 Tippees were defined as "persons given information by insiders
in breach of trust."5 4
The definition of insider-and now tippee-liability was again broadened
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.55 Here the court concluded that a corporate
employee, other than an officer, could be considered an insider.5 0 Then the
court followed the lead of the alternative holding in Ross v. Licht by stating
that although the tippees were not defendants in the action, their conduct would
be "equally violative of the Rule" and "equally reprehensible" if the tippees
46. 40 S.E.C. at 911; see Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 Yale LJ. 1120, 1143 (1950). The Commission further pointed out that the
coverage of the anti-fraud provisions was very broad and included misleading and deceptive
activities not sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud. 40 S.E.C. at 910.
47. 40 S.E.C. at 912 (citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52. Id. at 409-10.
53. Id. at 410 (alternative holding).
54. Id.
55. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
56. Id. at 848.
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acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the material information was
undisclosed. 57
Thus, as these cases indicate, prior case law had created a definition of an
insider which went far beyond the traditional meaning but was still de-
pendent to some extent on the finding of a relationship between the insider
and the corporation. 59 Therefore, in holding that a tippee-or one who has no
relationship with the corporation-can violate Rule lOb-5, the SEC in Investors
Management went a step beyond previous decisions and expressly held what
had theretofore only been suggested.60 In order to abandon the relationship re-
quirement for tippees, the SEC had to create a new requirement-the second
element in a Rule lob-5 violation-that a tippee knew or had reason to know
that the information was non-public.0 ' The impact of this new requirement is
discussed below.0 2
The third element of a Rule lob-5 violation, as defined by the SEC in In-
vestors Management, is that the information given must be a factor in the
decision to buy or sell the stock.6 3 Although it was always necessary to allege
that the information influenced the transaction, this question has never been at
issue in prior cases since an inference usually arose that it was a factor in the
decision. This occurred once a defendant significantly changed his security
position in the corporation within a short time after receipt of the informa-
tion." Since defendants in prior lOb-5 cases invariably changed their positions
shortly after receipt of inside information, the resulting inference disposed of the
necessity of proving that the information precipitated the transaction.05
57. Id. at 852-53 (dictum). The court also held that an insider violated Rule 10b-S by
merely passing information on to tippees, even though the insider never bought or sold stock
himself. Id. at 852. In a companion case to Investors Management, the broker, Merrill, Lynch,
was separately held to be in violation of Rule lob-5 for passing the inside information to the
defendants. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Securities Exchange Act Releasse No.
8459 (Nov. 25, 1968) [1968-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,629, at 83,347.
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
59. However, some commentators have felt that the definition of insider had expanded
enough to "include any person with material information not disclosed to the public2 H.
Henn, Corporations § 298, at 600 (2d ed. 1970); see 3 Loss 1451. But cf. N. Lattin, Corpora-
tions § 85, at 324-25 (2d ed. 1971).
60. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,319.
61. Id.
62. See notes 86-98 infra and accompanying text.
63. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,522.
64. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961). Some cases state the
test of reliance as to whether a party to the transaction would have been influenced to act
differently if the information was fully disclosed. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 39S, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
65. See notes 99-101 infra and accompanying text. Such an inference was found in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961). This doctrine can also be used as evidence to
show the materiality of the information, since if the tippee acts immediately upon its receipt,
one could readily infer that at least the tippee considered it material. Id. at 911-12.
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Although the cases prior to Investors Management dealt in detail with various
elements of a 10b-5 violation, they did not give rise to a definitive formula which
could be generally applied to unforeseen factual situations. The need for such
a formula or outline became greater as this area of the law expanded. Therefore,
in an attempt to clarify the law, the Commissioners in Investors Management
first stated that a tippee did fall under Rule 10b-5, and next set out three con-
crete elements to guide a court in determining whether a violation has occurred."0
At the outset, the SEC relied heavily on prior cases to find that, as tippees, the
defendants fell under the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.O7 It reasoned
that the coverage of both the section and the rule was broad since the intent of the
anti-fraud provisions was to prevent a "wide variety of securities activities
which were found to have been improper in light of the statutory objectives."O8
Moreover, the Commission viewed prior case law, including Cady, Roberts, Ross
v. Licht and Texas Gulf Sulphur, as having indicated that tippees might be in
a position to violate Rule lOb-5.6
The SEC then defined the first element of a 10b-5 violation: that the infor-
mation be material and non-public. 70 Regarding materiality, the Commission
drew upon prior case law to establish a new test of materiality and set forth
factors to be considered in applying that test.71 The Commission held that a
fact was material if "it 'was of such importance that it could be expected to
affect the judgment of investors . to buy, sell or hold ... [and, i]f generally
known, . . .to affect materially the market price of the stock.' "12 Therefore,
the SEC modified the Texas Gulf Sulphur test 73 by substituting the words "ex-
pected to" and "affect materially" for "might affect." As a guide to determine
whether a particular set of facts would meet this test, the SEC enumerated some
of the parameters that a court should examine:
Among factors to be considered in determining whether information is material
are degree of its specificity, extent to which it differs from information previously
publicly disseminated, and its reliability in light of its nature and source and circum-
stances under which it was received. 74
Even though information is held to be material, the SEC's first element of a
lOb-5 violation will not be fulfilled unless the data is also non-public.76 Pre-
66. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,518-19.
67. Id. In particular the SEC stressed the persuasiveness of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
68. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,518.
69. Id. at 80,518-19.
70. Id. at 80,519.
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
74. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,514-15. Also, the recipient's
immediate action upon receipt of the information is evidence of its materiality. Id. at 80,515;
see Painter 711.
75. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519.
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viously, the requirement that the fact be non-public was easily fulfilled. In
most cases, the defendants who had this knowledge either as insiders or tippees
were few in number and all had a relationship of some sort with the corporation
corresponding to their knowledge.76 Therefore, in prior cases, information was
obviously non-public because it was usually possessed by a small coterie of cor-
porate insiders or their privies77 until, as the Texas Gulf Sulphur court pointed
out in dictum, "such information [was] effectively disclosed in a manner suf-
ficient to insure its availability to the investing public." 78 However, since the
information in Investors Management was made available to a substantially
greater number of investors-50 investment advisors-the question arose
whether the information had been given sufficient publicity. 9 Moreover, in view
of the Commission's holding that tippees who have no connection with the cor-
poration could be liable, coupled with the suggestion that innocent possession
and use of non-public information could also violate Rule 10b-5,sO the question
of what is public and what is not becomes crucial. A fact is obviously non-public
if it is only available to twenty people, but what of one hundred, one thousand,
or even ten thousand?8 ' The Commission did not attempt to draw a sharp
demarcation between public and non-public, but substantially restated the
Texas Gulf Sulphur dictum that: "Information is non-public when it has not
been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors generally."s
The SEC then applied this rule to a factual situation presented in Investors
Management. A few of the defendants had attended a luncheon of about fifty
professional investors where rumors spread of the drop in earnings of Douglas.P
The SEC observed that, according to its test, disclosure to this limited number
of investors could not amount to enough publicity to place investors generally
76. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cart. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (involving a small number of employees of the corporation); Kuehnert
v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 412 Fad 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (in-
volving a friend of the corporation's president); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (information known only by controlling family and close family friends); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (involving some directors and a con-
trolling shareholder); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (ElD. Pa. 1947)
(where the defendants were brothers holding half of the corporation's stock).
77. See, e.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959) (only insider was
corporation's president-general manager); Ross v. Iicht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(insiders were four brothers who owned and ran the corporation and their close family
friends); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (insiders were the
three directors of the corporation).
78. 401 F.2d at 854.
79. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519-20.
80. Id. at 80,519 n.18.
81. See Investors Management Co., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680 (June
26, 1970) [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f1 77,832, at 83,928 (preliminary
finding of facts and holding by Examiner Blair). Chief Examiner Blair noted that no defini-
tion of "non-public' had previously been determined by the courts or the SEC. Id. at 83,940.
82. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,S19 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 80,520.
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"in an equal position in the market place."8 4 Apparently, everyone who at-
tended the luncheon could have violated the rule if the other elements were
present. Therefore, although the Commission decided that knowledge by fifty
professional investors is not public knowledge, the decision does not indicate at
what point information would be deemed public in a case where the data was
more widely disseminated. Perhaps, as suggested by Commissioner Smith in his
concurring opinion, the majority's definition of what is non-public means any-
thing short of a public announcement. s5
The second element of the SEC's outline of a 10b-5 violation was that the
tippee "knew or had reason to know that the information was non-public and
had been obtained improperly . . . ,,s8 This scienter element was necessary in
view of the SEC's extension of the scope of Rule 10b-5 to include tippees.8 7 The
SEC did not include the requirement of proving a relationship between the cor-
poration and the tippee. This exclusion is more of a clarification than a step in a
new direction. In Cady, Roberts, the relationship required was one which gave
access to inside information from the corporation, not a technical relationship
with the corporation per se.88 The SEC stated essentially the same thing in
Investors Management, although now no relationship need be alleged at all.80
The Commission has clarified the relationship question by holding that "one
who obtains possession of material, non-public corporate information, which he
has reason to know emanates from a corporate source ... acquires a relation-
skip with respect to that information .... ,s0
Therefore, no actual connection or tie with the corporation need be proved
over and above the possession of inside information and the knowledge, actual
or constructive, of its non-publicity.9 ' It is the possession and knowledge that is
important, not the access to the information. In a footnote, the Commission
commented that responsibility might even lie when one comes into possession
innocently and then uses the information, if he has reason to know it is in-
tended to be confidential. 92 The SEC did explain, however, that the more remote
the defendant from the corporation, the greater the burden in proving the
requisite knowledge on his part, and that this "requisite knowledge" would be
84. Id.
85. Id. at 80,524 (concurring opinion). In dictum, the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur lent
strength to this "public announcement" theory. The court stated that, "at the minimum [the
defendant] should have waited until the news could resonably have been expected to appear
over the media of widest circulation, the Dow Jones board tape .... " 401 F.2d at 854. The
Commission in Cady, Roberts utilized a similar theory. 40 S.E.C. at 915.
86. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,520.
87. See id.
88. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
89. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,520.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. This broadening of the coverage of "any person" was foreshadowed in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, where the court held that any one in possession of material information came under
the rule. 401 F.2d at 848; see Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities
Marketplace, 30 Ohio St. LJ. 225, 238-39 (1969).
92. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,519 n.18.
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determined by "an examination of all the surrounding circumstances. ' Con-
sideration should be given to the nature of the information, how it was obtained,
who was the informant, and the tippee's sophistication in the area. Employing
this rationale, the Commission concluded that the defendants in this case pos-
sessed the requisite knowledge since the information was specific, all the de-
fendants had a high degree of sophistication concerning securities, and they all
knew the informant was an underwriter for the planned Douglas debenture.os
This new test is definite, and yet can flex with different situations.O For ex-
ample, harsh results may be avoided if courts in subsequent actions follow the
SEC's guideline in requiring a heavy burden of proof where tippees appear to
be remote from the source of information. 7 Now Rule lob-5 can cover any
person, insider or tippee, who has possession of inside information and knows or
has reason to know of its corporate source or that it was obtained improperly.0s
Finally, the SEC discussed its third element-that the information be a factor
in the defendant's investment decision 0 -- very briefly. The Commission simply
applied the inference which arises when one sells or buys stock having knowledge
of inside information,100 and stated that the respondents had failed to rebut
this inference. 1 '
93. Id. at 80,520.
94. Id. at 80,520-21.
95. Id. at 80,521.
96. The majority was concerned about a potential situation involving, eg, industrial
espionage or commercial bribery, and their construction of the statute was intended to include
such cases. IU. at 80,519 n.18.
97. Id. at 80,521.
98. In a concurring opinion, Commissioner Smith cautioned against this broadening of the
coverage of Rule lob-S. He argued that the law should focus on the people having some rela-
tionship with the corporation-its uInsiders and their privies"--and not mere possession.
Id. at 80,523 (concurring opinion); see In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Otherwise, the majority's holding could become too broad to be workable. Smith felt that
the tippee must at least know that the source of the information was the corporation and
"that the material non-public information became available to them in breach of a duty
owed to the corporation not to disclose or use [it]... .Y SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9267, at 80,521. The Commissioner concurred in holding the defendants liable,
however, since the defendants knew of the relationship between Merrill, Lynch and Douglas
(i.e. the corporate source), and Smith considered this element essential to the defendant's
violation. In essence, Smith wanted to return to a rule similar to that of Cady, Roberts where
some semblance of a corporate relationship was required. This criticism by Commlisoner
Smith has been suggested by one well known commentator. Painter 703-09. Painter suggested
that to be covered by Rule 10b-S, a person needs more than mere possession of non-public
facts, he needs "possession plus knowledge, actual or constructive, of [the] company source,
or knowledge that the information comes from someone in an 'acces' relationship to a
company source... ." Id. at 709.
99. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,522.
100. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. According to this inference, when a
person possesses inside information, it is deemed to be a factor in his decision if he im-
mediately changes his position upon receipt of such information. See note 65 supra.
101. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,522. The Commission noted
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By expressly holding that all tippees may be subject to section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the SEC has made a logical and welcome advance from the ra-
tionale employed in earlier cases. Moreover, by expressly including tippees
within the scope of 10(b) and 10b-5,10 2 the SEC has brought another area of
potential abuse under the strict anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.
Since a tippee can take unfair advantage of his superior knowledge in a securities
transaction as easily as a traditional insider can, the decision will certainly
further the congressional policy against all stock manipulations. Morever, the
SEC was able to effectuate this policy without radically departing from prior
case law. The express inclusion of tippees, who have no formal connection with
the corporation, advances rather than contradicts the rationale of cases like
Cady, Roberts, Ross v. Licht and Texas Gull Sulphur.
The SEC's three-step formula for evaluating possible 10b-5 violations should
also serve the intent of Congress10 3 by furnishing federal judges with an easily
ascertainable standard by which they may conclude sooner and with a greater
degree of certainty whether a particular set of facts amounts to unlawful
conduct. Again, the SEC wisely adhered to the spirit of previous decisions in
arriving at its formula, as most of the elements are at least suggested by prior
cases. The Commission's formula is a successful attempt to integrate many
factors which courts have been considering in interpreting Rule 10b-5 as a
standard of wide application. Therefore, Investors Management is a welcome
continuation of the judicial trend to stretch the borders of Rule 10b-510 4 to in-
clude the innumerable "manipulative or deceptive device [s] or contrivance [s] '1105
in securities transactions, which Congress sought to abolish. Moreover, this
that the hearing examiner had dismissed the proceedings with respect to one respon-
dent (Investors Management Co., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680 (June 26,
1970) [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,832, at 83,961), crediting its
defense that the employee who received the Merrill, Lynch information did not inform his
superior that that information constituted the basis of his recommendation to sell the firm's
Douglas holdings. Id. n.28. However, the Commission cautioned that "in future cases we
[will] view as suspect and subject to close scrutiny a defense that there was no Internal
communication of material non-public information and its source by a member of a broker-
dealer firm or other investment organization who received it, where a transaction of the kind
indicated by it was effected by his organization immediately or closely thereafter." Id.
102. Id. at 80,519.
103. "'The concept of a free and open market for securities necessarily implies that the
buyer and seller are acting in the exercise of enlightened judgment as to what constitutes a
fair price. Insofar as the judgment is warped by false, inaccurate, or incomplete information
regarding the corporation, the market price fails to reflect the normal operation of supply
and demand.'" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 80,517, quoting S, Rep. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
104. This trend has been followed in such recent cases as Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795 (D. Del. 1970).
105. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); see Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
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trend indicates that the federal courts are likely to accept the SEC's formula-
tion as a rule of thumb for future decisions. 06
Securities Regulation-Investment Company Act of 1940-Mutual Funds
-Investment Adviseres Sale of Influence to Secure Appointment of Suc-
cessor Held Breach of Common Law Fiduciary Obligations and Section
15 (a) .- Plaintiffs were shareholders of the Lazard Fund, Inc., a mutual fund
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.' In 1967, Lazard Freres
& Co., an investment banking firm which had organized the Fund and had
thereafter acted as its adviser, sought to terminate its advisory contract.2 To
achieve this end it entered into a series of agreements with Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. The first of these provided for the replacement of Lazard as adviser by a
Dun & Bradstreet subsidiary.3 In a separate agreement it was specified that
Lazard would receive 75,000 shares of Dun & Bradstreet common stock in
return for certain continuing advisory services and for a period of noncompeti-
tion in the mutual fund industry. This exchange was conditioned, however, upon
shareholder approval of the new advisory contract, as required by section 15(a)
of the Act.4 Approval was thereafter secured and the agreements effected.
Plaintiffs brought this derivative action for an accounting, alleging that the
value of the Dun and Bradstreet common stock5 was far in excess of that of
106. See cases cited note 104 supra; accord, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
1. Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 StaL 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1970).
2. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir. 1971) petition for cert. filed sub nora.
Lazard Freres & Co. v. Rosenfeld, 40 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1971) (No. 71-771). At
this time the Fund was experiencing a shrinkage due to accumulating redemptions. Lazard
felt that these losses could be offset, and the best interests of Fund shareholders thereby ad-
vanced, by a continuous offering of Fund shares. As it was not in keeping with Lazard's
"traditional policies" to establish the organization necessary to carry out such a project, it
accordingly decided to withdraw altogether from the mutual fund industry. Id.
3. The mechanics of this replacement were as follows: Bloody's Investors Service, Inc.,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., would organize Bloody's Capital Fund,
Inc., a shell corporation with nominal capital, which would be merged with the Fund on a
share-for-share basis; the new fund's adviser would be Moody's Advisors & Distributors,
Inc., which was in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bloody's Investors Service, Inc. Id.
4. Section 15 provides in part that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to serve or
act as investment adviser of a registered investment company, except pursuant to a written
contract . . . approved by the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of
such registered company . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970). Section 2(a) (28) of the Act
defines the term person to include "a natural person or a company." Id. § 80a-2(a)(28)
(1970).
5. Plaintiffs' allegations that Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. common stock was selling over the
counter for more than $37 per share at the time of the signing of the agreements was not
disputed. 445 F.2d at 1340. Its market value of nearly $3,000,000, or $600,000 per year for
the five year period of noncompetition, is compared in plaintiffs' appeal brief to the $500,000
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Lazard's obligations and that the stock was actually given in consideration of
Lazard's assistance in bringing about the appointment of the new adviser-in
effect a sale of office." The district court granted summary judgment upon defen-
dants' motion.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that a sale of influence by an investment adviser in
obtaining shareholder approval of its successor violates common law fiduciary
duties which were impliedly incorporated into section 15(a) of the Investment
Company Act. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Lazard Freres & Co. v. Rosenfeld, 40 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S.
Dec. 10, 1971) (No. 71-771).
It is well settled that with respect to mutual fund shareholders, the invest-
ment adviser stands as a fiduciary.8 However, in the words of the late Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it
gives direction to further inquiry.... What obligations does he owe as a fidu-
ciary?"9 Those obligations owed by the investment adviser are found in the
common law by analogizing the adviser's role to that of the trustee, partner or
joint venturer, and corporate director.10 They are also found in the Investment
Company Act to the extent that it imposes new duties, and incorporates those
which existed prior to its enactment."
A reading of the reports of both houses on the hearings which preceded the
Act's enactment reveals congressional concern with, among other abuses, the
"trafficking in control" of investment companies which had by that time
become flagrant.' This concern is reflected in the policy statement of the Act,
which had been Lazard's average annual advisory fee. Brief for Appellants at 8, Rosenfeld v.
Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). The immediate value of the shares to Lazard was
reduced somewhat, however, by virtue of an escrow arrangement which provided that the
shares would be released in agreed upon installments and that they would not earn dividends
until their release. 445 F.2d at 1340.
6. Id. at 1341-42. Plaintiffs also made proxy fraud claims alleging that defendants' proxy
statement did not fairly summarize the agreement between Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. and
Lazard in that it had failed to represent that the 75,000 shares of common stock were being
passed to Lazard at least in part as consideration for the use of its influence, and in that the
presentation of the shares as having only $1 par value "not only gave the stockholders no
conception of how much Lazard was obtaining but tended to mislead them." Id. at 1349.
7. Rosenfeld v. Black, 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.
1971).
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963), citing
Professor Loss' reference to "the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory rela-
tionship." 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1412 (2d ed. 1961). See also SEC v. Insurance
Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
9. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
10. See, e.g., H. Henn, Corporations § 235 (2d ed. 1970).
11. See Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 266, 269 & n.9 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt. 1, at 38 (1940) (statement of Robert E. 'Healy, Comm'r,
SEC); S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7-8 (1940); H.R. Rep. No. 2639,
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section 1 (b), subsection 6 of which declares that the interests of investors are
adversely affected "when the control or management [of investment companies]
is transferred, without the consent of their security holders ... ."3 Section 15
therefore mandates a written advisory contract which "provides, in substance,
for its automatic termination in the event of its assignment 1 4 by the investment
adviser. Such contracts must be approved by the shareholders of the investment
company.15 Beyond these provisions, the Act is devoid of explicit reference to
the transfer of advisory contracts. Apparently the sentiment in Congress was
that given these safeguards, advisory contracts would cease to be marketable. 0
In recent years, however, judicial' 7 and scholarly' s attention has focused upon
an increasing number of transactions in which "sales" are alleged to have oc-
curred. In this context essentially two positions have evolved. Proponents of
the first argue that in any case of an alleged sale, whether of the advisory office
itself" or of influence20 in securing the approval of an advisory successor, the
only matter cognizable under the Act is the fact of approval.2' As the district
court said in granting summary judgment in the instant case: "[Wlhere... a
majority of the stockholders approve a new advisory contract... the manage-
ment's conduct in arranging such a substitution does not violate the Act, re-
gardless how it is labelled.122 Opponents of this theory, on the other hand,
76th Cong., 3d Sess., 7-9 (1940). See generally SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies pt. II (1940).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(6) (1970).
14. Id. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970). The term assignment includes "any direct or indirect
transfer . . . of a contract ... by the assignor, or of a controlling block of the assignor's
outstanding voting securities by a security holder of the assignor . .. ."' Id. § 80a-2(a)(4)
(1970).
15. Id. § 8oa-15(a) (1970).
16. See generally Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
17. See SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 651 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 823 (1958); Goodman v. Von Der Heyde, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ff 92,541, at 98,490 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1969) (mem.); Rome v. Archer, 41 Dal. Ch.
404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Krieger v. Anderson, 40 DeL Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
18. See, e.g., Comment, Termination of Management Contracts Under The Investment
Company Act of 1940, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 733 (1963), wherein the commentator states:
"Transactions in control are becoming more commonplace and the efficacy of the termination
provisions will undoubtedly attract increasing attention." Id. at 742 (footnote omitted).
19. A sale of the advisory office itself was alleged in SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.,
254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958). See text accompanying notes 36,
37 & 38 infra.
20. While plaintiffs had framed their complaint in terms of a sale of office, the court in
Rosenfeld v. Black rendered its decision with respect to a sale of influence. See text accom-
panying notes 1-7 supra.
21. See, e.g., Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act: Problems Relating to Investment
Advisory Contracts, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1034-35 (1959).
22. 319 F. Supp. at 897.
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maintain that, as fiduciaries, investment advisers are required to abstain from
certain kinds of conduct while assisting in the determination of their succes-
sors.2 3 They claim that a "narrow and preemptive view" of the Act, such as
that expressed above, would abrogate the common law rights of shareholders
which the Act, as remedial legislation, should be liberally construed to incor-
porate.2 Advocates of this view point to subsection 2 of section 1(b) which
states that the interests of investors are likewise adversely affected
when investment companies are organized, operated, [and] managed ... in the interests
of directors, officers [and] investment advisers .. rather than in the interests of all
classes of such companies' securities holders.25
A sale of office or of influence, it is maintained, is an instance of this sort of
impropriety, and one which the Act ought to be interpreted to eliminate. 20
The controversy itself is of fairly recent origin.27 In 1942 the Securities and
Exchange Commission issued a release28 stating that receipt of consideration
for the transfer of an advisory contract, whatever the form of the transaction,
would constitute a "gross abuse of trust" under section 3620 of the Act. Not
until 1956, however, was such a transfer challenged under that section. 0
23. 445 F.2d at 1345; cf. Comment, Mutual Funds and the Investment Advisory Con-
tract, 50 Va. L. Rev. 141, 150-55 (1964).
24. Comment, Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-
Corporation Control, 68 Yale L.j. 113, 116 (1958); see Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund
Litigation-New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 73, 101-04
(1962); Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 266, 269-72 (1959); Comment, Termination of Management
Contracts Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 733, 741-42
(1963); Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 376, 378-9 (1959).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(2) (1970). This section is cited by the proponents of liberal
application of section 15 and section 36 remedies. See note 24 supra.
26. See note 24 supra. Section 1(b) concludes with the declaration that the "policy and
purposes of this subchapter, in accordance with which the provisions of this subchapter shall
be interpreted, are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enu-
merated in this section which adversely affect the national public interest and the Interest
of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1970).
27. In fact, mutual fund litigation on the whole is a phenomenon of the recent past. See
Eisenberg & Phillips, supra note 24, at 74.
28. Opinion of the General Counsel, Investment Company Act Release No. 354 (May 11,
1942).
29. Section 36, as it then read, provided that: "The Commission is authorized to bring
an action . . . alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the following
capacities has been guilty . . . of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust in respect of any
registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts: (1) as . .. Invest-
ment adviser . . . ." Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, tit. 1, 54 Stat. 789, 841, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
30. SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d
642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
Indeed, until that date, with the exception of Aldred Investment Trust v. SEC,"1
a First Circuit case decided in 1945, no court had ever applied section 36.32
In Aldred, the trustees of a common law trust were found guilty of "gross
abuse of trust" for having surreptitiously altered their investment policy in
order to acquire controlling interest in a race track. The court stated that sec-
tion (1) (b) of the Act "in effect codifies the fiduciary obligations placed upon
officers and directors of investment companies 'a3 and that such fiduciary
obligations had been calculatedly denied.3 4 Consequently, it was held that the
defendants could properly be enjoined from serving as officers and trustees, and
further, that the appointment of a receiver was appropriate, since section 36
"invokes the equity power of the Federal Court .. to do justice and grant
full relief." 35
The SEC seized upon this language in SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.,30
alleging that the sale of a controlling block of shares by the corporate adviser
of a mutual fund for a premium far above the net asset value of shares trans-
ferred was violative of "historic equitable principles" and hence-under the
authority of Aldred-a "gross abuse of trust" within the meaning of section
301 The Ninth Circuit, while not commenting directly upon the Aldred case,
assailed the SEC's position upon two fronts. The court first dealt with the two
equitable principles allegedly violated by the defendants:
One of these is that a personal trustee, corporate officer or director, or other person
standing in a fiduciary relationship with another, may not sell or transfer such office
for personal gain.
The second principle .. is that a person occupying a fiduciary relationship with
another will not be permitted to exploit such relationship for personal gain, and in such
manner as to deprive the other of assets to which he is entitled. 38
Discussing these equitable principles, the court reasoned first that, in view of the
automatic termination clause in the Act (section 15(a) (4)) the office of invest-
ment adviser was categorically incapable of being sold or transferred-for any
attempt to do such would end the contract and its accompanying obligations3
31. 151 F.2d 254 (Ist Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
32. 146 F. Supp. at 781 n.9. The court stated that "[t]he only case cited by SEC involving
the application of Section 36 (and indeed the only case we have been able to find) is Aldred
Investment Trust v. Securities and Exchange Comm ... ." Id. (citation omitted).
33. 151 F.2d at 260.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 261.
36. 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
37. Id. at 649.
38. Id. at 650.
39. Id. This argument has been characterized by the SEC as "unrealistic". Report of the
SEC on Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 150-52 (1966). As one commentator has put it, although "operation of
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Further, the court found that the price received for the controlling stock in
excess of its net asset value could not constitute an asset of the fund. 40
In its other approach, the court concluded that section 36 was inapplicable
because section 15, which deals expressly with the matter of advisory contracts,
did not forbid the questioned conduct. 41 In turn the court assumed that section
15 had not been violated because, like section 1(b), it was entirely silent as to
the "price paid for the transfer of control.' 42
With respect to this argument, absence of affirmative language did not fore-
stall the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, from finding in Brown v. BulloCk40
that section 15 compels a standard of fiduciary conduct not lower than that
"prevailing generally." 44 The court based this conclusion upon section 1 (b) (2)'s
declared intent to reverse conditions whereby "investment companies are orga-
nized, operated, managed . . . in the interest of .. . investment advisers . . .
rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security hold-
ers . . . ."4 The court held that the requirement of section 15(a) of at least
annual directorial approval (in lieu of that of a majority of the outstanding
security holders) of the advisory contract4" requires "not merely ceremonial
performance of the act of approval but its performance in a meaningful
fashion . . .. 47
Much of the reasoning of Brown was carried into the Rosenfeld case. Recall-
ing its finding in Brown of an implied "uniform federal standard of directorial
responsibility"" under provisions of section 15, the Second Circuit stated in
Rosenfeld that:
section 15(a) (4) . . . theoretically ended the fiduciary relationship . . . the renewal of the
contract was a manifestation of the dominance and control over the investors upon which
the director-defendants' fiduciary status was based." Comment, Protecting the Interests of
Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-Corporation Control, 68 Yale L.J. 113,
125 (footnote omitted); see Note, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre
Dame Law. 732, 962 (1969).
40. 254 F.2d at 651; see text accompanying notes 57 & 58 infra.
41. 254 F.2d at 649 n.12. The court said: 'Under § 15 of the act, a service contract
which had been automatically terminated under paragraph (a) (4) can be reinstated by a
vote of the investors. No exception is made in the case of an assignment in connection with
which a substantial consideration was received in excess of net asset value. If this is per-
missible under § 15, it ought not to be subject to injunctive restraint under § 36." Id.
42. 254 F.2d at 649.
43. 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (en banc).
44. Id. at 421.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2) (1970).
46. Section 15(a) (2) provides that the service contract "shall continue in effect for a
period more than two years from the date of its execution, only so long as such continuance
is specifically approved at least annually by the board of directors or by vote of a majority
of the outstanding voting securities of such company . . . ." Id. § 80a-15(a) (2).
47. 294 F.2d at 420-21.
48. 445 F.2d at 1345.
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[i]t is wholly consistent with that view to say that when Congress [in § 15(a)] re-
quired stockholder approval of a contract with a new investment adviser, it intended
that the retiring adviser's use of the proxy machinery to procure appointment of the
new adviser must conform to the standards of abnegation of personal gain that equity
had long imposed.49
Hence the court's application of what it referred to as "the established pro-
phylactic rule."'r5 As its terms suggest, its rationale is one of prevention: 5'
"Possibility of profit" is foreclosed the adviser because given such possibility,
"the retiring adviser might recommend a successor who [is] less qualified or
more expensive than other candidates, and who might be on the lookout for
ways to recoup his 'succession fee' at the expense of the Fund."5 2
Actually, the rule employed by the Rosenfeld court is one which equity had
long imposed upon corporate directors53 and trustees.5 The decision in Rosen-
feld breaks new ground in the establishment of, in this instance, a trust relation-
ship as between the investment adviser and fund shareholders. Here the adviser
is conceived of as managing fund investments "quite as a trustee would do."55
Consequently he is found to owe a trustee's obligations. 0 A concomitant of this
finding is the court's refutation of the argument advanced in Insurance Secu-
rities that the "premium?' paid for controlling shares was not improper because
it was not a fund asset.r 7 In Rosenfeld the question of whose asset the adviser
receives is considered inapt.
49. Id.
50. Id.
5L The court pointed out that the prophylactic rationale is one of "removing the
temptation for the outgoing adviser to use his influence to recommend a successor, one of
whose qualifications is willingness to compensate the retiring adviser for his help ... ." Id.
at 1346 n.12. As another court has put it, the rule "does not rest upon the narrow ground
of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation,
extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the
fiduciary relation." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 DeL Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. CL 1939).
52. 445 F.2d at 1345 (footnote omitted).
53. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1962); Kratzer v.
Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926); Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968);
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't), atfd mem., 14
N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.YS.2d 877 (1964) ; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A.
428 (1914); Gaskell v. Chambers, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1858).
54. See, e.g., Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (1876); Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep.
620 (Ch. 1856).
55. 445 F.2d at 1343 (footnote omitted).
56. See Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under The Investment Company Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 266, 269 (1959), wherein the author states with reference to
section 1(b) that "the basic tenets underlying the law of trusts and trusteeship can be un-
mistakably recognized in the admonition of this declaration of policy." Id.
57. 445 F.2d at 1343. The "premium" was characterized in the Ninth Circuit's opinion
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It is wholly immaterial that the prospect of receiving future management fees if it
had continued as an adviser would have been an asset of Lazard rather than of the
Fund; the same would be true of a trustee's right to receive future commissions .... 8
Moreover, the standard of conduct prescribed is found to be mandated by
section 15 rather than by section 36. 9 This comes as somewhat of a surprise,
for in the past the argument had always been waged in terms of the latter
provision. 0 "Words and remedies," the court points out, "such as [those in
section 36] were dearly addressed to highly reprehensible conduct . . . we
would not dream of suggesting, much less holding, that [the defendants' ]
actions were so culpable."'O Assuming that the conduct countenanced in Insur-
ance Securities was no more "reprehensible" than that prohibited in Rosenfeld,
it would seem logical to conclude that in terms of section 36 a similar result
would have been reached in the Second Circuit had the Insurance Securities
facts been before that court.6 2 Beyond this, however, and despite pains taken
by the Second Circuit to distinguish the two cases,0 3 they seem irreconciliable.
as a reflection of "the value which the [adviser] does and will derive from the (advisoryl
fees paid, and expected to be paid, by Trust Fund." 254 F.2d at 646 (footnote omitted).
58. 445 F.2d at 1343.
59. Speaking of the SEC's recent Investment Company Report, the court acknowledged
that "[tlhe SEC's belief that the unamended Act did not adequately protect fund share-
holders against sales of the management organization rested upon a realistic assessment
of its own power under § 36 . . . ." Id. at 1348.
60. Indeed, plaintiffs in both the Insurance Securities and Rosenfeld cases sought recovery
under the Act solely in terms of section 36. 254 F.2d at 644; Brief for Appellants at 24,
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). Although section 36, both in its original
form and as tLmended, provides only that "[tihe Commission is authorized to bring an
action .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970) that section and others in the Act have been con-
strued as implying a private right of action for fund shareholders. See Brown v. Bullock, 294
F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Taussig v. Wellng-
ton Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 806 (1963); Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Contra, Brouk v.
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 369 U.S. 424
(1962).
61. 445 F.2d at 1346 (citations omitted).
62. The court's analysis and findings with respect to section 36 of the Act are academic
not only because higher standards of conduct are found to be imposed elsewhere in the Act
but also because, as the court notes, the section had been amended by the time its decision
was handed down. Id. at 1348. Section 36 reads, in its present form, as follows: "The Com-
mission is authorized to bring an action . . . alleging that a person serving or acting in one
or more of the following capacities has engaged . . . in any act or practice constituting a
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered Invest-
ment company for which such person so serves or acts-(1) as . . . investment ad-
viser . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970). With respect to the amended section, the court
speculated that "Congress could well have thought it had handled the problem created by
the Insurance Securities decision by expanding the SEC's powers under § 36 .... " 445 F.2d
at 1348.
63. The Rosenfeld court stated that "we do not find it necessary at this time to determine
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The Rosenfeld decision speaks throughout of "profit" received by the retiring
adviser in exchange for the exercise of influence, whereas it has been argued that
influence was not a factor in Insurance SecuritiesY" Even assuming the truth of
this, if it is postulated that control of the proxy machinery is virtually tanta-
mount to acquisition of shareholder approval of the advisory contract of the
controlling party,6 5 then this distinction disappears. What is being paid for in
both cases is simply the opportunity to accede to the managerial position with
its concurrent advantages. This so, there remains, as between the two cases,
only that distinction which consists of the manner in which the retiring ad-
viser's "profit" is distributed to it. Under the prophylactic rule, however, if one
simply may not profit, the question of how one may profit is of course not
reached. 6 It seems therefore that the Rosenfeld decision leaves little chance for
retiring management to derive compensation for the "'elements of value in the
[managerial] relationship which they may have built up over the years' '"-- a
condition which has caused, to say the least, concern in the mutual fund in-
dustry.68 Perhaps this reaction may best be met with the wisdom of one whose
whether the difference between a transaction such as that here before us and the sale of a
controlling block in a corporate adviser at a price reflecting the expectation of profits under
a renewed contract with the corporation which the sellers were to aid in procuring, is suffi-
ciently substantial to warrant a different result in this latter case . .. " 445 F.2d at 1346.
64. Plaintiffs in the Rosenfeld case made this argument in order to distinguish the Insur-
ance Securities case and thereby avoid the obvious onus of falling under its rule. Brief for
Appellants at 28-29, Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 Fa2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). However, it does
appear that influence was in fact exercised by the outgoing adviser in Insurance Securities.
See Comment, Protecting the Interests of Mlutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-
Corporation Control, 68 Yale L.J., 113, 118 n.13 & n.16 (1958). The author states that
"[t]he sale of control did not occur until after the transferors had utilized the investment
organization's proxy machinery to frame the reinstatement issue, comment favorably upon
the purchasers of control, solicit investor votes, and recommend the renewal of the service
contract." Id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
65. According to Professor Loss, "[tlhe widespread distribution of corporate securities with
the concomitant separation of ownership and management, puts the entire concept of the
stockholders' meeting at the mercy of the proxy instruments." 2 L. Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 857-58 (2d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted).
66. The court in a note made reference to an article by Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Invest-
ment Company Act: Problems Relating to Investment Advisory Contracts, 45 Va. L. Rev.
1023, 1030-34 (1959), in which the author had explored "[s]ome difficulties in applying the
principle prohibiting profit in the transfer of advisory office to the sale of controlling stock
in a corporate investment adviser.. . ." The court characterized Professor Jaretzki's criti-
cisms as "inapposite" even in a sale of stock situation because it had based its decision upon
a "prophylactic rationale" rather than section 36. 445 F.2d at 1346 n.12.
67. 445 F.2d at 1347 (footnote omitted).
68. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, § 3, at 3, cols. 1-5, in which the situation was
labelled "a new and fundamental crisis." According to the Times: "Analysts calculate that
among the consequences potential damages could be assessed on the industry as a whole at
upwards of $100-million." The Times also quoted SEC Chairman William J. Casey as having
said that "if this decision stands so that anybody starting a new mutual fund or manage-
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lead Judge Friendly has seen fit to follow; one whose oft repeated words bear
repeating once again.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.... Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate00
ment company will have no prospect of building up any equity, I would think it would
effectively stop people from starting new companies ... ." Id.
69. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 54S, 946 (1928) (Cardozo, 3.).
